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ABSTR AC T
‘Securitization and the Global Market’ presents a thorough investigation into the 
evolution of securitization and its adaptation to the international market. Additionally, 
we provide some insight into its future applications. Securitization is a relatively new 
form of financial intermediation, which allows the three functions of financing — 
origination, funding and servicing — to be separated and each placed with the most 
efficient provider. Since this method of financing promotes efficiency in the financial 
markets, it has shown remarkable growth in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, 
France and Australia.
The thesis explains how mortgage-backed securitization evolved in the United States 
and how this method of housing finance is being integrated into international markets. 
Additionally, we explain how securitization is used to fund receivables other than 
mortgages.
Because we address cross-currency transactions, we also discuss foreign exchange rate 
risk management by reviewing the history, development and application of financial 
products used in hedging various risks. Also a review of mortgage-prepayment 
modelling is presented, because prepayment creates the most uncertainty in the cash 
flow that is to be hedged.
Using the evidence presented in this thesis, the final chapter argues for the creation of 
a multicurrency sterling collateralised mortgage obligation. This product can serve to 
aid the development of the global market via securitization—a proven method of financial 
intermediation.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to provide the reader with a thorough understanding of 
securitization and its potential application in developing the global market. 
Securitization is a relatively new form of financial intermediation which was developed 
in the United States and is currently being used in most industrialized nations. As this 
method of financial intermediation evolves, it will enhance the efficiency of the global 
market. Securitization isolates the three functions of financial intermediation — 
origination, servicing and funding — and allows each to be handled by the most efficient 
provider. Just as securitization has excelled in the United States by serving as an efficient 
conduit for transferring funds across state borders, so can it serve as an effective method 
of transferring funds between nations.
To show how this process works, we develop an hypothetical instrument that we call a 
multicurrency collateralised mortgage obligation. At the time of writing, multicurrency 
securitization instruments do not exist, but we shall argue for their creation. This study 
focuses on just one instrument, but the methodology presented is not limited to UK 
mortgage-backed securities. Our model could be applied to any type of securitized debt 
instrument, regardless of the country of origin or type of underlying security. For 
illustrative purposes, we have chosen the UK because this country’s mortgage-backed 
securities market represents the largest and fastest-growing market in Europe.
The multicurrency aspect of this research is used to derive a cost-effective hedge against 
the risk of fluctuations in the foreign exchange rate. Once funds are allowed to flow
10
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freely across national boundaries without foreign exchange rate risk, multinational 
securitized products could be developed. This study provides a method of financing that 
can serve as a conduit to enhance the efficiency of global financial markets. Market 
efficiency is enhanced when a financial instrument is capable of tapping multiple capital 
markets without exposing investors or underwriters to exchange rate risk. Additionally, 
we have found that there is a lack of research on hedging long-term stochastic1 cash 
flow, and our thesis will expand this body of knowledge.
The dissertation is divided into ten chapters, this chapter being the introduction. Chapter 
2 examines the origin of the mortgage-backed security (MBS), reviewing its history and 
development in the United States of America. Chapter 3 discusses the global 
development of MBS, reviewing the countries that have adopted them and showing how 
social norms have been integrated into the MBS structure. Chapter 4 explains how this 
method of financial intermediation has expanded to include other products. Once we 
have established the significance of securitized debt instruments in the international 
financial community, Chapter 5 will review the history and development of the futures 
markets. This chapter gives the reader a fundamental understanding of the elements 
used to develop the foreign exchange rate hedging instruments that are reviewed in 
Chapter 6. Next, problems in hedging MBS are discussed in Chapter 7. To stress the 
complexities involved in hedging MBS, we critique an hedging methodology offered 
by Salomon Brothers Inc. in the next chapter, Chapter 8. Chapter 9 presents our
1A stochastic process is a statistically random sequentially process in which the probability of each step depends on the 
outcome o f previous steps.
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multicurrency collateralised mortgage obligation, which provides an economical and 
functional structure for hedging foreign exchange rate risk associated with MBS. This 
dissertation will conclude with Chapter 10.
12
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CHAPTER 2 
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES: ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITY
A general term describing a capital market instrument issued from a special 
purpose company whose assets consist primarily of mortgages.
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the origins, development and structure of 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS). MBS evolved from the United States’ complex, but 
efficient, mortgage market. To demonstrate the significance these financial instruments 
play in the US economy, we will describe how this system works. It is important to 
understand how the US market is unlike the traditional UK mortgage market, in that US 
mortgages receive government support and are traded on a secondary market.2 Even 
with these fundamental differences, securitization is being used successfully in both 
markets.
The first Section, 2.1, gives a brief history of the evolution of mortgage-backed securities. 
The following Section, 2.2, describes the federal and quasi-federal government 
organizations which participate in and support the US mortgage market. Section 2.3 
examines the structures and characteristics of the various instruments that are traded in 
the secondary mortgage market and provides a table with definitions of technical terms. 
Section 2.4 discusses the effects that market changes have had on credit supply for US 
housing finance, and the final section will summarise this chapter.
2 The term ‘secondary market’ refers to the trading of existing mortgages after origination.
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2.1 The Beginnings of the Mortgage-Backed Security
The origins of housing finance can be traced to the late Roman Empire, where the 
concept evolved of exchanging property rights for money (pignus). Under this legal 
structure, land was obligated in lieu of transfer of title. Following the demise of the 
Roman Empire, Germanic law developed the concept of using land as a security deposit 
This contract was called a gage. Later, when William of Normandy introduced the 
Germanic system into English law, the French word mort ("dead” or "frozen") was 
combined with gage to describe a "locked pledge," or mort-gage on property.
US mortgage-banks are the primary originators of mortgages that are securitised. Their 
origin is to be found in the nineteenth century, when mortgage lenders funded US 
Midwest farmers by selling debenture bonds to insurance companies. Farms were the 
dominant type of residential housing in the US that represented any significant value. 
By 1900 there existed approximately $4 billion worth of farm mortgages outstanding, 
originated by 200 mortgage companies.
During the roaring twenties the real estate market boomed, with appreciation ranging 
from 50 per cent to 75 per annum. This fuelled the demand for a secondary mortgage 
market, where mortgage bankers would sell short-term mortgage participation bonds 
in units of $500 to $1,000 to retail investors. The mortgages paid interest only with 
maturities ranging from one to five years and were held by a trustee who would service 
the loans. In the event of default, the trustee would foreclose on the property.
In 1929, the real estate market crashed along with the stock market. The fall in the 
stock market wiped out a considerable amount of the liquidity in the financial markets,
14
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which directly affected the funds available for mortgages. As funding sources for real 
estate dried up, the mortgagors were unable to roll-over their short term mortgages. 
This spurred foreclosures which flooded the depressed real estate market with new 
property, helping to drive down prices. Mortgage bankers wrongly assumed that in the 
event of foreclosure, the sale of the property would more than offset the mortgage debt. 
As a result of this error in judgement, virtually all these mortgage companies went 
bankrupt.
In an attempt to stabilise the economy in 1933, the federal government established the 
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC). This organisation sold 
government-guaranteed bonds, the proceeds of which were used to refinance defaulted 
mortgages. HOLC was the first major lending institution to grant long term amortising3 
loans with monthly payments. By amortising the loan, borrowers are able to make low 
monthly payments over long periods (normally 30 years in the US), making mortgages 
more affordable. HOLC helped a million families to save their homes within the first 
three years of its existence.
In response to the continued demand for residential housing finance caused by the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, the US government created the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) in 1934. Its purpose was
1. to encourage the improvement of the nation’s housing standards and conditions;
2. to provide an adequate home financing system;
3. to exert a stabilising influence on mortgage and residential real estate markets.
3 Amortisation refers to the reduction o f debt by regular payment of interest and principal sufficient to pay off a loan by 
maturity.
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The FHA stimulated and continues to support primary market activity by offering 
lending institutions strong incentives to lend their funds to home buyers. The FHA 
establishes lending standards and offers an insurance programme that protects lenders 
from losses due to default. FHA charges the borrower (the mortgagor) a small insurance 
premium of one-half of one per cent per annum on the outstanding balance of the loan. 
By standardising and insuring residential mortgages, FHA has provided the mortgage 
market with a transferable, low-risk mortgage which was essential to the development 
of a national mortgage market.
The FHA programme helped stabilise the mortgage market, but new single family 
housing construction was at a minimum between 1926 and 1946. Then, following 
World War II, when five million men came home, housing demand escalated. To help 
the returning servicemen adjust to civilian life, the government enacted the 
Servicemen’s Adjustment Act. The Veterans Administration (VA) programme was 
founded under this Act, and the VA guarantees mortgage loans made to US military 
personnel. It differs from the FHA programme in that it guarantees (rather than insures) 
the home mortgage loan and requires no down payment. Moreover, the VA is not 
dependent on the collection of insurance premiums to pay for losses due to default on 
loans, therefore, VA does not charge the veteran (borrower) for its services. The FHA 
and VA programmes were able to meet the huge demand for mortgages and funded the 
unprecedented postwar housing growth.
In order to continue its promotion of home ownership, the US Congress has focused 
on stimulating secondary market activity in order to provide liquidity to the FHA, VA 
and private mortgage market. The US government has formed an array of organisations
16
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to participate in the secondary markets, with names that sound like a country and western 
family: Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, and Freddie Mac. These organisations issue various 
forms of MBS, and are backed through either implicit or explicit US government 
guarantees.
These government-guaranteed MBS have been well received by investors because they 
offer higher returns than does other conventional government debt. The increased yields 
are primarily due to a unique call option that allows the mortgagor to redeem his 
mortgage before maturity. A feature that will be explained in detail later. For now, it 
is important to know that this call feature has value and that this value is reflected in 
the higher yields.
In the following section, we shall discuss in detail the government bodies that participate 
in the US mortgage market.
2.2 Government Participants in the Secondary Mortgage Market
According to Mr Mark Boleat, Secretary-General of The Building Societies 
Association, ‘The American housing finance system is the most developed, particularly 
in respect of a secondary market. ’ [ 1 ] The US secondary market receives support through 
special agencies that receive implicit and explicit US government guarantees. The 
following three sections will discuss these agencies’ development and functions.
2.2.1 The Federal National Mortgage Association
The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae) was formed as 
a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1938. Its mission is to
17
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provide additional liquidity to the mortgage market and improve the distribution of 
investment capital for financing the construction and sale of housing by providing a 
secondary market4 for FHA-insured loans. (It later adopted VA guaranteed loans too.) 
Fannie Mae provides liquidity for lending institutions so that they may always have 
funds available for new home loans.
As of June 1990, Fannie Mae reported a principal balance of $110,138 million in its 
portfolio, making it the largest holder of mortgage loans in the United States. Recently, 
it has been authorised to purchase conventional loans5, but its portfolio consists 
primarily of FHA and VA loans.
In 1968 Fannie Mae was split into two entities. One is a federally chartered corporation 
owned by public shareholders, which retained the Fannie Mae name. The second is 
the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae). Fannie 
Mae receives an implicit government guarantee whilst Ginnie Mae retains the explicit 
government guarantee.
Ginnie Mae is responsible for providing liquidity, primarily through guaranteeing total 
and timely payments on mortgage-backed pass-through securities, which represent 
interest in FHA, VA and Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) mortgages. 
Additionally, Ginnie Mae supports special government subsidy programs.
2.2.2 The Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA)
GNMA is a wholly government-owned corporation that functions within the
4 A secondary market is where lending institutions sell existing loans to another entity. These are loans that have been 
originated.
5 Conventional loans are residential mortgages without any government guarantees or subsidies.
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Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and whose president is 
appointed by the US President and acts under the secretary of HUD. GNMA operates 
from Washington, D.C., and offers mortgage bankers and other lending firms an 
efficient and profitable way to market FHA, VA, and FmHA loans.
GNMA mortgage-backed pass-through securities represent an undivided interest in a 
pool of residential mortgages. The mortgages are similar in interest rate, maturity, 
and the type of property in which they are secured. The pooled mortgages must have 
a minimum aggregate value of $1,000,000 for single family loans or $500,000 for 
manufactured home6 and project loans.7
Lenders, in their capacity as issuers of securities, must complete the required GNMA 
commitment documents and forward them to GNMA. Upon review by GNMA, and 
a favourable evaluation, GNMA issues a commitment and assigns the pool a number. 
The lender will then send the mortgage documents to a custodial agent, and the required 
pool forms to GNMA. Upon acceptance, GNMA will guarantee the mortgage-backed 
certificate, which then will be sold to investors, who consist primarily of institutional 
investors. After the sale of the certificate, the lender will service the pool. He will 
collect monthly payments on the pooled mortgages and remit that amount, less 
servicing fees, to the certificate holders, along with monthly accounting statements. 
GNMA also offers different types of issues that are collateralised by mortgages other 
than single family loans. These project market loans, as they are called, include
6 Manufactured homes are built in a factory then moved to their permanent location. They are also called mobile homes.
7 Project loans are loans made on a housing estates.
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multifamily housing, nursing homes, hospitals, low-income projects and senior citizen 
housing.
The GNMA 223(f) multifamily security program was introduced in 1975 and 
represents fifty per cent of the total project market. It has issued over $3,400 million 
worth of securities, with approximately $2,500 million worth of issues outstanding. 
However, this program was discontinued in 1990 because of the saturated US housing 
market.
These instruments were designed to help fund middle- to upper-income multifamily 
housing projects. Investors demanded a higher yield on GNMA 223(f) instruments 
than on standard GNMAs because of the thin market. The higher yield offsets 
investors’ liquidity risk. These securities will generally yield approximately 230 basis 
points (bp)8 over a ten-year Treasury bond and 20 bp over a standard GNMA.
2.2.3 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie Mac) was created by 
Congress in 1970, conforming to Title ID of the Emergency Home Finance Act of 
1970. This act provided the savings and loan (S&L) industry with a secondary market 
for its conventional loans.
Because S&Ls raised funds using short-teim variable rates and were lending money 
at fixed rates over thirty years, they were caught in a lending fixed long and borrowing 
short trap which exposed them to interest rate risk. When short-term rates exceeded
*A basis point is equal to 1/100 of one percent (i.e. 100 bp = 1%).
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the long-term rates, the cost of funds exceeded their revenues, and the S&Ls needed 
an active market in which to liquidate their loans. The act served as a lifeline for the 
S&Ls. Its mission was to enhance the liquidity of mortgage investments and to increase 
the availability of funds for conventional residential mortgage lending by developing 
and maintaining a nationwide secondary market. Freddie Mac accomplished its 
mission by standardising conventional mortgage instruments, forms and underwriting 
guidelines, and it continues to facilitate the growth of the conventional secondary 
market through innovative financial development.
Freddie Mac purchases conventional mortgages primarily from savings and loans 
associations, pools them, and then sells mortgage pass-through securities called 
Mortgage Participation Certificates (PCs) in capital markets. As of 31 March 1989, 
Freddie Mac reported $234,694.7 million worth of PCs outstanding. As described in 
the introduction to this chapter, these instruments represent an undivided interest in 
the mortgage pool and entitle the owner his prorated share of all interest and principal.
2.3 Secondary Mortgage Market Instruments
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, mortgage-backed security is a general 
term used for any security which is supported primarily by mortgage collateral. MBS 
can be divided into two broad categories: pass-through and pay-through. What 
distinguishes a pass-through from a pay-through is its legal structure. Table 1 defines 
the principal features of the MBS and the variations which have evolved from the these 
two basic structures.
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TABLE 1
PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
Pass-through Pay-through
Nature of Issuer Grantor trust Corporate issuer, which may be a special 
purpose corporation (bankrupt-remote entity)
Nature of 
ownership
Ownership represents a fractional 
undivided interest in a pool of mortgages
Ownership of a debt instrument secured by a 
pool of mortgages
Principal Variations
Single Class Straight Pass-Through: the security 
holder receives principal and interest 
actually collected by the servicing agent
Modified Pass-Through: the security 
holder receives interest due, whether or 
not it has been collected, and principal as 
collected.
Fully Modified Pass-Though: the
security holder receives principal and 
interest due, whether or not they have 
been collected.
Pay-through bonds: bonds whose debt 
service is determined by the cash flow from 
the collateral pool of mortgages
Mulitclass Real Estate M ortgage Investment 
Conduit (REM IC): allows pass-throughs 
tax entities to issue multiple-classes of 
ownership interest to investors.
Collateralised Mortgage Obligations 
(CMO): Mulitclass issue of pay-through 
bonds where certain tranches have maximum 
maturities and priority as to principal 
payment
REMIC: allows CMOs to be structured with 
‘zero equity’
2.3.1 Pass-Through Securities
Pass-through securities are legally structured under a grantor trust9, which requires 
pool managers to take a passive stance towards the management of cash flows.
’Trusts whereby the grantor retains control over the income or corpus, or both, to such an extent that such grantor will be 
treated as the owner of the property and its income for income tax purposes. (However, trusts for MBS are exempted 
from income tax.)
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Management’s function is to service the portfolio of mortgages by receiving the 
monthly payments and any prepayments and then "passing through" the prorated share 
to the owners of the security. Hence the name pass-through.
GNMA originated the first publicly traded pass-though security which represents an 
undivided interest in FHA and VA mortgage pools. All mortgage-backed pass-through 
securities offer higher yields than US treasuries of similar term because of embedded 
call options. These pass-through securities resemble a fixed-rate bond with a series 
of incremental calls. The calls are exercised every time a mortgagor prepays his 
mortgage or in essence ‘calls his mortgage’. When the call is exercised it lowers the 
principal balance of the security, which may expose investors to interest rate risk. If 
a mortgagor prepays a mortgage that has a higher rate of interest than the current 
market, the investor will suffer a loss (i.e., if the mortgagor’s interest rate is 15 per 
cent fixed-rate and the current rate for fixed-rate mortgages is 12 per cent, then the 
investor will lose 3 per cent). The call feature creates a great deal of uncertainty 
regarding the timing of the cash flows, making the security difficult to value and to 
market.
Pass-through MBS are traded mainly among traditional mortgage investors. Monthly 
payments and volatile cash flows are not acceptable to most non-traditional mortgage 
investors, who prefer half-yearly payments. In order to expand the investor base for 
MBS beyond the traditional mortgage investors, financial intermediaries developed 
pay-through structures. The legal structure and its benefits are explained in the next 
section.
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2.3.2 Pay-Through Securities
A pay-through security is a general obligation bond10 issued from a thinly capitalised 
special-purpose vehicle company, whose primary assets consist of a pool of mortgages. 
This structure allows the cash flow to be dynamically managed by tailoring cash flow 
to investors’ needs which were not met under the pass-through structure.
Prior to the pay-through structure, issuers of mortgage-backed bonds were required 
to overcollateralise their mortgage pools by 150 per cent (i.e. for every $100 worth of 
bonds issued, there had to be $150 worth of mortgages in the pool). This proved to 
be expensive to issuers. After resolving numerous legal, tax, rating and accounting 
issues, PHM Credit Corporation issued the first pay-through MBS in April 1981. This 
issue was for $39 million and was well received by the market.
2.3.3 Collateralised Mortgage Obligation
In June of 1983, hoping to attract a broader range of institutional investors, the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, assisted by First Boston Corporation, issued the 
first collateralised mortgage obligation (CMO). The CMO is a mortgage-backed 
pay-through security consisting of a number of pass-through MBS or a pool of whole 
mortgages, and by paying quarterly or half-yearly payments, resembles a standard 
debt instrument. A CMO also has multiple ‘tranches’11 of senior debt, i.e. bonds of 
differing maturities, but it can only have one tranche of junior (i.e. subordinated) debt, 
which is termed the ‘residual’. This residual has all the characteristics of equity and 
bears the highest risk. Under the CMO structure, all principal payments from the
10 A general obligation bond is a bond backed by the full faith and credit of the issuing entity.
11A block of shares. From the French for "slice".
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underlying mortgages go to the first class or tranche of bonds; once that tranche is 
paid off, the next tranche begins to receive principal payments. This continues until 
all the bonds are paid off. The amount of money left over, the residual, represents the 
profit the issuer receives.
The CMO was developed to broaden the investor base by offering different classes of 
maturity. According to the market segmentation hypothesis, investors are grouped as 
short-term, medium-term or long-term investors and will only invest in instruments 
within their maturity bands. The standard mortgage-backed security only attracted a 
small group of traditional mortgage investors who were accustomed to prepayment 
uncertainties. Prepayments from an MBS occur throughout the life of the security, 
which ranges from 0 to 30 years and has an average weighted maturity of 7 years. 
These prepayment characteristics are complex and will be explained later in Section 
7. However, one way to mitigate the prepayment uncertainty of the cash flow in the 
CMO is to segment the cash flow into short-, intermediate- and long-term maturities.
This new structure has attracted an array of new investors: commercial banks and 
money market funds are purchasers of the short-term class, insurance companies are 
attracted to the intermediate-term class, whilst pension funds and retail investors are 
most interested in the longer-term instrument.
In order to demonstrate the main characteristics of a CMO, Figure 1 displays the 
hypothetical cash flow of a ‘plain vanilla* CMO structure. Each issue is uniquely 
structured to satisfy clients’ maturity preferences. In this example, Tranche A pays 
principal and interest for almost five years with a 2.3 year average life. Tranche B
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receives interest income until Tranche A is fully paid, after which it starts receiving 
principal payments. This process continues until all the tranches are retired. Notice 
that the ‘Z’ Tranche does not receive any cash flow until the fifteenth year. The Z 
Tranche resembles a zero coupon bond with a twenty-one year average life. The 
purpose of this last tranche is to absorb any negative cash flows which may occur in 
the CMO structure. This will be explained in detail under the ‘Z’ bonds, Section 
2.3.3.1.
It should be carefully noted that this structure tightens the prepayment boundaries in 
the following sense. Consider Tranche B in Figure 1: the holders of this bond receive 
their first interest payment six months after the bond is issued and continue to receive 
interest only payments until the fifth year, which is when they receive a partial principal 
repayment. The investors in Tranche B will continue to receive interest and 100 per 
cent of the pool’s principal repayments until their bonds are fully repaid in or about 
year seven. Therefore, Tranche B has an average life of about six years. Additionally, 
the investors in Tranche C will receive interest starting six months after the bonds are 
issued but will not receive any of their principal until the Tranche B bond holders are 
repaid in full. However, the Tranche Z bond holders do not receive any cash flow 
until all the previous bond holders are repaid in full. The reasons for using the Z 
Tranche are explained in the following section. Interest payments in Tranche Z accrue 
during the life of the CMO, and when all the other bonds are repaid, then Tranche Z 
bond holders receive interest and principal payments until their bond is completely 
retired. Any monies left after all the bonds are retired is paid to the owner of the
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residual. This illustration clearly shows that the CMO structure is more resilient to 
prepayment uncertainty than the pass-through structure.
Figure 1 
Cash Flow of a CMO
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Since the introduction of the CMO, there have been many variations to the basic 
structures as shown in Figure 1 . The following subsections will describe different 
CMO structures, review the market size and discuss the tax issues that arise from the 
CMO.
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2.33.1 ‘Z’ Bonds
‘Z’ Bonds were first introduced by Pulte Homes, a major US property developer, as 
a method to manage cash flow problems caused when trying to securitize graduated 
payment mortgages (GPMs). A graduated payment mortgage is one in which the 
mortgage payments start at a lower level and then increase over the life of the loan, 
causing the loan to be negatively amortised12 (this type of scheme in the United 
Kingdom is often called a Tow-start’ mortgage). The GPM mortgage is attractive to 
home buyers because the mortgagor’s income qualification ratio is based on payments 
made in the first year (which are low), thus enabling the mortgagor to borrow more 
money.
Pulte Home’s GPM mortgage pool created a cash flow problem because CMOs 
require level payments. The negatively amortised mortgage payments are unable to 
sustain the CMO’s cash flow requirements. To eliminate this cash flow mismatch, 
Pulte created the ‘Z’ bond (named ‘Z’ because it is the last bond to become due in 
the series) to deal with this problem. The ‘Z* bond is similar to a zero coupon bond 
or an accrual bond. It does not pay out any principal or interest until all the preceding 
tranches have been paid (see Figure 1). Because of its resemblance to a zero coupon 
bond, the "Z" Tranche is most attractive to investors who desire a long-term 
investment with minimal reinvestment risk.
2.3.3.2 Calamity Clause
Cash flow from CMOs are not uniform, which can present a problem in making
12 Negative amortisation means that the principal balance will increase during the beginning, but when payments arc 
increased later, they will then start paying down the principal.
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coupon payments if prepayments are made while interest rates are low. If the issuer 
receives large prepayments from the underlying mortgages during a time of low 
interest rates, he loses money by being caught in a yield mismatch. For example, 
assume that the CMO pays 14 per cent per annum and interest rates drop to 10 per 
cent per annum. In this lower-rate environment the issuer receives high prepayments 
immediately following the last instalment paid to investors. In this case he would 
lose 4 per cent on the prepaid funds. To resolve this problem, the ‘calamity clause’ 
was introduced by Pulte Homes, the first issuer of ‘private’13 CMOs.[2] This clause 
allows the issuer to make monthly principal payments to the bondholders in the event 
of a significant drop in short-term interest rates.
2.3.3.3 Planned Amortising Class (PAC)
Section 2.3.3 described how the CMO structure provides investors with some call 
protection by narrowing the prepayment boundaries. However, many investors were 
not content with this improvement. The planned amortising class (PAC) is a CMO 
tranche that was developed to further reduce the risk of prepayment uncertainty. The 
PAC has a preset retirement schedule which takes priority over all other CMO 
tranches. It maintains a stable cash flow under a wide range of prepayment 
environments. The following examples illustrate the robustness of this instrument 
with prepayments ranging from 75 per cent to 200 per cent of the Public Securities 
Association (PSA) prepayment index.14
13 "Private” refers to the absence of any government agency acting as guarantor for the bonds.
14 See Section 7.2 for explanation of Public Securities Association (PSA) index.
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Note that in Figure 2, where prepayments are slow (25 per cent below the norm or 
75 per cent PSA), the PAC tranche payments stay fixed. This holds true when the 
PSA is at its norm as in Figure 3, or when it doubles as in Figure 4. All the payments 
from the other tranches move, but the PAC cash flow remains constant under extreme 
prepayment conditions.
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Figure 2
Figure 3
Cash Flow of a PAC
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2.33 A Market size
The collateralised mortgage obligation (CMO) securities market size has almost 
doubled every year since its inception. In 1983, when First Boston Corporation 
underwrote Freddie Mac’s first CMO issue, the total market size for that year was 
only $4,000 million. By 1988, over $175,000 million worth of CMOs have been 
issued. The CMO has also expanded the secondary mortgage market by meeting the 
demands of investors through offering a broader range of maturities. This has been 
accomplished through the creation of a multitude of mortgage-backed securities that 
can compete in the high quality fixed-income market by offering higher yields than 
US Treasuries.
2.33.5 Taxation Issues and Regulations
The CMO gained popularity among investors for its increased predictability of cash 
flow; however, the growth of the CMO was limited due to restrictive regulations. 
Under the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulation, a grantor trust can issue only 
a single class instrument in order for its income to be exempted from income tax. To 
avoid taxation, CMOs need to resemble the debt obligations of the issuer; however, 
this debt resemblance applies not only to the tax status but also to the accounting 
treatment. Treatment as debt for accounting purposes requires the issuer to carry the 
entire obligation on his balance sheet. This accounting treatment tends to inflate the 
size of the issuer’s balance sheet, causing an adverse effect on his capital-to-asset 
ratio.[3] Most originators in the US only maintain inventories until they build a large 
enough pool of mortgages to sell into the secondary market, which is about one million 
US dollars. If they were forced to carry all of their secondary market sales on their
32
SECURITIZATION AND THE GLOBAL MARKET
balance sheets, the expensive capital required to support the assets would make it 
cost-prohibitive.
In an attempt to circumvent these limitations, the Mortgage Bankers Association and 
Fannie Mae lobbied regulators to amend the tax law and the Securities and Exchange 
Acts of 1933 and 1934 with the trusts for investments in mortgages (TIM) legislation. 
TIM provided a legal framework that allowed assets to be sold into a grantor trust 
which could then issue multiple-class equity holdings as opposed to the existing 
legislation that only allows a single-class instrument. By treating the TIM structure 
as a sale of equity, the multiple-class security would be treated as a sale of an asset, 
which would enable the issuer to take the transaction off-balance sheet. 
Unfortunately, this effort failed when the IRS ruled against a $500 million 
multiple-class grantor trust issued by Sears Mortgage Securities. This keynote case, 
known as the ‘Sears Regulation’, ruled that the trust was not exempt for tax and that 
it must pay tax on the income generated by the mortgage pool. The IRS argued that 
this ‘trust’ required active management, therefore disqualifying it from special tax 
status. [4] Although the TIM regulation failed, legislators appreciated the need for a 
legal structure that could issue multiple-class securities while allowing mortgagees 
to take mortgages off-balance sheet. The US Congress created the real estate mortgage 
investment conduit as a viable solution to this problem.
2.3.4 Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit
In an effort to remove the federal tax and regulator constraints from multiple-class 
mortgage-backed securities, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 authorised the creation of 
the real estate mortgage investment conduit (REMIC). As mentioned in the previous
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section, pass-through structures were not allowed to issue multiple-class securities. 
The introduction of the REMIC enabled mortgage debt obligations to be structured in 
such a way as to have greater appeal to general capital market sources without forcing 
issuers to bear the added tax burden. As a tax-efficient version of the CMO, the REMIC 
was designed to increase the supply of credit for residential and commercial mortgage 
markets. In brief, the REMIC structure
• Creates a new pass-through tax entity that can hold mortgages secured by any 
type of property and can issue multiple-classes of ownership interest 
(senior/subordinated) to investors in the form of pass-through certificates, 
bonds or other legal forms.
• Allows multiple-class (similar to CMOs) mortgage pass-throughs.
• Allows CMOs to be structured with ‘zero* equity and immediate pay through 
of monthly bond payments, which eliminates all reinvestment risk.
• Allows mortgage pass-throughs to establish reserve funds for added credit 
enhancement.
• Allows thrift institutions and others underwriters of mortgages to sell mortgages
while treating the sale as a financing for accounting purposes, avoiding 
unwanted accounting losses.
• Allows mortgage-backed cash-flow bonds structured like CMOs to qualify as 
real estate investments for thrifts and Real Estate Investment Tmsts (REIT).
• Applies to all real estate mortgages and to public as well as private offerings.
• Creates new information-reporting requirements for CMOs and similar debt 
obligations, even when they are sold to corporations.
• Eliminates withholding tax on foreign investors.
This act allows for a five-year transition period in which other structures may be used, 
but after 1991 the REMIC structure will be the sole means of issuing multiple-class 
US MBS without imposing double taxation.
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2.3.4.1 Benefits of the REMIC
REMICs benefit both the issuer and the investor. The most significant benefit to the 
issuer is that when assets are transferred to the REMIC, the mortgages are treated as 
the sale of an asset for tax purposes and may be treated either as the sale of an asset 
or as a financing for accounting purposes, provided that they meet all applicable 
generally accepted accounting principles and regulatory accounting standards. This 
alleviates the problem of an inflated balance sheet, since the transfer of the mortgages 
into the REMIC is treated as a sale. The issuer also benefits from the provision that 
allows all real estate mortgages to be structured in senior/subordinated tranches with 
no restrictions on the sale of the subordinated class. Investors in the secondary market 
benefit from the increase in the volume and variety of multiple-class mortgage-related 
securities, as well as from greater liquidity in these instruments.
2.3.4.2 Effects on Foreign Investors
The most critical feature of the REMIC legislation is its effect on foreign investment 
in the seasoned secondary mortgage market. Traditionally, this market was 
prohibitively expensive to foreign investors, because of a 30 per cent withholding 
tax that was imposed on mortgage interest from instruments originated prior to July 
1984. The REMIC legislation eliminated such barriers to foreign investors. The 
retroactive REMIC legislation eliminated all withholding tax on pre-July 1984 
mortgages. This treatment made seasoned mortgages competitive with new mortgage 
originations, which were always more attractive to foreign investors in the 
pass-through market.
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2.4 Effects on the Credit Supply in the Mortgage Market
Because of the increased investor base, multiple-class MBS are expected to be issued 
more aggressively, creating greater liquidity than previously issued CMO. The broader 
investor base will attract non-traditional mortgage investors and lead to an increase in 
the supply of funds available to mortgage borrowers. This increase in funds from the 
capital market to the mortgage market is partially offset by a decrease in the savings 
and loan industry’s holding of mortgages. Savings and loans used to hold a large 
percentage of their assets in mortgages but they have diversified their portfolios and 
sold their mortgages. However, the growth in the holdings of mortgage securities by 
non-traditional mortgage investors outweighs any contraction in mortgages held by the 
thrift industry. This results in a net increase in the supply of credit to the mortgage 
market.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown the evolution of the US mortgage-backed securities 
market. As this market has evolved other developed nations have adopted this method 
of financial intermediation into their financial systems. We will review how 
securitization is being integrated into the international market in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3 
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT OF MORTGAGE-BACKED 
SECURITIES
The purpose of this chapter is to explain how American securitization techniques are 
being integrated into the global financial market. This chapter begins with a brief 
overview of the global growth of mortgage-backed securities. Following this section, 
Section 3.1 examines the fundamentals of financial intermediation and how mortgage 
securitization enhances the traditional intermediation process. In Section 3.2, we explain 
what fuels international financial innovation and how securitization lends itself to global 
acceptance. Section 3.3 will examine in detail how the United Kingdom, Canada and 
Australia are adapting mortgage securitization into their respected housing financial 
systems. The last section will summarise this chapter.
Globalisation of mortgage-backed securities started in 1984 when US MBS were first 
offered internationally to the European market. To date $1.1 trillion worth of residential 
mortgages have been securitized in the US, and the process should continue to grow as 
other countries adopt this method of housing finance. Dr. Sylvan Feldstein and Dr. Frank 
Fabozzi predict that the US securitized debt market could surpass government debt, 
which has made the US the largest debtor nation in the world. As the US mortgage-backed 
securitization process has shown how to provide relatively inexpensive funds for home 
mortgages, other countries have also started to pursue securitization.
Adopting the framework of US mortgage-backed securities, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Australia have started the securitization of residential mortgages. The 
French government approved private securitization of mortgages in 1989, and it is
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believed that the German government is considering privatising its secondary (or 
mortgage-backed) mortgage market operations. Finally, the Japanese government, 
which holds the world’s largest pool of mortgages, is starting to provide legal structures 
that will promote securitization.
3.1 Intermediation
Historically, in countries which are implementing mortgage securitization, funds for 
residential housing finance were supplied by the local community. Through the 
collective efforts of the local investor base, small building societies or mutual savings 
banks were formed by pooling their members’ funds. Only members were allowed 
access to the funds and usually they would queue for their mortgage. Members would 
mutually share the risks and rewards of the organisation. This was a very effective 
form of housing finance, given the then current technology and limited financial 
services.
As the financial services industry developed, the small mutual savings groups were 
replaced by larger private organisations. The purpose of these intermediaries was to 
provide an effective channel for savers’ surpluses to meet borrowers’ deficits. Benston 
and Smith (1976), for example, argue that financial intermediaries will exist as long as 
they reduce transaction and information cost between borrowers and lenders.
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Intermediation provides the following management functions:
• CREDIT/DEFAULT RISK Institutions are geared to assess, monitor and price
the risk of a borrower.
LIQUIDITY/MATURITY Institutions accept deposits in amounts and
RISK maturities that are different from the needs of the
borrower.
INTEREST RATE RISK Institutions meet the different interest rate structure
required by the saver and the borrower.
ECONOMIES OF SCALE Institutions have the infrastructure to handle higher
volumes, leading to cheaper transaction costs.
DIVERSIFICATION The number of borrowers actually reduces the risks 
incurred by the savers in the lending process, and 
similarly lowers the borrowers’ risk of an early 
repayment request from the savers.
The housing finance industry, the largest financial intermediation industry, has three 
distinct and independent functions:
Origination The origination of the loan. This service is provided by building
societies, banks, estate agents and mortgage brokers.
Servicing The collecting, accounting and enforcement of the mortgage
instrument. This service is provided by building societies, mortgage 
bankers, banks or may be provided by any collecting agent.
Funding The acquisition of funds and ownership of mortgages. The two
sources for funds are retail and wholesale. This service is provided 
by building societies, specialist lenders and banks who can hold or 
sell the mortgages in the secondary market.
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It is not necessary for intermediaries to perform all three functions. Intermediation 
costs are lowest when the lowest-cost supplier of the housing finance function provides 
the service. By independent specialisation of services for each function, the system 
becomes more efficient and cost-effective. This could explain the rapid growth of MBS 
in various countries and across national boundaries. When securitization was first 
introduced in the UK, critics argued that MBS were a US phenomenon and were only 
viable because of the US government’s guarantees. However, the MBS market has 
flourished under pure free market forces.
3.2 International Innovation
Dufey and Giddy (1981) state that international financial intermediaries provide four 
specific functions:
1. Liquid and standardised instruments for effecting payments in individual 
currencies,
2. instruments for monetary exchange between different currencies,
3. institutions and markets which provide a channel for savings and investments 
across national boundaries,
4. and structures for allocating, diversifying and compensating for risk.
Financial innovation occurs when an international financial intermediary provides a 
new technique which better serves one of the above mentioned functions. Since 
financial intermediaries are profit-making entities, these innovations must provide 
profit.
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There are two schools of thought on what economic forces spur financial innovation. 
Ben-Horim and Silber (1977) argue that supply factors are the primary contributors to 
innovation, especially when effected by regulator constraints. They cite the introduction 
of negotiable certificates of deposit, which was a direct result of financial constraints 
on banks. On the other hand, Greenbaum and Haywood (1971) argue for the demand 
side, suggesting that the rise in nonhuman wealth per capita is the primary stimulus of 
financial innovation. They argue that since portfolio management costs are fixed, an 
increase in wealth will increase the demand for a wider diversification of financial 
instruments, thus spurring innovation. The arguments for both sides are valid and it is 
our belief that innovation is driven by both supply and demand. To cope with constantly 
changing economic forces, it is important to know that the need for financial innovation 
will always exist
What kind of financial innovation will be introduced? Most financial innovation is in 
response to two elements: regulation or price. The first type of innovation occurs in 
response to the demand for products which circumvent government regulations on price, 
quantity, reporting and taxation of financial services. The latter results from changes 
in relative prices and perceived relative risks. The ability to quantify risk continues to 
improve with modem financial theory combined with advances in computer technology. 
These advances have served to develop better methods of assessing, classifying and 
disseminating risk. The innovative process of securitizing mortgages is driven by both 
by regulation and price. The following section will show how different countries have 
adopted securitization into their housing finance intermediation and will discuss the 
elements that have driven its growth.
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3.3 Comparison and Contrast of Different Countries’ Mortgage 
Markets
Even though the UK, US, Canada and Australia share a similar language, culture and 
legal system, their mortgages vary according to local norms. To appreciate these 
differences we first identify the main characteristics of a mortgage in the following list 
and then compare and contrast the countries’ mortgages in Table 2.
The main characteristics of a mortgage are:
1. Term - the life of the loan.
2. Interest - the amount of interest paid on principal, may be fixed or variable.
3. Principal - the total money borrowed less any principal repayments.
4. Index link - some variable rate loans are ‘linked’ to a commonly used market
interest rate. eg. London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR).
5. Forbearance - when the lender will refrain from foreclosing on a mortgage loan
which is past due.
6. Tax incentives - many governments offer tax relief for residential home owners.
7. Government insurance - many governments offer direct mortgage insurance and
pool insurance. This is to say that a government can 
directly insure the payments of a specific individual 
mortgage or it can insure the payments made from a pool 
of mortgages. Pool insurance is used to promote 
securitization.
8. Underwriting standards - lenders may conform to using standard forms and loan
criteria, which promotes secondary market activity. 
When loans are homogeneous, they are easier to trade.
These characteristics and how they differ from country to country are represented in
the table on the following page.
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TABLE 2
TYPICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MORTGAGE INDUSTRY
C haracteristic US Australia C anada U.K.
T erm  (years) 15 or 30 25 1,3, or 5 25
Interest fixed and variable variable fixed variable
Principal amortising amortising amortising over 
25 years15
non-amortising
R ate index link to 
funding source
direct indirect indirect direct and indirect
Forbearance uncommon common uncommon common
Tax incentives interest deduction capital gains 
exclusion
exclusion on primary 
residence
capped interest 
deduction
Federal insurer yes yes yes no
Secondary m arket 
governm ent 
insured as % 
outstanding
22% less than 1% 1% none
U nderwriting
standards
standardised non-standardised non-standardised non-standardised
Source: Standard & Poor's Corporation[5]
Just as the underlying mortgages differ, so do the characteristics of the MBS that each 
country issues. They vary in term, type of interest paid (fixed vs. floating), and call 
provisions. The common tie that binds them together is that they are all being well 
received by the market, as is evident from their current growth. A review of each 
country’s mortgage market and the securitization process follows, starting with the 
fastest growing non-dollar market.
3.3.1 United Kingdom
To make clear how the securitization process has been integrated into the U.K. housing 
finance market, this section will start with a review the different types of intermediaries
15 Loans in Canada are amortized over 25 years but become due in 1,3 or 5 years. This allows payments to be low and the 
loans are ‘rolled over’ when they become due, thus allowing the lender to reset the fixed-rate of interest
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that are active in the U.K. market. We shall discuss their size and market share and 
will describe in detail the three largest intermediaries. Following this explanation, we 
shall describe how sterling mortgage-backed securities are structured and integrated 
into the UK housing finance market.
We have identified the following six categories of mortgage lenders in the UK, with 
the first three representing approximately 96 per cent of the market:
Building Societies 
Monetary Sector (Retail Banks)
Mortgage Bankers (New Lenders)
Insurance Companies & Pension Funds 
Local Authorities 
Other Public Sectors
Categorising and quantifying the volume of mortgage business produced by certain 
lenders can be quite simple; for example, we can distinguish a building society’s 
holdings from a bank’s holdings. However, as regulation eases, and mortgage lenders 
merge, the lines that separate these entities are starting to fade. To illustrate, an 
insurance company will originate a mortgage and then sell it to a mortgage banker, 
who will securitize it and sell it to a bank. The current statistical collection services 
do not account for these transactions, so double counting may occur.
On the following page, Figure 5 illustrates the amount of new mortgages issued and 
Figure 6 shows the total value of all mortgages held by each category in 1988. The 
Central Statistical Office office publishes this information quarterly.
44
SECURITIZATION AND THE GLOBAL MARKET
Figure 5 
Net Advance for 1988
Building Societies 58%
Other Public Sector 1% 
Insurance Co & PF 2%
Mortgage Bankers 12%
Monetary Sector 27%
Source: Financial Statistics, Table 9.4
Figure 6 
Total Mortgages Held in 1988
Building Societies 70%
Other Public Sector 1% 
Local Authorities 1% 
Insurance Co & PF 2%
Mortgage Bankers 6%
Monetary Sector 20%
Source: Financial Statistics, Table 9.4
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Figure 7 shows the mortgage distribution according to the Financial Research Survey. 
Note that this distribution shows the number of mortgages held as a percentage and 
is not representative of value. Apparently, the building societies are holding mortgages 
with smaller values as compared to the high street banks and the mortgage bankers.16
Figure 7
Survey of Mortgage Holders for 1988
Building Societies 76%
Mortgage Bankers 4%
Local Authorities 4%
Retail B arks 11%
Source: Financial Research Survey
3.3.1.1 Building Societies
Building societies are the oldest and largest residential mortgage lenders in the UK, 
holding £155,195 million worth or 69.92 per cent of the outstanding mortgages in
16 This confirms the information gathered during an interview with Mr. Gary CowdriU of National Home Loans, who 
stressed that they targeted their mortgage business towards the high end of the market while the buildings societies have 
been pursuing the larger volume, smaller value mortgages, consisting primarily of first-time buyers.
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1988.[6] The first building society was established in Birmingham in 1775 and was 
formed by a small group of people who pooled their resources to provide funds to 
build their homes, hence the name ‘building societies’. There were 131 building 
societies in the UK as of 1988.[7] The largest building societies during this calendar 
year were the Halifax, Abbey National, Nationwide Anglia, Woolwich Equitable, 
Alliance & Leicester and Leeds. They each reported assets in excess of £10,000 
million in 1988, holding a total of £100,000 million in assets or 62.5 per cent of all 
building societies’ assets.
The primary difference between the building societies’ and the S&L’s assets, that is 
the mortgages, is in the coupon interest rate structure. In the US, mortgage rates are 
generally fixed-rate, while in the UK they are usually variable and are set at the 
discretion of the lender. This insulates the building societies from the disaster their 
US counterparts experienced when the yield curve became downward sloping 
(inverted) in the early 1980s. The S&Ls’ assets (mortgages) paid a fixed-rate that 
was lower than their cost of funds. Their being caught in this ‘borrowing short, lending 
long’ trap forced the US government to introduce new legislation to enable the S&Ls 
to compete with the banks.
The building societies maintained a pricing cartel until 1981. The cartel started to 
lose power because of Government intervention and was finally dismantled in 1983. 
Prior to 1981, the Building Societies Association would publish the current lending 
rate to which all building-societies adhered. There would be no incentive for a
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mortgagor to borrow from one building society as opposed to another. This caused 
a shortage on the supply side of mortgages and forced potential home buyers to queue 
for mortgages for periods ranging from six to eighteen months.
Not only were the building societies able to force customers to wait for their 
mortgages, but this cartel also enjoyed a large margin between their source and use 
of funds. Prior to 1981, building societies were able to borrow relatively cheap funds 
(i.e. retail deposits)17 and lend them with an average of a 5.75 per cent spread. [8] 
Since the removal of the ‘corset’ from the clearing banks in 1981 combined with the 
‘Big Bang’ in the City, fierce market competition has driven margins between retail 
funds and mortgage rates down to approximately 1.50 per cent while mortgage loans 
can be processed within 24 hours. Clearly, the consumer is reaping the rewards of 
free market forces.
The competition for retail funds has escalated between the high street banks, the stock 
market and the building societies. To attract these funds, market participants are 
forced to increase investors’ returns. Market forces have driven up the cost of retail 
funds, bringing their cost closer to wholesale funds. This in turn has caused mortgage 
rates, which are required to service these debts, to follow the cost of wholesale funds. 
This is clearly illustrated by Figure 8 on the next page, which compares an industry 
standard wholesale rate, LIBOR, with the average mortgage rate.
17 Retail funds are deposits made by individuals in their regular deposit account whereas wholesale funds are moneys 
raised via financial markets.
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Figure 8
LIBOR vs MORTGAGE RATES
Rate
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Source Bank ol England
Additionally, building societies’ increased dependence on wholesale funds has also 
forced mortgage rates to follow LIBOR. Wholesale funding pertains to funds which 
are obtained via the capital and money markets.18 As shown in the following Table 
3, building societies have had to increase their dependency on wholesale funding.
Table 3
Net Inflow of Wholesale Funds 1985-88 (£ Million)
Period Total
Wholesale
Total Retail Total Source 
of Funds
Wholesale as 
Percentage of Total
1983 1,584 6,839 8,423 18.81%
1984 2,231 8,572 10,803 20.65%
1985 3,096 7,462 10,558 29.32%
1986 6,142 6,592 12,734 48.23%
1987 3,159 7,487 10,646 29.67%
1988 5,419 13,554 18,973 28.56%
Source: The Building Societies Association
18 Money markets are where large commercial debt instruments, which normally have a maturity of less than one year, are 
issued and traded. Capital markets are where longer-term debt (in excess o f one year) and equity instruments are issued 
and traded.
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We show in Table 4 that the building societies’ wholesale funding comes from a 
number of sources. It is interesting to note that the bulk of the building societies’ 
wholesale funding comes from the issuing of Eurobonds. This is the same market 
in which the mortgage bankers access their funds. Building societies’ bonds are 
usually issued as a five-year floating rate note indexed at approximately 20 basis 
points (0.2%) over LEBOR.
Table 4
Net Inflow of Wholesale Funds 1985-88 by Product
Period Certificates 
of Deposit
Time
Deposits
Eurobonds Index
Linked
Bonds
Negotiable
Bonds
Loans
from
Banks
Other
Non-
retail
Total
Wholesale
1983 793 423 368 1,584
1984 1,039 875 92 225 2,231
1985 717 646 1,125 15 (81) 674 3,096
1986 301 1,245 3,583 30 (12) 995 6,142
1987 1,016 960 710 2 (247) 587 131 3,159
1988 586 989 3,433 (73) 383 101 5,419
Financial industry experts from Baring Brothers & Co. Limited, Goldman Sachs 
International Corporation, National Home Loans and S.G. Warburg explained during 
interviews that the building societies increased their use of the wholesale markets 
because of the relatively low wholesale rates. On the surface this appears to be false 
when we compare the percentage change in the net inflow of wholesale funds to 
LIBOR as shown in Fig. 9, but Fig. 10 clearly shows that the relative change in LIBOR 
may be what prompted building societies to access wholesale funds. Additionally, 
wholesale funding by the building societies has been driven by the lack of retail funds.
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There was a ‘fligit of funds’ from the building societies in 1986 when retail savers 
started to withdriw their savings from the building societies to invest in the stock 
market.
Figure 9
LIBOR vs Percentage Change in Inflow of Wholesale Funds
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Figure 10
Percentage Change in LIBOR vs Percentage Change in Inflow of Wholesale
Funds
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Today, another key issue facing buildings societies is whether they want to remain 
building societies. Abbey National’s recent transition from building society status 
to bank may indicate what the future holds for this industry. Abbey National’s move 
decreased the total assets held by building societies by approximately 10 per cent.
Mr Keith Danko, the mortgage securitization specialist for Goldman Sachs 
International, points out that this move offered Abbey National the best of both worlds 
(wholesale and retail) regarding funding. When wholesale rates are low, the new 
banking statute allows Abbey National to access a larger portion of wholesale funds 
than they would be allowed under building society status. He added that during times 
of low wholesale interest rates, the equity markets flourish, thus attracting funds from
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the retail sector. However, during times of high interest rates in wholesale markets, 
equity markets suffer, pushing retail funds back to the savings accounts. Under these 
conditions Abbey National is able to shift back to its low-cost retail source of funds.
Building societies’ investment portfolios may be divided into three classes. Class 
one consists of all mortgages made on owner-occupied residences. Class two consists 
of loans made on property other than class one. Class three represents investments 
made in real estate and unsecured loans. They are limited to a maximum percentage 
of loans (other than class one) that they may hold on their balance sheets.
Date Limit on Class 3 
Assets
Limit on Class 2 and Class 3 Assets 
Combined
Initial 5% 10%
1/1/1990 7V2% 17 V2%
1/1/1991 10% 20%
1/1/1993 15% 25%
Source: BSA Annual Report 1988
Independent survey data shows that the vast majority of the building societies’ 1988 
mortgage loans was to first time buyers. However, this was not found during the 
Building Societies Association’s 1988 five percent survey, which reported an average 
of 47.43 per cent. The Financial Research Services survey reported that between 
September 1987 and September 1988, 74 per cent of the first-time buyers who 
responded to the question said that they received their mortgage from a building 
society.
53
SECURITIZATION AND THE GLOBAL MARKET
To confirm that building societies may be holding a larger percentage of first-time 
buyers’ mortgages than the retail and mortgage bankers, one may look at the average 
size of mortgages held. Most first-time buyers’ mortgages may be high in 
loan-to-value ratio but relatively small in value when compared to other mortgages. 
Therefore, if we compare the number of mortgages held to value held, building 
societies should have a higher ratio than the other lenders mentioned. According to 
the Central Statistical Office (CSO) Financial Statistics, building societies held a total 
of 58.92 per cent of the total value of mortgage while the Financial Research Services 
reported that75.93 per cent of the respondents said their mortgages were with building 
societies. Additionally, the British Market Research Bureau’s survey showed that 
the average mortgage outstanding from a bank was 42.03 per cent19 larger than that 
from a building society. A further verification of the accuracy of the Financial 
Research Services’ survey is the relationship which one would expect from mortgages 
made by the local authorities. Mortgages issued by the local authorities are normally 
very small in value. As shown in Figure 11, local authorities are holding a large 
number of mortgages relative to value. This should justify the other comparisons.
19 Banks’ average outstanding mortgage was £29,400 vs the building societies’ average mortgage which was £20,700. 
Source: Council of Mortgage Lenders ‘Housing Finance No. 4’ October 1989 p. 13
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Figure 11
Value of Mortgages Held vs Number Mortgages Held
■ Value
m Number
Building Societies Monetary Sector Mortgage Bankers Insurace Co & PF Local Authorities
To show the changes in the overall complexion of the building societies’ financial 
position, we provide the consolidated balance in the following table:
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Table 5
Building Societies: Assets & Liabilities (Book Value) End of Period
LIABILITIES
Year Total
Shares & 
deposits
Interest 
accrued 
but not 
credited
Time
deposits
Certificates
of
deposits
Bank
borrowing Bonds
Total
Wholesale
Reserves, 
official 
loans 
and other 
liabilities
1985 121,239 104,870 1,611 1,878 1,499 1,106 1,798 6,281 8,477
1986 140,740 117,554 1,965 3,470 1,521 2,137 5,439 12,567 8,654
1987 160,543 131,963 2,329 4,318 2,051 2,640 5,983 14,992 11,259
1988 191,168 152,645 2,691 5,320 2,574 2,780 9,224 21,278 15,934
1985 100% 86.50% 1.33% 1.55% 1.24% 0.91% 1.48% 5.18% 6.99%
1986 100% 83.53% 1.40% 2.47% 1.08% 1.52% 3.86% 8.93% 6.15%
1987 100% 82.20% 1.45% 2.69% 1.28% 1.64% 3.73% 9.34% 7.01%
1988 100% 79.85% 1.41% 2.78% 1.35% 1.45% 4.83% 11.82% 8.34%
ASSETS
Year
Mortgages Assets other than mortgages
Short­ British Overseas
Total Personal Commercial term government Local Authorities government
assets Total Sector Sector Total assets securities Securities Other securities
298 23,802 11,036 9,521 156 1,067
562 28,215 17,245 8,308 62 568
977 34,103 22,071 8,868 29 348
0.21% 16.91% 7.84% 6.76% 0.11% 0.76%
0.35% 17.57% 10.74% 5.17% 0.04% 0.35%
0.51% 17.84% 11.55% 4.64% 0.02% 0.18%
Other
assets
1986 140,740 116,938 116,640
1987 160,543 132,328 131,766
1988 191,168 157,065 156,088
1986 100%
1987 100%
1988 100%
83.09%
82.43%
82.16%
82.88%
82.08%
81.65%
3 2,019
0 2,032
0 2,787
0.00% 1.43%
0.00% 1.27%
0.00% 1.46%
Source: Financial Statistics, Table 7.7
3.3.1.2 Monetary Sector
The monetary sector includes all banks in the United Kingdom. Before 1981 banks 
were not active in the housing finance market because regulation limited the total 
amount of mortgages they were allowed to hold as assets. This restraint or ‘corset’ 
was removed in 1981 and the banks aggressively pursued the retail mortgage market 
capturing approximately 40 per cent of the new mortgage loans in 1981. [9] As shown 
in Figure 6 (Total Mortgages Held in 1988), banks are funding approximately 20 per
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cent of all mortgages. To appreciate the differences between the building societies 
and banks, we are providing the monetary sector’s statistics as collected and reported 
by the Bank of England in the following Table 6.
TABLE 6
Monetary Sector’s Balance Sheet as of 30 December 1988
£ million
Assets
Market Loans
Notes & Sterling 
Total coin Balances with
Bank of England
Market Loans Other UK UK monetary 
Secured money monetary sector CDs 
with LDMA sector
UK Local Overseas 
authorities
282,572 3,375 749 5,220 17,639 4,201 738 3,573
assets continued
Bills Advances Banking Investments
Treasury Eligible Eligible Other 
bills local bank bills 
authority bills 
bills
1,502 388 6,060 137
UK UK Overseas 
public private 
sector sector
715 147,907 5,284
Department British Other 
lending to central government 
government (net) stocks
956 3,547 5,123
Assets continued
Other currency assets | Sterling
Market loans and advances Bills Invest- & other
UK UK UK 
monetary monetary public 
sector sector CDs sector
UK Overseas 
local
authorities
ments currency: 
miscel­
laneous assets
10,007 234 33 7,616 30,165 436 6,143 20,824
Liabilities
Sterling deposits Other currency deposits
Sterling and other 
currencies
Total Notes UKmon UK UK
issued etary public private 
Sector sector sector
Over- CDs&ot UKmon Other 
seas her short etary United 
-term sector Kingdo 
paper m 
issued
Over- CDs & Items in suspense & 
seas other transmission, 
short-term capital & other 
paper funds 
issued
282,572 1,407 20,165 4,080 137,467 17,609 11,965 6,373 6,883 26,211 3,549 46,863
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3.3.13  Mortgage Bankers (New Lenders)
The year 1986 marked the beginning of ‘Big Bang’, a property boom and the creation 
of special-purpose mortgage lenders. These special-purpose lenders offered faster 
service with competitive rates and were the first to rely solely on wholesale funds as 
their source of funds. The laymen’s term for them is ‘New Lenders’; however, in 
this paper we shall address them by their proper name: ‘mortgage bankers’.
Mortgage bankers are defined as mortgage lenders who depend on wholesale markets 
as their source of funding and who do not have a retail base on which to draw. [10] 
Mortgage bankers originate and service mortgages; however, the mortgages are sold 
or transferred shortly after origination. Therefore, we shall address these 
intermediaries as mortgage bankers.
According to the CSO Financial Statistics which report home loans under Table 9.4, 
the two subdivisions for monetary sector subsidiaries as follows:
1. ‘Monetary Sector Subsidiaries’ comprises specialised mortgage finance 
companies in the UK, not consolidated with their parent banks but which 
act as departments of their parents (and are in general largely funded by 
them); together with non-monetary sector banking institutions in the Channel 
Islands and Isle of Man which are members of UK-based banking groups.
2. ‘Other’ comprises UK mortgage finance companies which are not subsidiaries
of monetary sector institutions, albeit they may borrow from the monetary
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sector together with Channel Islands and Isle of Man banking institutions 
outside the monetary sector which are not connected with UK-based banking 
groups.
Although this sector only accounted for 5.62 per cent of the total value of mortgages 
held in the UK,20 it has moved from issuing only 1.55 per cent of all mortgages in 
1983 to an impressive 12.46 per cent of all mortgages originated in 1988, showing 
an 803 per cent growth. This sector introduced a new form of housing finance in the 
UK — securitization.
It is not necessary for an intermediary to perform all three housing finance functions 
— origination, servicing and funding. As we mentioned in the previous section, 
intermediation costs are lowest when the lowest-cost supplier of the housing finance 
function provides the service. Securitization allows independent specialisation of 
each function, which creates a more cost-effective system.[ll] This could be the 
reason for the rapid growth of the mortgage-backed securities market in the United 
Kingdom. We shall explain the structure and relative elements of this new technique 
of financing in the following section.
3.3.1.4 Sterling Mortgage-Backed Securities
Sterling mortgage-backed securities (SMBS) are a notes issued from a thinly 
capitalised PLC whose assets consist of a pool of endowment-linked residential 
mortgages (see Table 7). The SMBS are issued as floating rate notes (FRN) and are
20It is not clear to us how the statistics are kep t It is assumed that even though the mortgages are sold, the CSO does not 
account for secondary market operations and therefore assumes that the mortgages originated by this sector are 
considered to be held by this sector.
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traded on the FRN market. The sterling mortgage-backed security differs from the 
traditional FRN in that it has a series of embedded call options. Because of the 
structure of these notes, every time a mortgagor prepays his mortgage the principal 
is paid through to the note holder, which in effect triggers a call option. This call 
provision creates cash flow uncertainty, which presents an interesting problem when 
one is pricing the SMBS.
Table 7
Capitalisation of the
NHL Third Funding Corporation PLC
Share Capital
Authorised
Shares of £1 each 
Issued
2 shares of £1 each (Fully paid) 
49,998 shares of £1 each (25p paid
£
50.000.00
2.00
12,499.50
Loan Capital
£100,000,000 Mortgage-Backed 
Series A Notes Due 2014 
£10,500,000 Mortgage-Backed 
Series B Notes Due 2014
100,000,000.00
10.500.000.00
Total Loan Capital 110.500.000.00
Total Capitalisation 110.512.501.50
A capital ratio (or gearing) of only .0113 per cent
The first public sterling mortgage-backed security was issued in January 1985 through 
a special-purpose company called MINI which was formed to fund mortgages 
originated by the Bank of America. This issue was not well received by the investment
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community market, due to its complexity and small size (£50 million). Two years 
passed until National Home Loans Corporation PLC, a special-purpose mortgage 
lender, issued a sterling mortgage-backed security. This issue was well received by 
investors, and the market has grown rapidly, surpassing £9 billion as of January 1990. 
The SMBS have shown a steady growth ever since the introducing of NHL’s first 
issue. For a listing of sterling mortgage-backed securities issued through 1988, see 
Appendix A.
£ billion
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Growth of UK Mortgage-Backed Securities Market
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The growth of SMBS are significant when compared to traditional sterling FRN 
market instruments, which reported a total volume of £14 billion in January 1990. 
Additionally, the volume of SMBS traded surpassed the UK building society FRN
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market in 1989. [12] This rapid growth can be partly attributed to the dwindling 
supply of Gilts. Investors who require high quality investment grade sterling paper 
find that the SMBS serve as good substitutes for Gilts.
The UK growth has been accomplished solely by private means, with no support 
from the Government. The rapid growth of sterling mortgage-backed securities 
confirms that MBS are not just a US phenomenon and that securitization offers a 
more efficient form of intermediation than the antiquated conventional 
intermediaries.
3.3.2 Canada
‘Cannie Maes’, the name given to the Canadian government’s guaranteed 
mortgage-backed securities, made their debut on 1 January 1987. An amendment to 
National Housing Act (NHA) in 1984 permitted the Canada Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation (CMHC), a Canadian government agency, to guarantee NHA 
mortgage-backed securities or Cannie Maes.
NHA MBS were issued on the basis of a rigorous study conducted by the CMHC. This 
agency’s two primary economic aims were to increase the supply of housing for 
Canadians by attracting more funds into mortgage lending and to encourage 
longer-term mortgages. CMHC concluded that its objectives would be best obtained 
through the stimulation of secondary markets via securitization.
The Canadian residential mortgage market is unique in that mortgages are usually 
originated at a fixed-rate interest with payments amortising over 25 years. However, 
the mortgage becomes due and payable in full (i.e. balloons) in six months to ten years,
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with weekly, half-monthly and monthly payment frequencies. Furthermore, the lender 
guarantees to issue a new mortgage, or roll-over the mortgage, to the mortgagor at the 
current prevailing rate. This allows the lender to better manage his interest rate risk. 
Lenders do not charge front end fees, but there are prepayment penalties. Prepayment 
penalties are not standardised and vary from lender to lender. Table 8 represents the 
typical prepayment provisions.
Table 8
Typical Canadian Prepayment Provisions
1. The mortgagor has the right to prepay 10 per cent (some lenders now allow 15 per cent) of the original amount of 
the mortgage without notice, bonus or penalty, once in each calendar year;
2. Another typical provision allows borrowers to increase their mortgage payments once in each year providing that 
the cumulative increase over the term of the mortgage does not exceed 100 per cent of the original payments;
3. Also, in accordance with CMHC policy on its insured loans with a term of five years, the borrower has the right 
of prepayment in full after the third anniversary of the mortgage, subject to a penalty of three months’ interest The 
Canada Interest Act provides that all mortgages to individuals, whatever the term, are open after the fifth year, 
subject to a penalty of three months’ interest
Because of increased competition, lenders are becoming more lenient with prepayment 
penalties, thus causing a disturbance in the prepayment experience. Lower prepayment 
penalties cause the NHA MBS to become more sensitive to interest rates. The lower 
transaction cost will allow mortgagors to re-mortgage when there are relatively small 
downward shifts in the interest rates.
The Canadian residential mortgage market is dominated by large national financial 
institutions; approximately fifteen lenders hold eighty to eighty-five percent of the 
market share. The large lenders can easily gain access to low cost funds via the capital 
markets. However, small and medium regional mortgage lending firms, who are
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unable to access wholesale capital markets, must pay more for their cost of funds. The 
additional cost is passed to the consumer as higher mortgage rates and causes the 
smaller lenders to be competitively handicapped regarding interest rate pricing.
Since the introduction of MBS, there exists what is referred to as a ‘level playing field’, 
which is to say that all mortgage lenders, regardless of size, are able to gain access to 
the AAA rated capital markets. The government guarantee allows any lender to 
securitize its mortgages, and with a AAA credit rating, provides a low cost of funds. 
During the first year of inception, seventy percent of the volume and fifty-five percent 
of the dollar value of all NHA MBS were issued by regional trust companies. The 
heavy participation by regional lenders is expected to continue.
Retail investors dominate the NHA MBS market. The securities are sold in $5,000 
denominations, yielding about 175 basis points over Canadian treasuries, and pays 
monthly. These features have attracted individual investors, like pensioners, who are 
seeking a source of high yield, low risk and steady monthly income. Another reason 
for the growth of the retail market is that stockbrokers receive a one percent commission 
as opposed to the fraction of a percentage that they receive on treasuries.
The Canadian MBS market has shown a strong and steady growth, based on the 
following three factors:
• Securitization offers the regional lenders lower capital cost, which passes interest
rate savings to the consumer.
• The market demand is strong from the retail sector.
• MBS allow lenders to transfer interest rate risk, allowing them to offer longer term
mortgages.
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The NHA MBS market surpassed $15,000,000 in 1987 and represented only 6.8 per 
cent of the $220,000,000 mortgages outstanding. Securitization should continue to 
develop as a cost-effective form of financial intermediation for Canada’s housing 
financial market.
3.3.3 Australia
Australia has a high standard of living and the highest per capita rate of home ownership 
in the world. Savings banks provide the majority of the funds used to finance homes, 
with permanent building societies being the second largest lender. The Australian 
housing finance system is starting to use securitization as a method of financial 
intermediation with the support of the government and private sectors. This section 
will explain how securitization is developing in Australia
In Australia, mortgages are made with variable rates of interest and are amortised over 
20 or 25 years. Before 1986 the Commonwealth capped the interest rate federally 
chartered institutions could charge. This limited the supply of funds for mortgages. 
Additionally, because state-chartered institutions are limited to conducting business 
within state boundaries, mortgages are not standardised, and rates may vary by as 
much as two per cent between states. The reason for this variance is because savings 
banks and building societies primarily depend on the local savings base to supply funds 
for mortgages.
In 1983, the newly elected Labour government commissioned a review of the 
Australian financial system. Not only was the government interested in the general 
economic condition, but it was extremely interested in what effects deregulation may
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have on the housing finance sector. The government was interested in allowing greater 
competition in the banking industry by deregulating building societies and eliminating 
interest rate controls.
Mr Vic Martin, former chief executive of the Commercial Banking Corporation, 
chaired the review group and published the Australian Financial System, Report of 
the Review Group in December 1984. This report states that
‘It could be particularly valuable in attracting funds for housing from 
non-traditional sources and is a method much preferred to the imposition of 
direct controls over non-bank financial institutions or the establishment of 
special funds.’[13]
The Housing Loans Insurance Corporation (HLIC) was established by Australian 
parliament in 1965 to insure primary residential mortgages. Furthermore, to promote 
the secondary mortgage market, in 1985 the HLIC was empowered to insure approved 
dealers in the secondary mortgage market against losses, direct or indirect, relating to 
mortgage securities traded on the secondary market. HLIC is similar to the United 
States Federal Housing Authority, in that it is backed by the full faith and credit of the 
Australian government and in that it is self-financing through the insurance premiums 
it collects for its guarantees.
Within two years after HLIC started insuring mortgage pools, two mortgage conduit 
agencies were established with state assistance to securitize mortgages: the First 
Australian Mortgage Acceptance Corp. (FANMAC) in New South Wales and the 
National Mortgage Market Corp. (NMMC) in Victoria. In addition to these 
government supported securitization vehicles, several private entities like MGICA
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Securities Ltd and Security Pacific Mortgage Australia Ltd have sold mortgage-backed 
securities into the Australian market. The growth of the Australian market is best 
illustrated in Figure 13
Figure 13
Growth of Australian Mortgage-Backed Securities
Volume in billions of A$
1988 1989 1990
actual actual forecast
% change NA +92.0% +56.2%
Source: Moody's Investors Service
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we discussed the elements of financial intermediation and showed how 
securitization provides an efficient form of financial intermediation. To stress the 
efficiency of securitization, we provided examples of how securitization is being 
adopted into the housing financial systems of the United Kingdom, Canada and 
Australia. We would like to emphasise the level of activity with which each of these 
countries’ governments is participating in the development of the securitization market.
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In the UK, the Government is absent from market development, in Canada the 
mortgage-backed securities market was started and is dominated by the government, 
and in Australia, the government and private sectors are actively issuing 
mortgage-backed securities.
We have shown how securitization is promoting market efficiency in the housing 
financial markets throughout the world. In the next chapter we discuss how the process 
of securitization is being used to securitize non-mortgage related receivables.
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CHAPTER 4 
ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES
The purpose of this chapter is to give a general overview of non-mortgage securitization. 
All non-mortgage securitized debt instruments are referred to as asset-backed securities 
(ABS). In the previous chapter, we discussed how the securitization process is used to 
fund residential mortgages. However, this method of intermediation has evolved and is 
being applied to a host of other assets. By packaging homogeneous receivables for sale 
to investors via the capital and money markets, this new method of financing has grown 
exponentially because of the utility (savings and benefits) it offers issuers and investors.
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section presents a general 
overview of the US ABS market and examines the reasons for the its rapid growth, the 
legal structures of ABS and credit analysis considerations. Section 4.2 examines the 
pricing and cash flow of ABS with detailed illustrations of certain issues. Additionally, 
in this section we compare and contrast the ABS cash flows with those of 
mortgage-backed securities. Section 4.3 will close this chapter with a discussion on the 
potential development of asset-backed securities.
4.1 Overview of Asset-Backed Securities (ABS)
This section will provide an overview of asset-backed securities. We shall first discuss 
their growth and application. Following this discussion, we shall address the economic 
and regulatory elements that serve to perpetuate the market. Also, we shall examine 
the legal structure of ABS. This section will conclude with the role and activities that 
rating agencies have in the development of this market.
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4.1.1 Growth of Asset-Backed Securities
Salomon Brother Inc. is a major international investment bank that is active in the 
mortgage-backed and asset backed market. During an interview with Mr. Mark 
McCoy, asset-backed specialist from Salomon Brothers, I asked what assets are 
appropriate for securitization.
Hereplied, ‘Ifitflows, securitize it!’ By this he means that any receivable that generates 
a cash flow can be considered for securitization. Presently, the following receivables 
have been securitised:
. credit cards . utility leases
. auto loans . computer leases
. boat loans . municipal equipment leases
. marine loans . trade receivables
. furniture loans . health care receivables
. home equity loans . Euro-trade receivables
. non-performing loans . junk bonds
. unsecured consumer loans . insurance premiums
. manufactured housing loans . recreational vehicle loans
. auto leases . political subdivision bonds
. truck leases . utility debt & common stock
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. is considering securitizing its customers’ bills, 
whilst investment bankers are considering structured financing as a solution to Third 
World debt. As securitization technology evolves, we should see new types of assets 
financed by this method of intermediation.
Issues of asset-backed securities are growing at a dynamic rate. Over $17 billion worth 
of public and private issues were placed in 1988, a 70 per cent increase since 1987, 
with the cumulative growth exceeding $36 billion. Standard & Poor’s Corporation 
(S&P) predicts that this trend will continue. Currently, S&P is predicting that in 1989 
rated issues will surpass $20 billion, with total market growth exceeding $100 billion 
by 1992.
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Figure 14
ABS Market Cumulative Issue Volume 
Bank vs. Non-Bank Assets
Non-Bank
Bank
i i t i i f t i i i i r i 
1985 1986 1987 1988
Year and Quarter
The forces motivating this rapid growth are twofold: economic and regulatory. The 
economic and legal environment will continue to help spur the growth of ABS. The 
freeing of capital and lower intermediation cost are the two primary economic benefits 
that are fuelling ABS market growth. Ensuing regulatory reform will continue to 
motivate securitization in both the US and Europe. These areas are covered in detail 
in this section.
71
SECURITIZATION AND THE GLOBAL MARKET
4.1.2 Economic Motivation
Securitization offers the following economic benefits:
• Low-cost source of funds
• Fee income
• Off-balance sheet financing
• Lower intermediation costs
• Risk management - Interest rate
- Credit
4.1.2.1 Low-Cost Source of Funds
Securitization lowers the cost of funds by isolating risk. With asset-backed securities, 
investors buy a specific set of receivables with a known amount of risk. This is far 
safer for investors than lending to a low rated company which can then, at its 
discretion, fund existing assets or purchase riskier ones. This uncertainty leads 
investors to demand a higher rate of interest for general obligation bonds than for 
higher rated ABS. Issuing ABS may allow companies with low credit ratings to 
borrow funds at AAA rates.
On the surface, ABS financing appears to be dearer than traditional financing 
methods. As shown in Table 9, the ABS cost appears to be 25 basis points (25/100 
of 1 per cent) dearer than a comparable traditional corporate issue.
TABLE 9
Security Average life Rate % Spread over Treasury
Treasury 2 years 8.06 -
AAA Corporate 2 years 8.73 67 basis points
AAA ABS 2 years 8.98 92 basis points
Incremental cost of the ABS 25 basis points
Source: P. Zweig, The Asset Securitization Handbook[\A]
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This price differential, currently ranging between 20 and 25 basis points, is based on 
three factors. The first is that payments are received monthly as opposed to 
half-yearly. This increases the owners’administrative costs. Secondly, the embedded 
call option which is inherent in most ABS increases risk. Investors demand to be 
compensated for the prepayment uncertainty which exposes them to reinvestment 
risk. Finally, ABS are stated in terms of average life, which means that the actual 
maturity could far exceed the stated one.
When we consider the cost of capital, it appears that an ABS is dearer, but this analysis 
fails to consider the aggregate cost of capital. Traditional debt financing must have 
equity to support it when credit quality is evaluated; ABS are valued for their internal 
structure, independently from the company’s balance sheet. In many cases the cost 
of structuring and funding an ABS is less than the aggregate cost of the traditional 
debt and the cost of the supporting equity.
To illustrate, let us re-examine the previous example. Assume that the ABS has a 7 
per cent recourse rate. That is to say, in the event of default the originator will 
repurchase up to a total of 7 per cent of the ABS’s principal balance, thus giving the 
ABS a 14:1 debt-to-equity ratio. Additionally, suppose that the corporation has a 
10:1 debt-to-equity ratio and the cost of equity is 25 percent on a pretax basis. By 
identifying the all-in cost of capital, we find that the ABS actually offers a savings 
of 18 basis points to the issuer. We illustrate this savings in the following table[15]
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TABLE 10
COST OF ADDITIONAL £100 RAISED THROUGH CORPORATE DEBT
Rate % Spread over Treasury
Debt £100 8.73 67 basis points
Equity 10 25.00
Total
Weighted average cost of capital
£110
10.21 215 basis points
COST OF ADDITIONAL £100 RAISED THROUGH ASSET BACKED
SECURITIZATION
Rate % Spread over Treasury
Debt £100 8.98 92 basis points
Equity 7 25.00
Total £107
Weighted average cost of capital 10.03 197 basis points
Savings through ABS 18 basis points
Source: P. Zweig, The Asset Securitization Handbook
4.1.2.2 Fee Income
Fee income represents a large portion of the net present value of revenues when one 
is evaluating consumer loans generated by credit cost utilisation and other loan 
methods such as hire purchase. Fee income may include the fixed charges for cash 
advances on credit cards, annual membership fees and servicing fees. Additionally, 
revenues are generated through the net positive funding over the life of the asset. By 
securitizing assets, companies are able to earn up-front fees and servicing fees without 
inflating their balance sheets. Another benefit to fee income is that it is immune from 
interest rate risk. Increasing fee income shifts portfolio earnings from interest 
rate-sensitive spread income to fixed fee income.
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4.1.2.3 Off-Balance Sheet Financing
Securitization takes assets off the balance sheet, allowing banks with a tight capital 
structure to free capital. Taking assets off the balance sheet can significantly improve 
the return on equity.
4.1.2.4 Lower Intermediation Cost
Securitization lowers intermediation costs. [16] Securitization is simply a type of 
wholesale financial intermediation that re-bundles existing non-tradable financial 
instruments into new tradable securities and transfers risk. In Figure 15, we illustrate 
how risk flows via traditional methods and via securitization. The thicker the line the 
greater the risk. Our illustration shows that securitization transfers certain risks (i.e. 
prepayment, default and interest rate mismatch) from the traditional financial 
intermediary to a specialised risk manager and ultimately to the consumer. Special 
managers and the purchasers of ABS are able to manage the risk associated with these 
instruments at a lower cost than traditional intermediaries. We know that an 
intermediary’s economic function is to reduce transaction and information costs 
between borrowers and lenders. Thus, intermediaries that provide this service at the 
lowest cost shall stay active in the market, while other intermediaries will cease to 
exist
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Figure 15 
Wholesale Financial Intermediation
CONSUMER
lender
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Securitization enables intermediaries to perform their services without the burden of 
many of the traditional risks they were required to bear (e.g. prepayment, default and 
interest rate). It is therefore a form of disintermediation with regard to the various 
risks. In Figure 15, the thickness of the line corresponds to the amount of risk. Without 
securitization, the financial intermediary assumes the bulk of the risk, whereas with 
securitization a large portion of the risk is passed through the financial intermediary 
into the securitization process. Not being burdened with these risks, intermediaries 
are exposed to less risk and are able to lower their costs.
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4.1.2.5 Risk Management
• Interest Rate Risk
Financial intermediaries transfer the interest rate risk to the holder of the 
ABS. This is extremely beneficial to finance companies that have 
mismatched funding and that are highly sensitive to interest rate 
fluctuations.
• Credit Risk
Risky assets can be transferred off-balance sheet via securitization, which 
can help a company’s overall credit standing. For example, Credit 
Commercial de France used the ABS structure to improve its credit posture 
by removing $500 million worth of high-risk third world loans from its 
balance sheet in March 1989.[17]
4.1.3 Regulatory Motivation
US banks share with their European cousins the target date of 1992 for a new wave 
of regulatory reforms. The new risk-based capital rules in the US are scheduled to 
take full effect in 1992. These capital rules will require US banks to include the total 
dollar amount of credit cards, automobile loans, boat loans and other consumer loans 
when calculating capital requirements. These loans require a risk weighting21 of 100 
per cent; mortgage loans are risk weighted at 50 per cent while Treasury securities 
carry a 0 per cent risk weighting. The risk-based capital rules have caused banks to
21 Risk weighting refers to the amount of capital a bank must assign to a particular loan. For example, if  the bank’s capital 
ratio is 8 per cent and it makes a £100 loan with a 100 per cent capital weighting, then it must set aside £8 in capital for 
that loan.
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sell their high risk weighted assets and invest the proceeds in lower weighted ones, 
which may earn a higher return on capital after the risk weighting is accounted for. 
As mentioned earlier, even after taking the 100 per cent risk weighted consumer credit 
off their balance sheets, banks can still earn fee income via securitization by servicing 
the loans.
4.1.4 Legal Structure
Asset-backed securities share similar legal structures with their mortgage-backed 
counterpart. Either a AAA or AA rated trust or a special-purpose corporation is formed 
to hold the assets. This legal structure protects the assets in the event that the seller 
becomes bankrupt or is unable to continue to service the receivables. Figure 16 
illustrates the basic structure of an ABS.
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Figure 16 
Basic Structure of an ABS
Borrower
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In this diagram, we show how the seller/servicer sells the asset to a trust or special 
purpose corporation. These assets are combined with different forms of credit 
enhancement to produce a AAA or A A security that is sold to investors. The cash 
flow from these assets is collected and accounted for by the seller/servicer and is paid 
to the trustee less a small servicing fee. The trustee then distributes the cash flow to 
the investors.
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The ABS may be issued from two types of legal structures — trusts issue pass-through 
securities and special-purpose corporations issue pay-through securities. Pass-through 
securities represent an equitable interest in a grantor trust or credit card trust (used for 
revolving credit) whose corpus consists of a pool of designated receivables. All 
monthly payments, minus a small service fee, are passed through to the owners of the 
trust; hence the name ‘pass-through’. Pay-throughs represent a general obligation 
bond from a thinly capitalised special-purpose vehicle company whose primary assets 
consist of a pool of receivables. This method of securitization allows the cash flows 
to be dynamically managed, which allows for structures like multiple-class notes 
(similar to the collateralised mortgage obligation), varying coupon periods and bullet 
maturities (the total debt balance is due and paid at a specific date.)
Additionally, the assets of the trust or special purpose corporation (also referred to as 
the issuer) must be ‘bulletproof’ from claims made by creditors of the seller 
(originator). This is to say that the assets of the issuer must be completely immune 
from any claims the seller’s creditors may have in the case of bankruptcy. To complete 
a successful transfer of assets from the ‘originator’ to the ‘issuer’, they must establish 
a ‘true sale’. This topic will be further discussed under legal issues in Section 4.1.5.2 
(Legal Issues).
4.1.5 Rating Agencies Considerations
The two largest and best known rating agencies are Moody’s Investor Services 
(Moody’s) and Standard & Poor’s (S&P). Rating agencies serve as the investors’ 
advocates by constantly monitoring the financial status of issuers of debt securities. 
As the ‘market’s watchdogs’, they provide investors with credit analysis in the form
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of ratings. This lowers the investor’s evaluation cost and enhances market efficiency 
by providing a systematic identification of risk. Additionally, having multiple 
independent rating agencies maintains the integrity of the overall credit analysis by 
providing a means of checks and balances.
Securitization offers traditional and non-traditional financial intermediaries a source 
of low cost funds by packaging homogeneous receivables and then selling the package 
to investors via the capital and money markets. The package, which is represented as 
a marketable security, trades as investment grade rated paper. To receive this high 
rating by S&P and Moody’s, AAA or AA and Aaa or Aa respectively, the package 
must be well insulated from varying risk. This is accomplished by underpinning the 
pooled receivables through a combination of overcollateralisation, letters of credit, 
insurance and senior-subordinated debt structures.
Moody’s and S&P approach the rating of an ABS in similar ways. When evaluating 
an ABS security they look at three main areas of risk:
• Credit risk of the collateral - The credit strength of the receivables plus the 
originator’s overall risk profile are reviewed.
• Legal Issues - Two key areas we consider the perfection of the lien or assets
(Is the lien legally enforceable?); and the legal structural weakness with regard 
to the ‘true sale’ of the assets (Are the assets bulletproof?).
• Cash flow risks - We consider the inherent risks in the payment structure with 
regard to the timing and amounts of cash flow under extreme economic 
environments.
4.1.5.1 Credit Risk
The risk analysis is achieved though the rating process. This starts when the issuer 
approaches the agencies to discuss the rating parameters before it registers the ABS
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with the regulatory authorities. The issuer, or its investment banker, meets each 
agency to discuss the structure of its transaction and to introduce the agency to the 
nature of the issuer’s business and its operations. Prior to this meeting, the issuer 
submits a package containing the company’s background, strategy, operations, 
systems and five years of portfolio performance data.
During this preliminary meeting, the parties discuss the viability of the issue, the 
level of rating required and any potential weakness of the issue. When the parties 
agree that the issue is likely to achieve its rating goal, the issuer sends the agency a 
formal letter requesting a rating. Additionally, they agree to keep the rating agency 
fully informed of any alterations in the legal documentation or the asset-backed 
security’s structure.
Following the rating request, the issuer forwards all initial drafts of the standard 
documentation, including
• the pooling and servicing agreement,
• the prospectus if it is a public issue,
• a private placement memorandum for a private issue and
• an indenture when applicable.
After reviewing the documentation, the agency performs an on-site examination. 
This involves meeting management to review the overall efficiency of the 
organisation. It is accomplished by interviewing the senior financial management, 
lending division managers, the underwriting or credit managers, collection managers
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and the computer systems management. The control functions of accounting, 
auditing, documentation and management information systems are reviewed. This 
enables the agency to determine the efficiency of the credit and collection processes.
Furthermore, a delinquent receivable is traced through the system, from the first 
notification through collection, charge-off and liquidation of the collateral (if 
applicable). Particular attention is given to the work load of each collector, the 
duration of the process and involvement of upper management in the more difficult 
cases. Upon final assessment of the originator’s system, the agency will make 
recommendations on procedures to segregate the pooled receivables for tracking and 
reporting purposes.
4.1.5.2 Legal Issues
When assessing the legal structure of an ABS, it is crucial to make sure the transaction 
is ‘bulletproof’ because the issuer could be exposed to losses if the originator went 
bankrupt. For example, under the US Bankruptcy Code, transfer of assets from the 
originator to the issuer must pass the ‘true sale opinion’, which is obtained from 
independent legal counsel. Therefore, when evaluating the ‘true sale’ of a structure, 
S&P makes the following key considerations:
1. Transfer is treated as a sale for accounting and tax purposes.
2. Level of recourse (direct or indirect) to originator is less than a reasonably 
anticipated default rate based primarily on historical default data. Recourse 
may take several forms including:
-repurchase of defaulted assets 
-substitution of good assets for defaulted assets 
-reimbursement of third-party credit provider 
-retention of subordinated piece
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3. Originator retains none of the benefits of ownership of the transferred assets, 
i.e., originator is not entitled to any appreciation of the assets and originator 
does not have the right to use the proceeds of the assets.
4. The documents are consistent and evidence the parties’ intent that the transfer 
be characterised as a sale.
5. Neither the assets nor the proceeds of the assets are commingled with property 
of the originator. [18]
4.1.5.3 Cash Flow Risks
The cash flow of an ABS are predominantly dependent on the cash flow from its 
underlying receivables. If for some reason the cash flow from the receivables are 
impaired through delinquency or default there must be additional support. This 
support can be through overcollateralisation, letters of credit or repurchase 
agreements. By underpinning the pool of receivables with one or more of these 
supports, the investors’ cash flow are guaranteed even during times of extreme 
economic uncertainty.
The amount of credit enhancement is determined by exposing the pool of receivables 
to various stress tests. The maximum arrears and losses expected during times of 
hyper-inflation, or in times of severe recession and depression, must be offset by the 
credit support. Additionally, the liquidity and interest rate sensitivity of the 
receivables are tested under the same extreme economic conditions. This is to ensure 
that there will be enough cash value in the assets if the trustee or issuer is forced to 
liquidate the receivables to honour payments to investors. The par value of the 
asset-backed security less the worst-case environment price equals the amount of 
credit enhancement that will be required to receive the investment rating. The higher 
the rating the more severe the tests.
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The issuer may use three types of credit enhancement:
• Overcollateralisation
• Letter of credit
• Repurchase agreement
Overcollateralisation is the amount of receivables placed by the originator in the ABS 
that exceeds its par value. This excess serves to cushion the cash flow from any 
seasonal fluctuations, delinquencies or defaults. The amount of overcollateralisation 
will vary according to the credit risk of the receivables. The issuer recoups the excess 
value once the ABS matures.
A letter of credit (LOC) is another method often used to support ABS. The main 
benefit of the LOC is that it allows the ABS to obtain a higher rating than its originator. 
This is accomplished when a high-rated bank or institution underwrites the LOC, 
guaranteeing a set percentage of the receivables from arrears and losses.
Repurchase agreements are made with the originator, who contracts to buy back a 
set percentage of the receivables at face value. This method still supports the ABS 
but does not tie up the issuer’s assets, as overcollateralisation does. However, the 
face value of the repurchase agreement must be shown on the originator’s balance 
sheet.
For instance, let us assume that Nat West is going to sell £500 million worth of its 
credit card receivables via an ABS structure. In the sales agreement, Nat West 
promises to repurchase or replace any account that is in arrears or default up to an
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aggregate amount of £100 million. Under this agreement, Nat West would show a 
£500 million sale of assets and a £100 million contingency liability for the repurchase 
agreement, thus reducing the balance sheet by £400 million.
The rating agencies practice due diligence when assessing asset-backed securities 
and only give an opinion on the asset’s risk sensitivity based on the information they 
receive. They do not serve as financial advisers. Also, they continue to monitor the 
ABS monthly throughout its life and will keep investors informed of any dramatic 
changes.
4.2 Understanding the Value And Cash Flow of ABS
The value of an asset-backed security is based on either the present value of its net cash 
flow or the aggregate face value of its underlying receivables, which ever is less. To 
prevent over-pricing, one must compare the face value of the receivables with the ABS 
net present value. For example, suppose there is a pool of receivables valued at a 
premium and this premium is used to value the security. If all the debtors of the 
underlying receivables decided to repay in full the day after the issue is sold, the cash 
flow would not be able to satisfy the ABS debt because the premium would be lost due 
to early prepayment. In this case the total face value of the receivables should have 
been used to value the ABS. Alternatively, when receivables are at a discount the 
present value method is appropriate.
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The following three methods are used to determine the present value of an ABS:
GROSS-TO-GROSS
CONSTANT-TO-NET
NET-TO-NET
Applying these three present value methods to the same set of cash flow may yield 
different results. Therefore it is important to have an understanding of the different 
methodologies. All these methods assume no prepayment and use the same payment 
frequency for the receivables as for the notes.
The GROSS-TO-GROSS method discounts the gross cash flow at the gross rate. 
The gross rate includes the note rate (coupon rate), the servicing fee and other 
expenses. This method has a tendency to overstate the note’s value.
The CONSTANT-TO-NET method discounts the gross cash flow, less a static 
servicing fee and other expenses, at the note rate. This method has a tendency to 
understate the security’s value because it fixes the servicing fee based on the 
beginning balance of the pool of receivables. Servicing and expenses are normally 
charged as a percentage of balance outstanding, and since this balance is 
amortising, the expenses are overstated.
The NET-TO-NET method offers the best approach because it most accurately 
reflects the true cash flow. This method discounts the net cash flow (cash flow 
received by the security holder) at the note rate.
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To explore every ABS structure would require reviewing every security issued — a total 
of 157 up to July 1989. Therefore, selected issues of credit card-backed securities, 
which are referred to as Certificates for Amortising Revolving Debts Securities 
(CARDS), and auto-backed securities, referred to as Certificates for Automobile 
Receivable Securities (CARS), will be examined. The reason we selected credit card 
receivables and automobile loan receivables is because credit cards represent the largest 
dollar value in total ABS issued and auto loans represent the largest number of ABS 
issued.
4.2.1 Certificates for Amortising Revolving Debts (CARDS)
CARDS are normally issued paying a fixed-rate of interest for the first eighteen months; 
they then begin amortising from the eighteenth month, paying out in a relatively short 
period. Over the past four years, average monthly repayment rates have ranged from 
9.61 per cent for private label cards, which are historically slow payers, to 19.59 per 
cent for cards like VISA and MASTERCARD. The first issue structured as a sale for 
regulatory and financial reporting purposes was Bank of America’s $300 million 8.20 
per cent California Credit Card Trust 1987-A. As shown in Figure 17, this issue paid 
interest at a fixed-rate for the first eighteen months, and then fully amortised in the 
following three months.
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Figure 17
Cash flow of California Credit Card Trust 1987-A
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The graph shows that the overcollateralisation of the CARDS issue served to cushion 
fluctuations in the receivables, leaving the investor’s cash flow intact. Additionally, 
the rapid amortisation was expected because of the traditionally high monthly payment 
rates the pool had previously experienced.
4.2.1.1 Spiegel Charge Account Trust No. 1
In this subsection we shall examine a specific credit card-backed security originated 
by Spiegel Inc., an American mail-order retail clothing company. By examining and 
explaining the various elements of this structure, we hope to make possible a thorough 
understanding of credit card securitization.
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In December 1988 Spiegel Inc., a subsidiary of Otto Versand G.M.B.A., securitized 
its Preferred Charge credit card receivables via the Spiegel Charge Account Trust 
No. 1 (SCAT 1), offering $150 million in investor certificates, yielding a 9.6 per cent 
annualised monthly rate — a lower interest rate than Spiegel Inc. could have obtained 
through issuing its own debt because the company has a lower credit rating than 
SCAT1. This was the first credit card-backed security issued by a German-owned 
company that was underwritten by a German Bank. The issue received AAA ratings 
from both Moody’s and S&P.
As a retail mail-order merchant, Spiegel Inc. provides open-ended revolving 
consumer credit to its customers. Spiegel has 61 billing cycles of which 1-16 were 
included in its first ABS issue. The Spiegel Charge Account Trust No. 1 cash flow 
is supported by overcollateralisation and letters of credit, which are explained in the 
following section.
4.2.1.1.1 Structure
As shown in the Figure 18, Spiegel Inc. sold $190 million worth of credit card 
receivables to Spiegel Credit Corporation (SCC). This is a special-purpose 
corporation which serves as an intermediary in order to effect a ‘true sale’ of the 
receivables. Spiegel’s selling the credit card receivables to SCC insulates the 
receivables from any claims Spiegel Inc.’s creditors may have against the assets in 
the event of bankruptcy.
SCC then sells the receivables to the Spiegel Charge Account Trust No. 1 credit-card 
trust for $190 million, which in turn issues and sells $150 million worth of investor
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certificates to the lead underwriter, Deutsche Bank Capital Corporation (DBCC), 
the American investment banking arm of Deutsche Bank. The trust then channels 
the $ 150 million cash and a $40 million seller’s certificate back through the structure 
to Spiegel Inc.
Figure 18 
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Spiegel Inc. will continue to service the receivables, passing the cash flow down 
through the structure to the investors. Any excess servicing income will be paid to 
a spread account which funds the cost of Deutsche Bank’s 30 per cent Letter of 
Credit (LOC). The 30 per cent LOC protects the trust’s cash flow from default or
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delinquent receivables. Given this support, the trust would have to suffer a $97 
million22 or a 51.05 per cent loss before investors would be affected. Considering 
the historical performance of Spiegel’s credit card receivables and servicing 
capabilities, losses of this magnitude are most unlikely.
Also, Deutsche Bank issued an additional $20 million service LOC to protect the 
pool if the servicer, Spiegel, went bankrupt. The servicer accrues collected 
receivables on a monthly basis and then passes the accrued money through the 
structure to the SCAT 1 at the end of the month. If Spiegel Inc. goes bankrupt, 
Deutsche Bank will compensate SCAT 1 to a maximum of $20 million. This ensures 
a timely and prudent flow of funds to the trust. If for some reason Spiegel exceeds 
$20 million in accrued receivables, the excess must be remitted to the trust’s account 
within two business days.
4.2.1.1.2 Payments
As shown in Figure 19, the Spiegel Charge Account Trust No. 1 investor certificates 
have a 4 year maturity with an average life of 3 V2 years, and the payment streams 
are divided over two periods:
• 36 month revolving period when the principal balance remains constant
• 12 month controlled amortisation period were the principal is repaid.
During the first 36 months, SCAT 1 pays interest only. When the revolving period 
terminates, the pool will amortise over the next 12 months, paying interest and one
22 Thirty per cent of 190 million plus 40 million equals 97 million.
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twelfth of the principal each month for the next twelve months. Furthermore, Figure 
19 shows that the seller’s certificate cushions the investor’s face value from seasonal 
fluctuations and interest rate movements. This 26 per cent ‘overcollateralisation’ 
reverts to Spiegel Inc. following the maturity of the ABS. In traditional financing 
the overcollateralisation could be viewed as equity.
Figure 19
Cash flow of the Spiegel Charge Account Trust No. 1
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Source: Mr. Barry Perhac of DBCC
The beauty of this structure is that Spiegel receives the best of both the financial 
and the tax worlds. Under the provisions of the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards, Spiegel is able to treat this sale as an ‘off-balance sheet’ transaction. 
Spiegel converted $150 million worth of risky receivables into cash at a relatively
93
/
69
SECURITIZATION AND THE GLOBAL MARKET
low cost, dramatically improving its balance sheet complexion. Even though the 
credit card receivables were treated as a ‘sale’ for financial accounting purposes, 
Spiegel Inc. is able to treat the interest payments as a debt expense under tax 
accounting rules. This tax saving lowered Spiegel Inc.’s ‘all-in’ cost of capital. 
Moreover, this ABS structure allowed Spiegel Inc., an unrated company, to tap AAA 
rated funds at 73 basis points over comparable US Treasuries while enjoying 
secondary tax benefits.
4.2.2 Collateralised Automobile Receivable Securities (CARS)
Collateralised Automobile Receivable Securities (CARS) are asset-backed securities 
that are supported by amortising personal auto loans that are paid monthly with 
maturities ranging from two to seven years. Most loans are paid at fixed rates and are 
secured by liens on new cars or light trucks. Lenders use different methods for 
calculating interest and have different types of loans. The interest and outstanding 
balance calculations are based on one of the following three methods:
• internal rate of return or actuarial method,
• simple interest, and
• rule of 78.
It is important to know which method is used when structuring the security because 
different methods can affect the CARS payout.
Additionally, there are two main types of auto loans:
Direct loans: made by the lending institution, and
Indirect loans: originated by the auto dealer and sold to the lending institution.
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CARS portfolios consist mainly of indirect loans. When these loans are made on a 
non-recourse basis they experience a higher default rate than do dealer-recourse loans. 
This is because the dealer absorbs the losses and is not necessarily representative of 
the borrower’s credit quality. Therefore, one should consider the portfolio’s 
composition when assessing risk, and the CARS prospectus should indicate the 
portfolio’s weighting of each type of loan.
4.2.2.1 Fixed-rate CARS
In 1984 the failing US automobile industry introduced ‘incentive-rate financing’, 
which offered low or 0 per cent financing on new cars. These deep-discounted 
‘incentive-rate’ loans allowed fixed-payment CARS to be issued. Through their 
wholly owned finance subsidiaries (also called captives), manufacturers offered 
below-market loans to entice buyers and to promote new car sales. This marketing 
method was well received by the US public, and the captives now dominate the 
market.
The fixed-payment CARS structure eliminates investors’ concerns over prepayment. 
This type of structure resembles a corporate bond with a sinking fund and is not 
directly dependent on prepayments. The issuer is able to achieve this structure by 
utilising a guaranteed investment contract which absorbs the prepaid cash flow. The 
investment contract guarantees a predetermined yield for undistributed cash flow. 
This eliminates reinvestment risk by allowing issuers to invest their excessive cash 
flow, with a yield that will support the ABS debt service. To gain a better 
understanding of this structure we shall review one of Salomon Brothers’ CARS 
issues in detail.
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4.2.2.2 Salomon Brothers Receivables Inc., CARS, Series 1
Salomon Brothers Receivables Inc., Series 1 (SAL 1) is a AAA rated special purpose 
company whose assets consist of $442.6 million worth of collateralised auto 
receivables purchased from Marine Midland Bank. SAL 1 issued two notes (A & 
Y) which Salomon Brothers Inc. placed on 17 November 1987. This issue has a 
‘pay-through’ structure — the same structure that is used when underwriting 
collateralised mortgage obligations (CMO).
4.2.2.2.1 Structure
SAL 1 ’s legal structure and cash flow are shown in Figure 20. Marine Midland Bank, 
N.A. is a New York bank that purchased and bundled a group of instalment sale 
contracts from New York State car dealers and then sold them to SAL 1. This 
indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of Salomon Inc. serves as a limited-purpose, 
bankruptcy-remote legal entity, established specifically to issue asset-backed 
obligations.
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Figure 20
Structure of Salomon Brothers Receivables Inc. CARS, Series 1
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Sal l ’s notes represent two tranches of senior debt that pay quarterly. Class Y has 
a coupon of 8.15 per cent with a guaranteed termination date of 15 November 1989, 
whilst Class A has a coupon of 8.50 per cent with a guaranteed termination of 15 
November 1990. The guaranteed termination dates are attractive to investors 
because they eliminate maturity uncertainty. The logic for having two tranches is 
the same as that used when issuing CMO: varying maturities allow the issuer to 
dynamically manage cash flow uncertainty resulting from prepayments.
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This transaction is supported by the following three credit enhancements, which 
were issued by the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS):
• 8.5 per cent Letter of Credit (LOC),
• 6.85 per cent Interest Guaranteed Investment Contract (IGIC) and
• Purchase Agreement
The 8.5 per cent LOC serves to cushion cash flow from problems with the underlying 
receivables. If these receivables fall in arrears or default, impeding the issuer’s 
ability to pay the note holders, the trustee — Chemical Bank — will draw on the 
LOC. This irrevocable letter of credit will support impaired cash flow to a maximum 
of $38 million (8.5 per cent of the ABS face value). This LOC cushion should 
support the receivables, even during harsh economic periods. Delinquencies for the 
Marine Midland Bank N.A. auto loan portfolio ranged from 2.38 per cent to 3.39 
per cent between 1983 and 1987, with defaults only ranging from 0.53 per cent to
0.59 per cent.
The 6.85 per cent IGIC serves to protect cash flow from reinvestment risk. If interest 
rates dropped severely, this could affect the yield on the intermediate cash flow. For 
example, let us assume that all the receivables are prepaid in full the day after the 
issue is sold and on the same day interest rates drop to 3 per cent. Three months 
later when the quarterly payment becomes due on the note, the issuer would not 
have enough cash to cover the debt. The IGIC significantly reduces this risk because 
it acts as an interest rate floor.
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The purchase agreement assures the note’s guaranteed maturity. The underlying 
receivables are in the form of amortising consumer debt, which has prepayment 
uncertainty. These receivables can prepay at any time or wait the full term of their 
contracts. If the pool experiences a zero prepayment rate, then the issuer will not be 
able to retire the Class Y notes in 1989. UBS, through their repurchase agreement, 
will buy a substitute Y note in the amount equal to the unpaid balance of the Y notes. 
If the same problem arises for the Class A notes, then UBS will purchase all the 
remaining receivables. This will enable the issuer to meet its obligations to investors.
To summarise, Marine Midland Bank, N.A., which is rated below AA, was able to 
attain AAA rates via SAL 1. This transaction, which was structured similarly to a 
CMO, attracted investors because it paid quarterly over a maximum guaranteed life. 
With a combination of proper credit underpinning, SAL 1 was able to offer two 
AAA notes that resembled traditional corporate debt.
4.2.3 Prepayment: Asset-Backed vs. Mortgage-Backed Securities
Prepayment is the most important variable to consider when assessing a US 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS). MBS prepayment rates exhibit ‘inverse 
convexity’ with relation to interest rates; that is to say, prepayment rates increase as 
interestrates decrease. We shall explain this in detail in Section 7.3. However, CARDS 
and CARS do not suffer inverse convexity because of the nature of their underlying 
receivables. In Figure 21, we show the prepayment sensitivity in relation to movements 
in interest rates.
99
SECURITIZATION AND THE GLOBAL MARKET
Figure 21
Prepayment Rates Sensitivity Based on Interest Rate Movements
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The reason why CARS prepayments remain relatively flat is that prepayment on auto 
loans is contingent on transfer, cashing out, repossession, loss or death. Effectively, 
all US auto loans are made with a ‘due-on-sale’ clause, and when the asset is transferred 
or traded-in the loan must be repaid. This is the primary cause of prepayment. The 
next item that can cause a prepayment is cashing-out. Cashing-out is the voluntary 
repayment of a loan and rarely occurs. When a vehicle is repossessed, it is sold and 
the proceeds are used to retire the debt, while losses due to fire, theft or death of the 
creditor are covered by insurance. Prepayments caused by refinancing are usually not 
economically beneficial for the consumer because auto loan rates are higher on 
second-hand cars.
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We also show in Figure 21 that the prepayment sensitivity to revolving credit (i.e. 
CARDS) is not significantly affected by swings in interest rates. Suppliers of revolving 
consumer credit adjust their rates when there are wide swings in the market. The 
different rates charged by credit card companies is marginal and does not offer any 
economic incentive for a consumer to prepay his debt with another credit card.
Investors are well aware of the CMO’s interest rate sensitivity and are demanding 
approximately 30 basis points above CARDS and CARS issues to compensate for the 
additional volatility. A CMO A Tranche currently yields 110 basis points over US 
treasuries, while ABS enjoy the narrower margin of 80 basis points.
4.3 Asset-Backed Securitization - Global Developments
Global corporate treasurers, commercial banks and international fund managers are 
investing heavily in asset-backed securities. Forexample, in November 1988, European 
investors purchased 15 per cent of Citibank’s $750 million card-backed issue, and in 
January 1989 they purchased over 25 per cent of Citibank’s $ 1 billion card-backed ABS 
deal. As global investors are learning more about ABS, their investment activities are 
increasing. The pressure is on for non-dollar issuers and there are several issues being 
offered. Italy and the United Kingdom have already issued car-backed securities.
4.3.1 Asset-Backed Securitization in the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom’s 1989 budget cleared away one of the major hurdles for 
asset-backed securities. Prior to the 1989 budget, sterling-denominated debt issues 
were limited to a five-year minimum maturity, which restricted securitization to 
long-term debt receivables. Mortgages were the only long-term homogeneous debt
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instruments that had enough depth to permit the securitization. Now that short and 
intermediate maturities are allowed, sterling asset-backed securities are being issued. 
Even though the selling side is cleared, there are still some minor difficulties hindering 
the underwriting of sterling asset-backed securities (SABS). The existing consumer 
credit laws complicate the securitization process. For example, a consumer who buys 
a new car on a hire purchase agreement has the right to return his car to the finance 
company without penalty once he has paid half the contracted price. This complicates 
structuring an ABS for an investment grade rating. Theoretically, every debtor could 
return his car to the originator half-paid. The potential losses due to this possibility 
would appear to make securitization prohibitively expensive.
Another significant cost is stamp duty. Whenever there is a transfer of assets, the 
Government taxes the value of the transfer at a rate of 1 per cent. There are exemptions 
for small transfers, but when transacting in hundreds of millions of pounds, this tax 
becomes excessive.
The development of SABS will be limited given the current environment. A thin 
supply of homogeneous receivables, combined with the previously mentioned UK 
consumer protection regulations, limits market penetration. The transfer of 
receivables is not restricted by English or Scottish law, and this is beneficial to SABS 
market growth. The problem that faces SABS underwriters is not the transferring of 
assets but what is being transferred. English title law, which dates back centuries, is 
not conducive to the bundling and transferring of assets. Additionally, UK financial 
lending methods are splintered and not designed for a secondary market. To find a
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large pool of homogeneous receivables with clear rights of recourse could be a difficult 
task. The legal restraints, tax costs and standardised financing methods will need to 
fall in line before sterling asset-backed securitization can develop into a sizable market.
Another problem with trying to securitize sterling receivables is that medium-term 
sterling investors prefer floating rate notes as opposed to fixed-rate. This could 
complicate the underwriting process because funding fixed-rate consumer debt with 
floating-rate loans can be dangerous if the margins are thin. If the floating rate ‘cost 
of funds’ exceeds the fixed-rate ‘source of funds’, cash flow dwindle and losses are 
incurred. In the case of credit cards, margins are wide enough to support any short-term 
swings in interest rates, and long-term movements could be offset by increasing the 
card rate. Additionally, auto loans could be made on a floating rate, eliminating the 
floating/fixed rate mismatch.
Given the efficiency and savings inherent in the securitization process, SABS should 
develop as the primary markets are standardised and Government restraints are 
removed. In 1987, sceptics of sterling mortgage-backed securities said that SMBS 
were a ‘fluke’ and would never survive in the UK financial environment. Today, those 
sceptics are silent. As securitization has established itself in the mortgage market, 
SABS should also find their niche.
4.3.2 Asset-Backed Securitization in France (titrisatiori)
French legislators, in December 1988, laid the ground work for titrisation (French for 
securitization). The French law allows underwriters to securitize many types of 
amortising debt. After studying the US asset-backed securities market, the French
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government decided to adopt titrisation into its financial market in the hope that it 
would stimulate free market growth. The government’s purpose for introducing 
titrisation was threefold:
• to support the housing finance industry,
• to lower the cost of consumer credit and
• to give banks an additional means of balance sheet management
The French government, through an autonomous state agency, Caisse des Depots et 
Consignations (CDC), is taking an active part in developing the securitization process. 
While other financial institutions were waiting for the French government to finalise 
the titrisation legislation, CDC, which is given certain legal privileges, had already 
issued a mortgage-backed security.
The French government rightly believes that titrisation is an efficient form of 
intermediation which can help lower the cost of consumer credit. They want to lower 
consumer credit cost, but they do not want to support credit abuse. Therefore, they 
are allowing only amortising credit to be securitised. This aids the financing of durable 
goods like cars but is designed to deter credit card mania.
Furthermore, titrisation offers French banks an effective tool for balance sheet 
management French banks need effective ways to improve capital-to-asset ratios. 
Currently in France the capital requirement for banks is 5 per cent of assets, but they 
must have capital backing of 8 per cent by 1992 to be in line with the Bank of 
International Settlement. Securitization provides the banks with a cost-effective way 
of transferring assets without suffering significant loss.
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter served as a general introduction to non-mortgage securitized debt 
instruments — a market which deserves continued monitoring, for asset-backed 
securitization should continue to show remarkable growth during the 1990s. As capital 
markets and financing techniques become globalised, ABS will play a crucial role in 
corporate finance. Serving as a cost-efficient alternative to traditional debt, this method 
of financing will be adopted in the United Kingdom and the rest of the world. It will 
be fascinating to see how this method of financing is integrated into the various 
international capital markets.
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CHAPTER 5 
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FUTURES MARKETS
A hedging methodology for the sterling mortgage-backed security (SMBS) is developed 
later in this thesis using currency swaps. This section will show that swaps are the most 
cost-efficient financial instrument used in hedging foreign exchange risk on long term 
multiperiod static cash flow. To understand the rationale for this argument, it is important 
to know the history and development of financial futures, which are the basic component 
of most financial hedging instruments.
FUTURES MARKET commodity or financial exchange where future contracts
are traded[19]
FUTURES CONTRACT ‘a commitment to deliver or receive a standardised
quantity and quality of a commodity (or financial 
instrument) at a specified future date.’[20]
5.1 General Introduction
Futures trading is not unique to this century; its origins can be traced back to about 
2000 BC, when merchants took goods on consignment for barter from the Bahrein 
Island to India. As civilisations developed and trade increased, there came a need for 
an effective system in which to exchange commodities. There emerged a need for 
money, laws, an established market for exchange and, eventually, the futures market. 
The first semblance of today’s modem futures exchange began in seventeenth century 
Japan when merchants traded ‘rice tickets’ (warehouse receipts) on an organised 
exchange. In the eighteenth century the ‘to arrive’ contract, was widely traded in Europe
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and was the immediate predecessor to the modem day futures contract. The nineteenth 
century marked the birth of today’s current exchanges when, in 1848, the Chicago Board 
of Trade (CBOT), the world’s oldest active commodity exchange, was established.
Before describing the historical development of commodities markets (synonymous 
with futures market), it is best to summarise the five basic methods of exchange:
BARTER One commodity is exchanged for another without the use of money.
CASH Commodities are exchanged simultaneously based on an accepted medium of 
exchange.
SPOT A sample of a commodity is tendered for sell at ‘the spot* rate of trade but not 
exchanged there.
FORWARD Two parties agree on an exchange of a specific quality and quantity of a 
commodity for a specific amount to be delivered at a future date. Also known 
as the ‘To Arrive’ or ‘Lettre de Faire’ contract.
FUTURE This form of trading is the only one that requires an established exchange with 
standardised contracts. The exchange sets the standard grades for the articles, 
contract lengths, and method of delivery.
5.2 Early Trade
The first transactions were based on the barter system. As civilisations became more 
complex and commerce increased there came the need for money—an accepted medium 
of exchange.
In 344 BC, shortly after the Gallic invasion of Rome, Lucius Furius built a temple to 
Juno Moneta (the Monitress). Attached to this temple was the first Roman mint, in 
which they coined moneta, hence our word money.
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Money was first coined in Lydia23 during the sixth or seventh century BC. These coins 
were basically a commodity (like silver) which was stamped to signify unit weight and 
standard quality. The Lydia coins were not widely accepted by their sceptical foreign 
neighbours, who preferred their personal mark over the mint’s stamp. Silver talents24 
and shekels grew to be the accepted medium of exchange in the major empires of 
Palestine, Syria, and Greece. As time progressed, the prevailing ruling bodies 
established acceptable weights and standards, which were based on a counting of readily 
available, commonly uniform items such as barley-corns, carats,25 or cowries. This 
primitive practice was used as late as the thirteenth century, when the English 
Government defined a penny sterling to be the weight of ‘32 wheat corns in the midst 
of the ear’.[21] Today money holds no intrinsic value but is accepted as legal tender 
for domestic transactions.
As villages grew into cities, there came the birth of the common market place. These 
markets became a nest of activity at the heart of most cities, providing a forum for ease 
of exchange using barter and cash transactions. The air would come to life as merchants 
haggled over value in much the same way that modem futures markets’ floor traders 
use the ‘open outcry system’ to establish price.26
During the medieval age, trade grew and so did the need for a common meeting place 
for merchants. Trade fairs began sprouting up in the larger cities, which provided a
23 According to Brewers’ s Dictionary of Phrase and Fable , Cassel, London 1959, p. 575 - Lydia was the ancient name of 
a district in the middle of Asia Minor which was an important centre of early civilisation and exerted much influence on 
Greece.
24 Talents are an ancient unit of weight used in Palestine and Syria: 1 talent equaled 3,000 shekels, and in Greece a talent 
was equal to 6,000 Drachmas.
25 Carat as derived from the Greek word meaning carob bean.
26The rules and regulations of the Chicago Board of Trade require that pit traders use an open outcry in buying and 
selling.
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venue where merchants could trade in bulk. The long journeys over robber-ridden 
highways made it too cumbersome and dangerous for merchants to carry all their goods 
to market. The merchants would bring samples of their goods to the trade fairs, thus 
offering but a trivial bounty to the highwaymen.
The merchants would establish their price at the ‘spot’ of exchange and arrange for 
transfer of the commodity from their storage centres. Title and moneys would change 
hands at the time of delivery. Thus the origin of the "spot price", a term used in the 
futures market which in essence means today’s price or current price.
Trade fairs were usually held annually, lasting for as long as a month. Due to this 
relatively short period for trade, and as commerce increased, there came the need for 
a permanent venue. In the sixteenth century, major trading centres were built in massive 
buildings which each housed a storage centre, a floor of exchange, and a clearing 
house.27 Through the following centuries these exchanges splintered into specialised 
functions. Storage centres were built close to the harbours for ease of transportation. 
The trading floors and clearing houses took root in the central business districts of the 
major cities and grew into the world’s current commodity and financial markets.
5.3 The First Futures Exchange
The first recorded case of organised futures trading occurred in Japan in the 1600s. 
During the Tokugawa era (1603-1868) wealthy feudal landlords were always in need
27 A clearing house serves as an intermediary for market participants. The clearing house may standardise contracts, 
assume credit risk and provide accounting.
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of cash to keep up their lavish households and impressive garrisons. The need for a 
constant cash flow from a seasonal income, combined with poor budgeting, created a 
vacuum which the futures market filled.
The Shogun, Tokugawa, decreed that his feudal lords were to stay in residence in the 
capital city of Edo (Tokyo) for at least six months a year, and when they were away 
their families were to stay as insurance against disloyalty. This allowed the Shogun to 
keep dominion over his Imperial Court. By decree the feudal lords would travel 
throughout Japan in lavish caravans heavily guarded by samurai while attending to 
affairs of state. In addition to paying travel expenses and supporting two major 
households, these men of honour were constantly required to fund municipal 
improvements such as building roads, reclaiming land, and repairing castles.
These feudal lords derived their income primarily from the rice and other crops that 
were grown on their lands and sold at market in Edo and Osaka. As with any agrarian 
product, prices fluctuated drastically due to seasonal supply and demand. It was usually 
feast or famine, and for the lords it was always a feast! The constant drain of cash and 
the seasonal income left these poor budgeters in need of cash. They first started to sell 
"rice tickets", which functioned as warehouse receipts, to rice merchants.
The merchants used these rice tickets to offset anticipated needs, thus hedging their 
supply line. Hedging is using an investment to offset the risk of another investment or 
future need by keeping the aggregate price, as shown on Figure 22, relatively flat, like 
a hedge row. The rice tickets became so commonly used that they developed into a 
means of currency. It is interesting to note that government officials were the first to
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administer these rice tickets but the merchants eventually took full control of this market.
Figure 22 
Hedging Rice Tickets
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As the demand for cash continued while the warehouse supplies dwindled, the men of 
the court began to borrow from the merchants, using future warehouse receipts as 
collateral. These loans, while bearing a high rate of interest, were very advantageous 
to the merchants, enabling them to become wealthier than some of the lords they served.
In 1650 the first Japanese futures market was established in Osaka in the home of a 
shrewd and wealthy merchant named Yodoya. This was the hub of Japan’s rice trade, 
where merchants met to exchange information and establish prices. The ‘spot price’
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forrice was known as ‘The price at Yodoya’s’. Forty-seven years later Yodoya moved 
the exchange to the Dojima district in Osaka, and the market was renamed as the Dojima 
Rice Market.
The Dojima Rice Market marked the establishment of the world’s first futures market. 
In 1730, the Tokugawa Shogunate officially sanctioned this market, which was entirely 
formed and structured by the private merchants. Its activities and system of exchange 
were accepted unchanged and were protected by the supreme power of the land.
Tokugawa Shogunate officially designated it ‘Cho-Ai-Mai-Kaisho’ (literally translated 
as ‘rice-trade-on-book meeting place’) and it was to be governed under the rules on the 
following page:
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Table 11
RULES OF CHO AI MAI KAISHO
1. The contract term was limited to four months.
2. The year was divided approximately into three four-month periods.
3. At the end of each contract period the market was closed for a few days.
4. Trading was carried on in rice only.
5. All contracts in any four-month term were standardised.
6. The basic grade for any contract period was chosen by the traders by majority 
vote. There were four grades available.
7. No physical delivery of grain against outstanding contracts was permissible.
8. All differences in value had to be settled in cash.
9. All contracts had to be settled and accounts cleared on or before the last day of
the trading period.
10. No contracts could be carried over into the new contract period.
11. All traders had to be cleared through a clearing-house.
12. Every trader was required to establish a line of credit with the clearing-house 
of his choice.
13. Any default in payments was borne by the clearing-house.
14. The clearing houses were non-profit operations, but a commission was charged 
for services rendered.
15. No new contracts could be made during the last three days of any trading 
period.
These rules are remarkably similar to those of modem commodity futures markets with 
one exception: the Cho-Ai-Mai-Kaisho futures contract had to be settled in cash. This 
rule segregated the futures market from the spot because contracts could not be settled 
in kind. As the Tokugawan period came to an end, the economy became unstable, 
which resulted in violent moves in rice prices. With the dichotomy between the futures 
market and the spot market, and with high price volatility, there was little, if any,
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resemblance between spot and futures prices. In desperation contract lengths were 
shortened to two months in 1863, and then, in a final attempt to save the market, contract 
lengths were shortened to one month in 1869.
This final attempt was to little avail. The Meiji regime came to power that year and 
closed all futures trading because it regarded the futures trading as a form of gambling. 
The ruler considered only the speculative component of this market and failed to 
consider the hedging instruments it provided. However, this forced closure was short 
lived; within two years the government was forced to authorise futures trading so as to 
bring order to the rice markets. During the market’s resurrection a new rule was 
introduced, which allowed all futures contracts to be settled in kind. On the settlement 
date the person who was ‘short’ (the person who sold the contract) could go to the 
market and purchase rice at the current price then deliver the rice to the person who 
was ‘long’ (the person who bought the contract). Allowing physical delivery of the 
commodity to settle the futures contract tied the cash market to the futures market, 
which served to stabilise prices even during unstable periods.
The world’s futures markets continue to operate today basically under the same rules 
as they did two hundred years ago in Japan. The futures markets have grown 
considerably and have expanded to include a variety of contracts, ranging from pork 
bellies to pools of US government guaranteed mortgages.
5.4 European History
During the sixteenth century, Antwerp held the title as being the ‘most renowned 
merchandising City that ever was in the World’.[22] It was in these markets that
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unsanctioned futures and option trading began. Merchants would place wagers on items 
of a vast array of interest, from the possibility of ships returning to the sex of an unborn 
child. It was to these gambling merchants that we can attribute the origins of marine 
insurance, forward contracts, futures contracts and options.
Amsterdam became the financial hub of Northwest Europe after the political unrest in 
Antwerp during the 1570s. Trading in the ‘to arrive’ (i.e. still afloat) contract in grains 
became a common practice. The ‘to arrive’ contract was the immediate predecessor to 
the modem forward contract. It was a contract that simply stated that the grain would 
be purchased upon arrival at a predetermined price.
During the early seventeenth century options were offered on a variety of commodities, 
including herrings, grain, spices, whale-oil and salt. Gerard Malynes, a seventeenth 
century writer and trader, describes option trading this way:
And this bargaining is most proper for such and the like commodities, 
the price whereof doth quickly rise and fall, and are also commodious 
when a mans money is not so ready to buy much, and to make a great 
employment with little money, which happeneth upon some sudden advice 
many times unexpected, whereupon men are very hot either to buy or 
sell: which is much used in Flanders in buying of Herring, before they 
are catched, by "stellegelf, as they called it, that is by a summe of money 
agreed upon to be paid, if  the partie doeth repent himselfe o f the 
bargaine.."[23]
Stellegelt was basically the practice of setting a prearranged price on the future delivery 
of a certain commodity. If the buyer chose not to fulfil his end of the bargain then he 
was to pay a set fee. This ex post facto option fee was the option price and in modem 
option markets is paid ex ante.
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The United Kingdom’s cotton industry formed the foundation on which modem futures 
markets were built. In 1841 the Cotton Brokers’ Association was formed by ninety 
firms. Its mission was to assimilate information and develop a code of conduct. This 
group of merchants is considered to be the parent body of organised futures trading.
The ‘to arrive’ market, the immediate predecessor of the forward market, began to 
flourish in the 1840s when Samuel Cunard’s Steam Packets began running regularly 
across the Atlantic. These steam powered, paddle wheel, wood boats offered fast, 
reliable transatlantic crossings. These three-mast single-funnel ships would carry 
information on crop reports and bulk samples from North America to the British cotton 
merchants six to seven weeks prior to the arrival of the goods. The ‘to arrive’ market 
grew as merchants were eager to pre-sell their goods to dealers and manufactures who 
wanted to hedge their supply needs.
5.5 Development of Financial Futures
According to Merton H. Miller, Milton Friedman is credited as the first person to 
conceptualise financial futures. In 1971, when Friedman was a member of the 
Department of Economics at the University of Chicago, he believed that the British 
pound was over-valued and wanted to ‘ short’ the pound. However, none of the Chicago 
banks would accommodate his request. During a social occasion, he mentioned his 
dilemma to Leo Melamed, an employee of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange who had 
close ties with the university. Melamed pursued the concept and within a year the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange formed the International Money Market (IMM), which 
offered the first currency futures contract. This fired the imagination of financial market 
participants and propagated the development of financial derivatives.
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Soon after, on 20 October 1975, the first true financial futures were introduced by the 
Chicago Board of Trade — the Government National Mortgage 
Association-Collateralised Depository Receipts, (GNMA-CDR), or better known in 
street terms as the ‘Ginnie Mae 8s.’ This contract was revolutionary for it provided 
cash market users the opportunity to hedge their interest rate sensitivity. This contract 
was offered in response to the demands of mortgage-bankers who were in need of an 
instrument to hedge the interest rate risk exposure they carried on their mortgage 
pipelines. Mortgage bankers have to warehouse their mortgages until they have enough 
to bundle into a MBS. For example, one must have $1,000,000 before one can issue a 
GNMA. During the warehousing period, mortgage bankers are completely exposed to 
interest rate movements. The GNMA’s futures offered them a method of hedging this 
risk.
The Ginnie Mae 8s are based on a stated deliverable GNMA with a $100,000 principal 
balance bearing an 8 per cent coupon or a suitable GNMA which would emulate the 8 
per cent yield. The futures contracts require an initial margin of $2,000 and the delivery 
months are March, June, September and December. As within the futures market, 
settlements on GNMA 8s are normally made in cash, but may be settled in kind. 
Therefore, it is important to know the price of the cheapest to deliver contract because, 
as already mentioned, spot price must equal the delivery price when the contract matures, 
or else arbitrage opportunities would exist For a detailed description and explanation 
see Johnston (1986).
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5.6 Conclusion
Since the introduction of Ginnie Mae 8s there has been a proliferation of new financial 
instruments. To cite all of them would be beyond the scope of this thesis; nevertheless, 
the ones relative to this thesis will be reviewed in the next section. Even though the 
first financial futures has been primarily replaced by the T bill futures when hedging 
mortgages, it is important to note that demand by the mortgage market served to 
revolutionise the financial industry and will continue to serve as a breeding ground for 
financial innovation.
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CHAPTER 6 
FINANCIAL HEDGING INSTRUMENTS
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, GNMA 8 s were created to help mortgage 
bankers manage the interest rate risk on mortgages in their pipeline28. Even though 
Treasury futures are mainly used today in lieu of GNMA 8s, the introduction of the 
GNMA 8s sparked the creation of a thriving financial futures market. Today, the financial 
markets offer an array of various financial risk management instruments that allows 
investors to expand their investment horizon.
As securitized products of various types proliferate and are integrated into international 
capital markets, interest from foreign investors arises. Because foreign exchange rate 
risk may cause unwanted additional risk to foreign market participants, a need for hedging 
emerges. This chapter defines foreign exchange risk in Section 6.1; reviews hedging 
instruments, markets and pricing in Section 6.2; and in the final section offers some 
foreign exchange rate hedging methodologies.
6.1 Currency Risk
"So much of barbarism, however, still remains in the transactions of most 
civilized nations, that almost all independent countries choose to assert their 
nationality by having, to their own inconvenience and that of their 
neighbours, a peculiar currency o f their own." John Stuart Mill (1806-73).
Just as were nineteenth century investors, modem investors in international capital 
markets are exposed to foreign exchange risk. Modem capital market theory defines
28 Pipeline it the term used to describe mortgages that are being warehoused until a  critical mass is formed to achieve 
securitization.
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foreign exchange risk as ‘the systematic risk associated with a foreign currency 
denominated return (or cost) stream and measured by the covariance between the rate 
of change of the exchange rate and the domestic market return’.[24]
From 1944 to March of 1973, international investors were not especially concerned 
with foreign exchange risk because major currencies were under a quasi-fixed exchange 
rate system. But after the demise of the Bretton Woods agreement (1944 to 1971), 
followed by the short-lived Smithsonian Accord (1971-1973), there emerged the current 
floating exchange rate system.
Today, whenever an investment is made in a major foreign currency, with an expected 
funds flow back to the domestic currency, an exchange risk exists. Foreign exchange 
(FX) rates are stochastic and can drastically affect the return on any given investment 
To limit this risk, a vast array of hedging instruments has been developed. FX hedging 
is the technique of taking a position in an investment which will offset the FX risk in 
existing or expected foreign exchange commitment.
6.2 Types of Hedging Instruments
Increased volatility in the foreign exchange market has caused a rapid growth in the 
number and type of hedging instruments that are available to investors. This section 
will review the structure, markets, pricing, benefits and drawbacks of each instrument.
6.2.1 Forward Contracts
A currency forward contract is an agreement to deliver at a future date a specified sum 
of currency at an agreed exchange rate. This method guarantees the future exchange
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rate and so eliminates exchange rate uncertainty. It is very effective for hedging a 
foreign investment with a guaranteed cash flow. In practice, most forward contracts 
have a maturity of five years or less.
The value of a forward contract at origination is zero, and the parties involved do not 
incur any cost until the settlement date. Forward contracts are formed in the interbank 
market. Trading is done via an informal network of telephones and telexes between 
banks, foreign exchange brokers and large corporations. This market has high entry 
barriers because of the size of the contracts, usually ranging from three to ten million 
dollars, and is illiquid because forward contracts are not tradeable.
The primary rationale for using forward contracts for hedging, as well as the valuation 
of forward contracts, is based on the interest rate parity theorem. This theorem (Eq. 
6.1) states that interest rate differentials are equal to forward and spot exchange rate 
differentials. For example, in a world of frictionless currency exchange markets, the 
sterling rate of interest, adjusted for the interest rate differential, must be the same as 
the US dollar interest rate.
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From Equation 6.1 the pricing formula for a forward contract is derived.
r-o (6.2)r
(T -0
'  ( ! + * / ) '
Where:
Fd is the forward exchange rate given in the domestic currency per unit of 
7 the foreign currency 
Sd is the spot exchange rate given in the domestic currency per unit of the 
7 foreign currency
Rd is the risk free rate for the domestic currency
Rf  is the risk free rate for the foreign currency
T is the termination date
t is purchase date
Y is the total number of days in a year29
A forward contract price is always derived from the Interest Rate Parity Theorem 
because if this price diverged significantly from parity, arbitrage opportunities would 
exist
To better understand the rationale of forward pricing, consider the price valuation for 
a US dollar forward contract for sterling with a trade date of 15 September 1989 and 
a delivery date of 15 September 1990. Assume that the UK one year Euro-sterling
9 When evaluating Deutsche marks, French francs, Japanese yen or Swiss francs, use 360 days; when evaluating British 
pounds, Australian dollars and Canadian dollars, use 365 days.
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rate is 14 per cent, the one year Euro-dollar rate is 9 per cent and that the spot value 
of the pound is $ 1.584. After applying Equation 6.2 the forward price of pounds would 
be $1,515.
If the forward price were less than (greater than) $1,515 then one could make riskless 
profits by borrowing (lending) pounds at spot and buying (selling) pounds forward. 
For example, let us assume the forward rate is $1,700 instead of $1,515. One could 
borrow $8,173,375 at 9 per cent and exchange for pounds at spot which will equal 
£5,159,959 ($8,173,375 X .631) and invest in sterling for a year at 14 per cent. During 
this transaction one would simultaneously sell forward $10,000,000 at a rate of $1.700, 
which would result in a $1,091,022 arbitrage profit.
The transaction would be as follows:
On 15 September 1989
(a) borrow $8,173,375 and exchange for £5,159,959
(b) sell $10,000,000 forward
On 15 September 1990
(a) receive £5,882,353 and settle forward contract $10,000,000
(b) Pay loan plus interest -$8.908.978
Leaving a net risk-free profit of $1,091,022
The essence of the Interest Rate Parity Theorem is the establishment of a relationship 
between the premium (or discount) on a forward contract for foreign exchange based 
on the differential in interest rates on securities that are identical in all respects except 
for the issuing currency.
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Historically, the forward price will vary around the traditional interest rate parity 
equilibrium point. Jacob (1975) describes a neutral band around this equilibrium point 
and proves that due to various transaction costs, arbitrage profits do not exist. This 
explains why the basis30 will fluctuate when the FX market is at equilibrium.
6.2.2 Futures
Currency futures contracts began trading on the International Monetary Market (IMM), 
a division of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), on 16 May 1972. Table 12 
gives specifications of the IMM currency futures contracts. The creation of this 
exchange marked the beginning of the financial futures market. This market has grown 
rapidly with trading taking place worldwide through various central exchanges. For 
a listing of all markets including types of contracts traded see the FUTURES 
supplement ‘1989 International Guide to Futures/Options Markets’.
Table 12
Currency Futures Contracts Specifications
Australian
Dollar
(AD)
. British 
Pound 
(BP)
C anadian
Dollar
(CD)
Deutsche
M arket
(DM)
French
F ranc
(FF)
Japanese
Yen
(JY)
Swiss
Franc
(SF)
European 
Currency 
Unit (EC)
Trading Unit in 0000) AD100, DP25, CD100, DM125, FR250, JY12,500, SF125, EC125,
Quotations US$ per A$ US$ per 
UK£
US$ per 
C$
US$ per 
mark
US$ per 
FF
US$ per¥ US$ per 
SF
US$ per 
ECU
Min. Price Change 0.01% 0.05% 0.01% 0.01% 0.05% 0.0001% 0.01% 0.01%
Value of One Point $10.00 $12.50 $10.00 $12.50 $12.50 $12.50 $12.50 $12.50
Price Limit None
M onths Traded March, June, September and December
Last Day of Trading Two business days before the third Wednesday of the delivery month
Delivery The third Wednesday of the delivery month
Source: Chicago Mercantile Exchange
30 Basis is the difference between the forward price and the spot price. For an detailed explanation of basis, see Section 
6.2.2. 1.
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Futures contracts are initially priced in the same way as forward contracts. However, 
as explained in Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2, they are traded on a formal exchange with 
standardised contracts. The exchange requires each participant to deposit a percentage 
of the value of the contract in a margin account which is held by the broker. This 
margin account may vary in value every trading day when the contracts are 
‘marked-to-market’. This means that on every trading day the accounts are re-balanced 
as to price. Given that there is a price movement, the gaining party’s margin account 
will be credited whilst the losing party’s margin account will be debited. Table 13 
illustrates the cash flow of a futures trade.
Table 13 
Cash Flow of Marked-to-market
Date Item Futures
price
price
change
profit
/-loss
account
balance
Mon. 5/11 Buys one December £  future
Post initial margin with brokerage firm
$43,750.00 2,187.50
Tues. 6/11 Marked-to-market $45,000.00 100 1,250.00 3,437.50
Wed. 7/11 Marked-to-market $44,062.50 -75 937.50 2,500.00
Thurs. 8/11 Marked-to-market
Margin call of $329 to bring balance to 5%
$43,437.50 -50 625.00 1.875.00
2.204.00
Fri. 9/11 Marked-to-market $44,687.50 100 1,250.00 3,454.00
Mon. 12/11 Sell 1 December £  futures to close $44,687.50
In our illustration, on the fifth of November an investor buys one December £ future 
priced at $1.75 per pound sterling. A sterling futures contract represents £25,000; 
therefore the price of the contract is $43,750. When he buys the futures contract he 
is required to deposits $2,187 (5% of $43,750) with his brokerage firm to establish 
his margin account The following day, the December futures moves up 100 points 
and his margin account is credited with $1,250. However, the next day his position 
drops 75 points. After the drop he retains over 5 per cent of the futures price in his
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margin account Unfortunately, the following day, Thursday 8/11, his position drops 
another 75 points and he receives a call from his broker informing him that he must 
deposit money into his margin account to bring the margin balance to equal 5 per cent 
of the futures price. This is referred to as a ‘margin call.’ If the investor does not 
deposit the $329 into his margin account the broker is forced to close the investor 
position. In this transaction, the broker would sell one December £ contract, which 
would close the position.
Fortunately, the investor made the margin call and earned 100 points the following 
day. He closed his position by selling a December £ futures. In this example, our 
investors earned $625 on a total investment of $2,518.50 or a 1,825 per cent annual 
return.
6.2.2.1 Basis
The change in price during the above transaction is referred to as the movement in 
basis. Basis is the futures price minus the spot price. As Figure 23 shows, the basis 
tends to zero as the futures delivery date approaches. However, the basis, or gap, 
between the spot and futures does not converge at a constant rate. The fluctuation 
around the equilibrium point is referred to as basis risk. On the delivery date the 
basis is always equal to zero because on that date the futures price and spot price are 
equal.
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Figure 23
THE CONVERGENCE OF SPOT AND FUTURES PRICES
Futures price
Basis
Spot price<Do
CL
Time Delivery date
6.23 Forwards vs. Futures
Practitioners usually regard the forward and futures markets as synonymous. Either 
market can be used to hedge foreign exchange risk and it is assumed that both serve 
the same economic function. Seemingly, the only perceptible differences are 
administrative; forward contracts are settled at maturity, whereas futures contracts can 
be viewed as being settled daily. Black’s (1976) seminal article explains in detail the 
different payment schedules. He deduces that the two markets are equivalent; that is, 
forward prices are equal to future prices when interests rates on constant.
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In practice, however, this is not true. In reality interest rates fluctuate, affecting the 
price of futures contracts when compared to the price of forward contracts. Cox, 
Ingersoll, and Ross (1981) prove that when interest rates are stochastic, there is a 
fundamental difference between the pricing of forward and futures contracts.
Even though forward and futures contracts are initially priced using the same theory, 
they serve different functions. Because of transaction costs, they are not perfect 
substitutes. The forward market tailors large contracts, usually ranging from three 
million to ten million dollars, whereas the futures market has a set of small 
"ready-made" contracts. These differences should become evident from Table 14, 
which compares and contrasts the futures and forward markets.
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Table 14
COMPARISON OF THE FUTURES MARKET TO THE FORWARD
MARKET
Futures Market Forward Market
1. Trading is conducted in a competitive arena by 
"open outcry” o f bids, offers and amounts.
1. Trading is done by telephone or telex, with banks 
generally dealing directly with other banks, foreign 
exchange brokers or corporations.
2. Participants are either buyers or sellers of a contract 
at a single, specified price at any given time.
2. Participants quote a  bid (buy) and asked (sell) price.
3. Non-member participants deal through exchange 
members who represent them on the trading floor.
3. Participants deal on a principal-to-principal basis, either 
directly or through brokers.
4. Market participants usually are unknown to one 
another , except when a firm is trading its own 
account through its own brokers on the trading 
floor.
4. Participants in each transaction always know the other 
trading party.
5. Participants include banks, corporations, financial 
institutions, individual investors and speculators.
S. Participants are banks dealing with each other, and other 
major commercial entities. Access is limited for 
individuals and small firms.
6. Trading prices are disseminated continuously by 
the exchange.
6. Indicated bids and offers are available throughout the 
interbank market
7. The exchange’s clearing house acts as the opposite 
side of cleared transaction and so credit risk 
monitoring is reduced.
7. Each counter party with whom a dealer does business 
must be examined individually as to credit quality. This 
offers a wide range o f credit capabilities of participants.
8. Margins are required of all participants. 8. Margins are not required by banks dealing with other 
banks, although for smaller, non-bank customers, 
margins may be required.
9. Settlements are made daily via the exchange’s 
clearing house. Gains on position values may be 
withdrawn and losses are collected daily.
9. Gains and losses are realised on settlement date.
10. Usually less than one percent of all traded 
contracts result in actual delivery.
10. The majority o f trades result in delivery.
11. The market is very liquid. 11. Forward positions are hard to offset or transfer. The 
market is illiquid.
12. All contracts are standardised. 12. All contracts terms are negotiated.
13. Prices are usually quoted in US dollars per foreign 
currency unit
13. Prices are quoted in domestic currency unit per foreign 
unit except for sterling and some Commonwealth 
currencies.
14. A single commission is charged and is negotiated 
between the broker and customer.
14. No commissions are charged if  the transaction is made 
directly with another bank or customer. A commission 
is charged if  transacted through a foreign exchange 
broker.
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6.2.4 Currency Options
When dealing with hedging foreign exchange rate risk, there are instances where cash 
flow is not certain. For example, the bulk of Jaguar’s automobile production is sold 
in the United States for US dollars. Therefore, Jaguar’s treasurer wants to hedge his 
US$ exposure, because if the dollar depreciates relative to the pound, so will Jaguar’s 
earnings. The treasurer could use futures to lock in the exchange rate. However, he 
is uncertain as to the number of automobiles that will sell and as to the timing of the 
sales. In this case, using Jaguar’s sales forecast, the treasurer could sell dollar futures 
equal to what he believes to be the minimal dollar cash flow and buy US$ currency 
options to hedge the difference between the minimum sales and expected sales. This 
strategy is robust because it does not obligate the treasurer to exchange the ‘uncertain’ 
dollar cash flow but gives him the right to exchange US dollars for sterling at his 
discretion. To better understand currency options, this section will explain how these 
options are structured, priced and traded.
A currency option gives the owner the right to exchange one currency for another at 
a preset quantity, exchange rate and date or dates (depending on the type of option). 
A ‘call option’ gives the owner the right to buy a predetermined quantity of one 
currency for another; a ‘put option’ entitles the owner to sell a set quantity at an agreed 
price. Since currency options were first introduced on the Philadelphia Exchange in 
December 1982, they have shown remarkable growth and expansion throughout 
international markets.
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There are two types of options: American and European. The American option may 
be exercised from inception till maturity; the European option may only be exercised 
at maturity.
Theoretical option pricing gained practitioners’ recognition when Black and Scholes 
published their seminal paper in 1973. This paper derives the price of a European call 
option on a stock. Based on this pricing theory and Merton (1973), numerous currency 
option pricing models have been developed. The next section reviews the development 
of currency option pricing theory and presents a pricing model.
6.2.4.1 Pricing
Feiger and Jacquillat (1979) were the first to suggest the opening of a market for 
options on foreign exchange. They developed a pricing model based on a variant of 
Merton’s option pricing model when interest rates are uncertain. By first pricing a 
currency option bond,31 they attempted to derive a foreign currency option price. 
They showed that the two-currency option bond is equivalent to a single-currency 
bond plus an FX option. However, they failed to find a simple closed-form solution.32
Grabbe (1983)[25] was able to develop a rational pricing model with a closed-form 
solution that derived an exact pricing equation for European currency options when 
interest rates are stochastic. Following Merton’s (1973) approach, and expanding on 
his methodology by introducing an additional stochastic bond, Grabbe derived the 
following closed form solution for the European currency call option:
31A currency option bond allows the holder to choose between two currencies in which coupons and principal are paid 
according to a predetermined exchange rate.
32 A closed-form solution is a standard mathematical expression whose values can easly be obtained from a set of 
published tables.
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c(t) = B(t,T) [F & T m d r ) -X N (d 2)] (6.3)
Where:
In (FIX)+^T
d' =
In ( F IX ) - ^ T
^  cWf
and
CT 1o = J  -<rp(t + T -il,il)d \i,
Where:
o k t.T ) -is the instantaneous variance of dF(t,T)/F, where dF is the stochastic 
differential of F.
t -is the current date
T -is the time until expiration
c{t) -is the domestic currency price at time t of a European call option written 
on one unit of foreign exchange.
B(t,T) -is the domestic currency price of a pure discount bond which pays one unit 
of domestic currency at t + T.
F(t,T) -is the forward domestic currency price of a unit of foreign exchange, for 
a contract made at time t and which matures at time t + T
X -is the domestic currency exercise price of an option on foreign currency.
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The following is an example of how this equation is used to determine the price of a 
European currency call option.
Assume that we want to price a three-month call option on US dollars. The current 
continuous risk-free rates in the UK and the US are 14 per cent and 8 per cent 
respectively. The current exchange rate is £0.625 per US$; we shall assume a 14.9 
per cent standard deviation and an exercise price of £0.65. Therefore our terms will 
become:
Current rate — 0.625
Forward rate Fm = 0.634445
Exercise price X  = 0.65
Risk-free Domestic r£= 0.14
Risk-free Foreign r$= 0.08
Time T=  0.25
Discounted bond B(t,T)= e 'rJ
Standard deviation G= 0.149
By entering this data into Equation 6.3, we derive the option price of £ 0.0511. Thus, 
it will cost the investor 5.1 lp to have the right to purchase $1 at a price of £0.65 three 
months from now.
Option prices will vary from their theoretical price even in efficient markets where 
no arbitrage profits exist. These differences are almost certainly due to the fairly 
strong assumptions used in the development of the pricing model. One of these 
assumptions is that foreign exchange rates can be modelled as an Ito processes. This 
essentially assumes that there exists some transformation of the foreign exchange 
rates which can then be modelled directly as a Wiener process, which looks like a
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normal distribution. Exchange rates are not normally distributed. Empirical evidence 
suggests that exchange rates are best described as non-normal members of the 
Pareto-Levy33 class of probability distribution (Westerfield[26] and Vinso & 
Rogalski[27]).
An additional source of potential error in the theoretical price is that volatility may 
change. Implied volatilities are used when pricing options, but market anticipation 
may change, thus causing option prices to increase (decrease) if volatility increases 
(decreases).
6.2.4.2 Markets
The major currency option markets are in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
International Monetary Market Division and the Philadelphia Stock 
Exchange/Philadelphia Board of Trade, which are responsible for trading 
approximately 99 per cent of all currency options. Table 15 lists all exchanges on 
which options are traded and includes contract specifications.
33 The work of Levy in connection with stable distributions showed that the Pareto distribution can be derived from a 
version of the central limit theorem in which the individual random variables do not have finite variance.
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Table 15
CURRENCY OPTION CONTRACTS SPECIFICATIONS
Contract Contract months Trading hours 
(local time)
Contract size Minimum price 
fluctuation
Daily
limit
Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
International Monetary Market Division
Deutsche
Mark
Jan/Mar/Apr/June/July/Sept/ 7:20-2:00 
Oct/Dec and spot month
125,000 DM $0.0001/DM = $12.50 50 pL*
Canadian
Dollar
7:20-2:00 100,000 CD $0.0001/CD = $10 100 pL*
Swiss
Franc
7:20-2:00 125,000 SF $0.0001/SF = $12.50 150 p t*
British
Pound
7:20-2:00 62,500 BP $0.0002/BP = $12.50 400 pL*
Japanese
Yen
M 7:20-2:00 12,500,000 JY S0.000001/JY = $12.50 150 p t*
Australia
Dollar
7:20-2:00 100,000 AD $0.0001/AD = $10 150 pL*
* EDT, Sun.-Thur.;6:00-10:00 p.m. EST.
Philadelphia Stock Exchange 
Philadelphia Board of Trade
British
Pound
Mar/J une/Sept/Dec plus 
two near months
4:30 a.m.- 
2:30 p.m., 
7-11 p.m.*
31,250 BP $0.0001/BP = $3,125
Canadian
Dollar
4:30 ajm.- 
2:30 p.m.,
50,000 CD $0.0001/CD = $5.00 — —
Deutsche
M ark
4:30 a.m.- 
2:30 p.m., 
7-11 p.m.*
62,500 $0.0001/DM = $6.25
Swiss
Franc
4:30 a.m.- 
2:30 p.m., 
7-11 p.m.*
62,500 SF $0.0001/SF = $6.25
French
Franc
4:30 a.m.- 
2:30 p.m.,
25,000 $0.00002/FF = $5.00 ———
Japanese
Yen
4:30 a.m.- 
2:30 p.m., 
7-11 p.m.*
6,250,000 JY S0.000001/TY = $6.25
Australian
Dollar
4:30 a.m.- 
2:30 p.m., 
7-11 p.m.*
500,000 AD SO.0001/AD = $5.00
European
Currency
Unit
4:30 a.m.- 
2:30 p.m.
62,500 ECU $0.0001/ECU = $6.25
* Opening limit between 7:20-7:35 a.m.; no limit after 7:35 a.m.
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Table 15 (continued)
CURRENCY FUTURE CONTRACTS SPECIFICATIONS
Contract Contract months Trading hours 
(local time)
Contract size Minimum price 
fluctuation
Daily
limit
Sydney Futures Exchange Ltd
Australian
Dollar
Mar/June/Sept/Dec out to 
six months ahead
8:30 a.m- 
4:30 p.m.
A$100,000 US$0.0001/AD = US 
$10
Bolsa de Mercadorias de Sao Paulo (Brazil) 
(Sao Paulo Commodities Exchange)
US Dollar all months 10:15 a.m.- 
4:00 p.m.
US$5,000 Cz$0.001/US$l -----
Bolsa Mercantil & de Futuros (Brazil)
US Dollar all months 10:30 a.m.- 
3:45 p.m.
US$5,000 Cz$0.01/US$l -----
New Zealand Future Exchange
Kiwi Dollar Spot plus next three 
months, then quarterly
8:15 a.m.- 
4:45 p.m.
NZ$100,000 0.01 -----
Singapore International Monetary Exchange
E urodollar Mar/June/Sept/Dec and 
spot month
8:30 a.m.- 
5:20 p.m.
$1,000,000 0.01 pt.
= $25
-----
Deutsche
M ark
8:20 a.m.- 
5:10 p.m.
125,000 DM $0.0001/DM = $12.50 -----
London International Financial Futures Exchange Ltd
British
Pound
Mar/June/Sept/Dec and 
three nearby months
8:32 a.m.- 
4:02 p.m.
£25,000 0.010/£ = US$2.50 — —
US$-Mark
currency
8:34 p.m.- 
4:40 a.m.
US$50,000 
traded against 
DM
$0.0001 DM/US$1
London Traded Options Market
US Dollar Mar/June/Sept/Dec plus 
two nearest months
9:00 a.m.- 
4:05 p.m.
£12,500 0.050 -----
US$-Mark 9:00 a.m.- 
4:05 p.m.
62,500 DM 0.010 -----
Source: Futures supplement ‘1989 International Guide to Futures/Options Markets'
6.2.5 Synthetic Currency Contracts
Via financial engineering, investment bankers have developed numerous synthetic 
contracts from options for their clients who are restricted, either by their articles of
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association or by regulation, from direct participation in the options market. These 
products are attractive to clients because they offer the benefits of options while staying 
within their corporate or regulatory guidelines. This section provides some examples 
of these contracts.
6.2.5.1 Range Forward Contract
The range forward contract, introduced by Salomon Brothers, specifies a range of 
exchange rates in which currency may be exchanged. This exchange range offers 
investors the benefit of profiting when the currency moves to the upper end of the 
range whilst offering a floor to the down side. If the spot exchange is within the 
boundary range, the contract will be settled at that rate.
Salomon Brothers protect themselves from risk by using a hedging technique called 
the ‘zero cost option.’ By taking opposing positions in currency options, they are 
able to offer the range forward contract to their customer without charging an up front 
fee.
6.2.5.2 Break Forward Contract
Midland Bank developed the break forward contract, which allows customers to break 
the contract if the spot rate at maturity is more favourable than the pre-specified rate 
or ‘break rate.’ By setting the break rate higher than the market forward rate, the 
underwriter is compensated for allowing the customer the option of breaking the 
contract.
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The underwriter protects himself form risk exposure by using the same technique 
used in the range forward contract. Therefore, he is able to offer this contract without 
charging any front-end fees.
6.2.5.3 Scouts
In a shared currency option under tender (Scout) the cost of the option contract is 
distributed among a group of clients that are bidding on the same contract. This 
currency option contract allows foreign bidders on the same contract to share the 
sunken cost of hedging by spreading the cost amidst all the bidders.
6.2.5.4 Participating Forward Contracts
Salomon Brothers devised the participating forward contract, which sets a lower 
boundary or floor on the exchange rate but offers a percentage participation in 
appreciation. This floor rate is usually lower than the standard forward contract rate. 
Treasurers benefit by limiting FX losses while not restricting gains; moreover, it 
requires no initiation fees.
6.2.6 Currency Swaps
A currency swap is a contract between two parties whereby they exchange a series of 
cash flows denominated in one currency for one denominated in another. They were 
created to provide hedgers with a simple low-cost method of managing foreign 
exchange rate risk on certain multiple-period cash flows over longer time horizons 
than those provided by contracts offered on the futures market. A swap can be viewed 
as a bundle of forward contracts that can extend over a long period, normally to a
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maximum of ten-years. Currency swaps were publicly introduced by the World Bank 
and IBM in August 1981. Since their introduction, the swap market has shown an 
amazing growth, with over $110 billion outstanding at the end of 1988.
6.2.6.1 Development of Swaps
In this section, we describe the evolution of the currency swap market, providing 
examples of the three stages of development—parallel loans, back-to-back loans and 
swaps. Additionally, we shall explain the environmental forces that spurred the 
creation of the swap.
The origins of the swap can be traced to parallel loans. A parallel loan is one whereby 
a home company lends funds to a foreign company’s subsidiary located in the home 
country, in exchange for the foreign company providing a loan for the home 
company’s subsidiary located in the foreign company’s country. The parallel loan 
technique was first used in the mid 1970’s, spurred by the change ffom a fixed to a 
floating currency exchange market and UK exchange control legislation. During this 
period, UK multinational firms needed capital for their foreign subsidiaries but were 
restricted by currency controls. The UK government, in an attempt to protect foreign 
exchange reserves, charged a tax on all non-domestic sterling investment This tax 
barrier spurred City financiers, such as Kleinwort Benson and Hill Samuel, to discover 
ways in which to circumvent this expense by arranging parallel loans.
For example, suppose that Virgin Films Inc, the American subsidiary of the British 
company Virgin Films Ltd, is producing its new film in Hollywood over the next 
year with a budget of $100 million. Also assume that the American company, MGM
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Inc, has a British subsidiary, MGM Ltd, which is planning to shoot its new production 
in London. MGM Ltd has budgeted £64,433,000 over the year for production. 
Assuming that the spot exchange rate is $1.552/£, these two firms could eliminate 
exchange rate risk by entering into parallel loans. MGM would borrow $100 million 
from Bank of America while Virgin Films would borrow £64,433,000 ffom National 
Westminster. Then they would each transfer the principal to the other company’s 
subsidiary. The relevant subsidiary makes interest payments to the lending firm, and 
upon loan maturity, the subsidiary returns the original principal. Figure 24 illustrates 
this transaction.
Figure 24 
Parallel Loan Structure 
Virgin & MGM
IN TH E U S  IN THE UK
in terest on loan
MGM Ltd.
len d s  £ 6 4 ,4 3 3 ,0 0 0
Virgin Ltd.
Virgin Inc.
le n d s  $ 1 0 0  million
MGM Inc.
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During the 1970’s, back-to-back loans were also introduced, which are a simpler 
variation of the parallel loans. As shown in Figure 25, these loans are similar in all 
respects to parallel loans, except that the parent companies are the only transacting 
parties.
Figure 25 
Back-to-Back Loan Structure
$ repayment
$ loan 
------------------------ ►
us UK
parent company
£ repayment 
------------------------ ►
parent company
£ loan
In the 1980’s financial institutions discovered they could lower transaction costs by 
serving as intermediaries in a structure similar to back-to-back loans. They introduced 
the fixed-rate currency swap, which is depicted in Figure 26 on the following page.
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Figure 26 
Swap Structure
1 3 .8 5 %1 4 %u s
p a r e n t  c o m p a n y
U K
p a r e n t  c o m p a n y
9 .9 %
The three main reasons why currency swaps eventually replaced back-to-back loans 
are cost, risk and regulation. Back-to-back loans are very expensive to originate. 
Every back-to-back loan is unique, requiring voluminous amounts of legal 
documentation, usually involving two different legal environments and insurance 
policies to protect against default risk. These front-end costs are high compared to 
those of a fairly standardised swap transaction. In the above example the aggregate 
transaction cost is only twenty-five basis points.
Another reason why swaps have replaced back-to-back loans is that in the event that 
one of the parties defaults (because of bankruptcy or for some other reason) on a 
back-to-back loan, the counter party may suffer losses because of delayed payments. 
Alternatively, in a swap the principal is contracting with an intermediary who usually 
has a high credit rating, and is therefore not exposed to the counterparty’s default
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risk. Finally, under financial reporting regulations, back-to-back loans must be 
reported on-balance sheet, whereas swaps are considered off-balance sheet items. 
Off-balance sheet transactions are preferred by corporations because reporting 
transactions on-balance sheet inflates the balance sheet, affecting important ratios, 
such as return on assets and return on equity.
6.2.6.2 Pricing
Swaps are economically beneficial to both the contracting parties because of the 
comparative cost advantage each party has in issuing debt in their domestic market. 
For a detailed explanation of the rationale of the swap market, see Dubois-Pelerin 
(1988) or Smith (1986).
Swap contracts for major currencies are actively traded throughout international 
financial markets via a network of telephones and telexes. Consequently, prices are 
easily obtained through swap dealers or through financial information services, such 
as Reuters. In this section, we will first present the theoretical pricing formula for a 
swap. Then, to bridge the gap between theory and practice, an example is given of 
how a swap dealer may go about pricing a transaction.
Before the swap pricing formula is presented, we must assume that capital markets 
are perfect. Copeland & Weston set the following conditions for a perfect market:
• Markets are frictionless; i.e., there are no transaction costs or taxes, all assets 
are perfectly divisible and marketable, and there are no constraining 
regulations.
• There is perfect competition in product and securities markets. In product 
markets this means that all producers supply goods and services at minimum 
average cost, and in securities markets it means that all participants are price 
takers.
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• Markets are informationally efficient: i.e., information is costless, and it is 
received simultaneously by all individuals.
• All individuals are rational expected utility maximisers, i.e. risk averse.
To value a swap, we replicate the cash flow of the swap by using a series of forward 
contracts, because a swap is defined as a bundle of forward contracts. Therefore, by 
definition, the swap and the portfolio of forward contracts must have the same value 
at inception, which must be zero. If the swap is priced differently from the portfolio 
of forwards, arbitrage opportunities would exist Given that we know how to price 
a forward contract (see Eq. 6.2), we can determine the theoretical value of the swap. 
As shown in Equation 6.4, subtracting the sum of the present values of the domestic 
cash flow ffom the present value of the foreign cash flow exchanged at the spot 
exchange rate, the value of the swap must equal zero, the same value a forward 
contract has at inception.
V = B l - B 2 (6.4)
B, = t  P.e-"'1'
i =0
B, = S £
i =  0
where
V = is the value of the swap, which is zero 
Ri = Domestic interest rate at time i 
pt = Domestic cash flow at time i 
S = Spot exchange rate at time 0 
F, = Foreign cash flow at time i 
r = Foreign interest rate at time i
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To gain a better understanding of this pricing model, let us consider the following 
transaction:
Virgin Films Ltd has decided that it needs $10 million over the next five years to 
fund a US venture and is willing to pay a 12 per cent fixed-rate of interest per annum. 
Because Virgin Films Ltd is not well-known in the dollar capital markets, it has 
decided to issue a sterling bond and swap the proceeds. Since a swap can be viewed 
as a portfolio of forward contracts, the intermediary would produce a table similar 
to Table 16 to evaluate the cash flow before he tenders an offer to Virgin.
Table 16
Theoretical Cash Row of a Swap for Virgin Films Ltd
Year US$ swap Implied $ Interest rate £ Interest rate £ Swap
cash flow forward cash flow
0 10,000,000 1.653 * 12.00% 15.50% 6,049,607
1 (1,200,000) 1.603 12.00% 15.00% (748,639)
2 (1,200,000) 1.561 11.50% 14.00% (768,692)
3 (1,200,000) 1.527 11.00% 13.50% (785,927)
4 (1,200,000) 1.493 10.75% 13.00% (803,628)
5 (11,200,000) 1.463 10.00% 13.00% (7,652,909)
NPV (10,000,000) (6,049,607)
IRR 12.00% 14.83%
* Current rale is given
Checking the figures in this table by entering the data into Equation 6.4, we find that 
the value of our swap is zero. Even though this theoretical price is correct, it does 
not include items that cause market friction, such as transaction cost, liquidity risk 
and divisibility. In practice the intermediary must consider these costs. As one can
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see, the pound cash flow of this swap is staggered, which causes the swap dealer 
problems in developing a tender for Virgin Films Ltd It is unlikely that Virgin would 
be able to issue a fixed-rate sterling debt paying staggered payments. Therefore, the 
professional swap dealer must solve this problem by adjusting the cash flow. He can 
use Equation 6.5 to produce a payment stream similar to that of a standard five-year 
coupon bond as shown in Table 17.
C = P - - r dr  (6.5)
I  — —
» = l ( l+ r j"
Where:
r = the internal rate of return 
C= coupon payment 
P= principal
Table 17
Level Cash Row of Swap for Virgin Films Ltd
Year US$ swap £Swap
cashflow cash flow
0 10,000,000 6,049,607
1 (1,200,000) (897,062)
2 (1,200,000) (897,062)
3 (1,200,000) (897,062)
4 (1,200,000) (897,062)
5 (11,200,000) (6,946,669)
NPV (10,000,000) (6,049,607)
IRR 12.00% 14.83%
By viewing the sterling cash flow in Table 17, the intermediary may compute the 
minimum cash flow needed ffom Virgin Films’ swap. After deriving the base cost,
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the swap dealer will incorporate his commission and risk premium into the coupon 
payments, or he may choose to charge a premium. This premium should be the 
summation of his commission and risk premium discounted at a risk adjusted rate.
6.2.7 Interest Rate Swaps
An interest rate swap is a bilateral contract where one party agrees to exchange a fixed 
stream of cash flow for an index-linked variable stream of cash flow. Interest rate 
swaps have shown a remarkable growth. Bias toward borrowers in the fixed and 
variable interest rate lending markets is the force driving this growth. Each party is 
able to use its comparative advantage in its particular market, fixed-rate or variable 
rate, by issuing debt at a lower cost than it could in the opposing market. Bicksler & 
Chen (1986); Smith, Smithson & Wakeman (1986) and Hammond (1987) explain in 
detail how interest rate swaps are used by capital market participants who take 
advantage of the anomalies that exist in different credit markets. The following 
example will explain the structure of an interest rate swap as well as its economic 
benefits.
Virgin Films PLC is ready to embark on another project that will require it to obtain 
an additional £5 million. Virgin Films PLC decides to issue debt to fund the new 
project. Because Virgin Films PLC holds a low credit rating (BBB), it should issue 
debt in the floating rate market. Poorly rated companies are at a relative disadvantage 
when issuing fixed-rate debt rather than variable rate debt, because investors view 
fixed-rate debt as riskier, which tends to magnify the cost for poorly rated companies. 
Investors in fixed-rate instruments are more sensitive to credit quality than investors 
in floating rate instruments.
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However, the project is on a limited budget and the company does not want to be 
exposed to the potential risk of increasing interest costs. To eliminate this problem 
they enter into a swap with Deutsche Bank, a AAA rated company. Deutsche Bank 
uses its comparative advantage in the fixed-rate market but prefers the variable rate 
of interest because it matches its variable source of funds, short-term deposits. This 
scenario is shown in the following analysis:
Current Market Deutsche Bank Virgin Films Comparative
Advantage
Credit rating AAA BBB
Direct fixed 14.8% 16% 1.2%
Cost of floating LIBOR + 1/4% LIBOR + 3/4% .5%
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To illustrate the swap:
Figure 27 
Interest Rate Swap Structure
6 month £ LIBOR
14.90%  fixed from
LIBOR+ 75
Virgin FilmsDeutsche Bank
borrows floating 
rate funding
borrows fixed
rate funding
Net Costs Deutsche Bank Virgin Films
OUTFLOWS
fixed 14.80% 14.9%
floating LIBOR LIBOR+ .75
INFLOWS
fixed 14.9%
floating LIBOR
TOTAL COSTS LIBOR-.10 15.65%
less non-swap costs LIBOR + .25 16.00%
SAVINGS FROM SWAP .35 .35
The analysis of this transaction clearly shows that each firm was not only able to obtain 
the type of debt it desired (fixed or floating) but was able to reduce its total cost by 
70 basis points. In this example the parties shared equally in the savings, but in practice
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the party with the higher credit rating would demand a greater portion of the savings.
Like the currency swaps market industry, the interest rate swap industry has adopted 
standard structures as well as involving intermediaries. Intermediaries serve to 
promote market efficiency by transmitting information, providing liquidity, 
guaranteeing payments and promoting standardisation.
International investors also use a combination of currency and interest rate swaps to 
hedge risks. By using swaps, investors are able to transcend their traditional markets 
and begin to invest in a broader range of products. For example, US investors could 
eliminating currency risk via the swap market when invest in sterling mortgage-backed 
securities.
6.2.7.1 Pricing
Interest rate swaps are simple to price. The price of an interest rate swap is equal to 
the sum of
1. present values of all the fixed-rate cash flow,
2. rate difference (stated floating rate less index used34) and
3. transaction costs.
Equation 6.6 is the pricing formula used to value an interest rate swap.
_  * C, + (U -/g) + r  (Eq. 6.6)
“ i = i  ( 1  +r)*
34 LIBOR is a commonly used index but it is open to negotiation.
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Where:
P = price of the swap 
ci = coupon payment from fixed-rate bond 
V = contracted rate of the floating side 
R = index rate (eg LIBOR)
T = transaction cost consisting primarily of commissions earned by the 
intermediary. 
r — discount rate
6.3 Conclusion
This chapter presented a thorough investigation of the hedging instruments used by 
international investors. We showed that swaps offer the most efficient method for 
hedging discrete, multiperiod, long-dated cash flow. Additionally, swaps may be 
structured in a variety of ways to meet investors’ needs. However, no matter how 
complicated these structures may appear, they can always be broken down into the 
essential elements that were presented in this chapter.
In Chapter 9 of this thesis, we present a UK-based multicurrency collateralised mortgage 
obligation (MCMO). We create this instrument to explain how securitization could 
evolve on a global scale. An integral part of our structure will be an amortising currency 
swap, which is used to hedge the foreign exchange rate risk on a specific tranche of the 
MCMO. Before we discuss the structure of the MCMO, it is important to appreciate 
the problems that can arise when one is trying to hedge a mortgage-backed security. 
The next chapter will examine the most difficult element to hedge in MBS — mortgage 
prepayment.
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CHAPTER 7
PROBLEMS IN HEDGING MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
Earlier in this thesis, we mentioned that mortgage-backed securities (MBS) have a unique 
embedded call feature that is caused by prepayment. If it were not for this embedded 
call, the MBS would resemble a traditional corporate debt issue. As explained in the 
previous chapter, standard debt instruments can be easily hedged against foreign 
exchange risk by using currency swaps. However, this prepayment uncertainty does 
exist and presents a major obstacle when it comes to hedging and valuing the MBS. It 
should be stressed that the UK mortgage market is being used solely for illustrative 
purposes. The hedging methodology presented in this thesis can be applied to any form 
of securitized debt, regardless of country of origin.
Prepayment models were first built by researchers who were trying to value MBS. The 
value of an MBS, or any investment, may be viewed as the sum of the present value 
(PV) of its future cash flows. Therefore, because PV is time dependent, the value of an 
MBS is contingent on the timing of its cash flow. An MBS cash flow consists of two 
components: the regularly scheduled mortgage payments, which are predetermined by 
contractual agreement; and the unscheduled, irregular prepayments and arrears. A 
prepayment occurs when the mortgagor repays his mortgage prior to the contracted date. 
He may do this for numerous reasons which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Prepayment models are developed to minimize this uncertainty by estimating the timing 
and size of the prepayments.
A published functional prepayment model for UK mortgages does not exist The only 
published study was a survey conducted for the Building Societies Association.
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According to this survey of 1,000 mortgagors, the average life of a UK mortgage is 6.8 
years. This research is of litde use because the sample size is dated and is not relevant 
to mortgages that are securitized.
However, American researchers have published a large number of academic papers 
investigating the pricing of mortgage-backed securities, which include prepayment 
models. Since the model presented in this thesis is based on American research, Section 
7.1 will review the development of the current methodology used in constructing US 
prepayment models. Section 7.2 explains how prepayment rates are quantified. In 
Section 7.3, we compare and contrast the causes of British mortgage prepayment with 
those of the US. Based on this comparison, the prepayment elements found in the US 
mortgage that are similar to those found the UK mortgage will be used in discussing the 
structure of a UK prepayment model. Section 7.4 will conclude this chapter.
7.1 US Mortgage Prepayment Modelling
Currently, in the United States of America most residential mortgages are securitized. 
This market is in excess of $850 billion, and has had considerable interest focused on 
the problem of MBS valuation. Most US mortgage-backed securities are supported by 
a portfolio of fixed-rate, thirty-year, amortising mortgages. The pool of mortgages may 
be viewed as a long-dated amortising bond with a series of calls. According to Fabozzi
(1985), this call feature, or prepayment, is triggered by
• economic,
• seasonal and
• aging influences.
153
SECURITIZATION AND THE GLOBAL MARKET
7.1.1 Economic
US mortgagors have the right to prepay their mortgage throughout its life without 
penalty. Therefore, when interest rates drop there exists a rational economic incentive 
for the mortgagor to replace his existing high rate mortgage with a lower rate mortgage. 
US mortgage prepayment research has dedicated a great deal of attention to interest 
rate sensitive prepayment modelling. See Chung, Tang & Fong; Dunn & McConnell 
(1981); Fabozzi 1987; Kau, Keenan, Muller & Epperson (1988); Hendershott (1985); 
and Johnston (1986). This thesis does not consider the interest rate element of 
prepayment because most UK mortgages are variable rate. However, UK mortgagors 
are economically motivated to prepay their mortgage when interest rates are high, 
whereas American mortgagors are motivated by low interest rates. This will be 
explained in detail in Section 7.3 British vs. US Mortgage Prepayments.
7.1.2 Seasonal Movements
US mortgage prepayments are affected by the time of year. Seasonal changes 
particularly affect building activity: most homes are built and sold during the summer. 
Another factor is family utility: families prefer to move during the summer while the 
children are out of school and the climate is mild. Additionally, more couples are 
married during the summer. Carron (1986) shows that prepayments accelerate during 
April and May, remaining high through the summer until they drop during August and 
September, and reaching a lull between November and February.
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7.1.3 Mortgage Aging
Blaine (1987) and Green and Shoven (1986) show that US mortgagors rarely prepay 
during the first two and a half years. This is intuitively obvious, because demographic 
considerations that cause prepayment (e.g. job transfer, trading up, divorce and default) 
are not likely to happen during this time frame. Rational people will not generally 
purchase a home if their short-term domestic or professional situation is volatile.
7.2 Quantifying Prepayment
When MBS were first introduced in the 1970s, the investment industry modelled 
prepayment as a ‘ 12-year prepaid-life’. This method assumes that the MBS receives 
no principal payment for the first twelve years, then on the twelfth year the principal 
balance is paid in full. The rationale for this model was based on early research 
conducted by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA), which found that the average 
FHA mortgage is prepaid in about twelve years. This crude method of prepayment 
modelling was a poor representation of actual cash flow, so the US Department of 
Housing and Urban Development started publishing annual survival rates for FHA 
mortgages in a document appropriately called ‘The FHA Experience’.
FHA Experience
The FHA periodically publishes its mortgage prepayments, which is often used as a 
bench-mark for investors. Past prepayments are not representative of future 
prepayments. Many investors wrongly assume that if a past historical prepaid rate of 
a pool was, let’s say, 200% of the FHA Experience, the pool would continue to prepay 
at that rate. Fabozzi (1987) shows that this naive assumption is unfounded through 
empirical tests.
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Constant Prepayment Rate
To reflect the actual prepayment rate of a MBS, the constant prepayment rate (CPR) 
was developed. CPR is an index that is considered to be more sensitive to prepayment 
than the FHA Experience. It expresses current prepayment as a proportion of the 
outstanding balance of the principal from the prior year. The results are typically stated 
as a percentage. Measurements of prepayment are expressed in terms of single monthly 
mortality (SMM) and CPR, where
SMM simply reflects the percentage of outstanding principal balance 
prepaid each month and
CPR is the annualised equivalent of SMM.
CPR = 100 x
Public Securities Association
The Public Securities Association (PSA) introduced the current industrial standard in 
July 1985. It is based on a combination of the previous methods. This prepayment 
index assumes that the SMM is 0 per cent at origination, increasing by 0.2 per cent 
monthly until it reaches a maximum of 6 per cent CPR in the thirtieth month and remains 
constant thereafter. This is graphically represented in Figure 28.
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Figure 28 
PSA Prepayment
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Even though the PSA model is commonly used because of its simplicity, empirical 
evidence shows that it does not accurately describe prepayment. Green and Shoven
(1986) sampled 3,938 mortgages issued by a large California savings and loan 
association over the period of 1947 to 1976. This study included mortgages of every 
possible age. They made inferences on mortgages of a particular age, which allowed 
them to gauge the probability of prepayment at a given age. Green and Shoven (1986) 
used a method of analysis called the ‘baseline hazard function’. The following graph 
shows the annual repayments that resulted because of aging.
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Figure 29
The Pure Aging Effect: Annualised Percentage Prepay Rates
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The model of Green and Shoven (1986) is limited in that it is static. It is inelastic in 
that it only views the habits of a limited geographical locale during a certain economic 
environment. To compensate for this inelasticity, Schwartz and Torous (1988) 
developed a model that is robust in that it allows the modeller to incorporate forecasts. 
It allows flexibility by permitting inferences to be made on the prepayment of mortgages 
that differ from observed maturities.
To date, the model developed by Schwartz and Torous (1988) has not been tested, and 
its efficiency will depend on the accuracy of the economic variables. However, we will 
show in Chapter 9 how the Schwartz and Torous model could serve as a base on which 
to build a UK prepayment model. The following section will contrast the UK mortgage 
market to that of the United States.
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7.3 British vs. US Mortgage Prepayments
When adapting United States prepayment models for United Kingdom analysis, one 
must be sensitive to the differences between the mortgage markets in these countries. 
Economic effects on mortgage prepayment differ vastly between the US and the UK. 
US methodology may be used to develop a UK model, but the weighting of economic 
variables must be derived independently. These economic differences will be explained 
in this section.
The primary difference between UK mortgages and US mortgages is in the sensitivity 
prepayments have to interest rate movements. As already mentioned, most US 
mortgages pay a fixed-rate of interest as opposed to most UK mortgages, which pay a 
variable interest rate. US MBS are different from other fixed-rate instruments in that 
they experience what investors call ‘Inverse Convexity’. This refers to the MBS price 
movement in relation to interest rates. When interest rates fall, fixed-rate instruments 
rise in value. However, MBS do not enjoy the same amount of appreciation because 
mortgage holders will call their mortgages when rates drop. Investors are then forced 
to reinvest at the lower current rate because prepayment accelerates when interest rates 
drop. The concept of ‘inverse convexity’ may best be understood through Figure 30. 
As interest rates drop below the rates on the underlying mortgage pool, mortgagors 
start remortgaging at the lower rate, which increases prepayments.
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Figure 30 
Inverse Convexity
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UK mortgage-backed securities do not suffer from this price sensitivity, because sterling 
mortgage-backed securities (SMBS) are issued on the floating-rate market. The interest 
rate is reset every three months at a set margin over the London Interbank Offer Rate 
(LIBOR). Therefore, the instrument trades at, or close to, par. However, the average 
life of a SMBS is affected by interest rate movements. Where in the US the prepayment 
is inversely related to interest rate movements, the current UK prepayment experience 
is positively correlated to interest rate movements. During the autumn of 1989, when 
the base rate in the UK rose to 15 per cent, National Home Loans reported that 60 per 
cent of their business was remortgaging. The rationale for remortgaging is that most
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mortgagors are on a fixed-income, while their mortgage rates are variable. Therefore, 
mortgagors opt for a low-start or lower-cost fixed-rate mortgage, which helps to ease 
cash flow problems.
Historically in the UK economic influences such as capital market interest rate 
movements did not affect mortgage prepayment. The mortgage market used retail funds 
and was controlled by a cartel, the building societies association. There existed a 
dichotomy between the retail and wholesale markets, which served to insulate the 
mortgage market from the volatile interest rates movements in the capital markets. 
Additionally, the cartel would set mortgage rates causing the mortgage lending rate to 
be the same throughout the market. This offered no economic incentive for the 
mortgagor to remortgage because the mortgage products and rates were identical. The 
primary motive to prepay came when one moved house.
However, since the demise of the cartel and the advent of securitization, mortgage base 
rates have shown a positive correlation with capital market rates. As we show in Figure 
31, the UK mortgage rates now have a positive correlation with capital market interest 
rates.
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Figure 31 
LIBOR vs MORTGAGE RATES
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Since the cartel was dismantled in 1981, a host of new mortgage lenders have entered 
the market, introducing a range of new products, such as the fixed-rate, low-start and 
foreign currency mortgages. Mortgagors’ prepayment decisions are now sensitive to 
movements in LIBOR, because they may improve their economic position by 
remortgaging. Because this has been a recent development, efficient prepayment data 
do not yet exist for empirical research. Therefore, when modelling the effects of interest 
rate movements, one must make inferences regarding prepayment sensitivity to interest 
rate movements.
Prepayments caused by seasonal movement in the UK are similar to those in the US. 
According to the building societies association statistics, prepayments exhibit seasonal 
variation because people are more likely to move house in summer than winter.
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Therefore, prepayments are low in January, February and December and then tend to 
peak in late summer. Additionally, advances on mortgages are higher during the summer 
than the winter.
7.4 Conclusion
Because of the rapid changes in the UK mortgage market and the lack of detailed 
prepayment data, foreign investors are not able to economically invest in sterling 
mortgage-backed securities without being exposed to foreign exchange rate risk. We 
have shown in this chapter that prepayment risk is the most difficult to manage because 
it is impossible to accurately predict the prepayment of a mortgage. In the next chapter 
we review a hedging methodology that is suggested by a leading investment banking 
firm that is known for its expertise in mortgage-backed securities. Our analysis shows 
that their system fails in providing an efficient hedge.
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CHAPTER 8 
SALOMON’S HEDGE
8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we discussed how prepayment causes difficulties in predicting 
the cash flow of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). This prepayment uncertainty 
exacerbates the foreign exchange rate risk faced by foreign investors in MB S. In Chapter 
9 we introduce a multicurrency collateralised mortgage obligation (MCMO), which 
allows foreign investors to purchase interest in sterling mortgage-backed securities 
without being exposed to foreign exchange rate risk. To clarify how the MCMO 
contributes to the development of securitization, this chapter reviews a leading 
practitioner’s recommendation for hedging foreign exchange rate risk on sterling 
mortgage-backed securities. We shall analyze Salomon Brothers Inc.’s (SBI) hedging 
strategy as described in ‘An Introduction to Sterling Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate 
Notes’, and we shall show through empirical tests that the Salomon’s strategy is weak 
when hedging for the long-term.
The remaining sections of this chapter are organized as follows: a general overview of 
sterling mortgage-backed securities is given in Section 8.2; the section explains the 
instrument’s structure and its inherent risks. Section 8.3 reviews the claims made by 
the SBI hedging strategy and explains the theoretical basis of the strategy. Section 8.4 
presents our test model, test data and test results. Section 8.5 concludes this chapter 
by commenting on the outcome of the tests.
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8.2 Sterling Mortgage-Backed Securities
Sterling mortgage-backed securities (SMBSs) are notes issued from a thinly capitalised 
public limited company (PLC) whose assets consist of a pool of endowment-linked 
residential mortgages. To appreciate how low the capital ratio is for a SMBS, we show 
the capital structure of one of National Home Loan’s SMBS in Table 18.
The SMBS resembles a floating rate note with a series of embedded call options (i.e., 
prepayment). Prepayment gives rise to a call option. The mortgagor exchanges his 
promised payment stream for a lump sum of money to purchase the "house". However, 
at any time the mortgagor can call the payment stream (i.e. his loan) by prepaying the 
principal balance of the loan. Thus exercising his call option. The variable rate and 
put provision create two sources of uncertainty, which present an interesting problem 
for anyone trying to hedge the SMBS against foreign exchange (FX) risk.
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Table 18
Capitalisation of the
NHL Third Funding Corporation PLC
Share Capital
Authorised
Shares of £1 each 
Issued
2 shares of £1 each (Fully paid) 
49,998 shares of £1 each (25p paid)
£
50,000.00
2.00
12.499.50
Loan Capital
£100,000,000 Mortgage-backed 
Series A Notes Due 2014 
£10,500,000 Mortgage-backed 
Series B Notes Due 2014
100,000,000.00
10.500.000.00
Total Loan Capital 110,500.000.00
Total Capitalisation 110.512.501.50
Capital ratio .0113%
8.2.1 Prepayment of Principal
As discussed in Chapter 7, the primary source of uncertainty of cash flow in a MBS 
is mortgage prepayment. The mortgagor has the right to prepay his mortgage at any 
time during the life of the loan without suffering penalty. This prepayment of principal 
by the mortgagors causes the MBS to resemble a callable bond with a series of 
embedded American call options. The mortgages within the MBS are called over the 
life of the MBS.
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Because SMBS have been only recently introduced, prepayment trends do not exist 
for these mortgage pools. However, it is often naively assumed that these instruments 
will have a five-year average life.
8.2.2 Uncertainty of Income Stream
The second source of uncertainty is the income stream. All sterling mortgage-backed 
securities are indexed to the three month London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) plus 
a small percentage ranging from 0.2 per cent to 0.5 per cent. LIBOR is stochastic and 
has ranged between 4.41 per cent to 18.07 per cent over the past twenty years, as shown 
in Figure 32 on the following page.
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Figure 32 
Movement of LIBOR 
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8.3 The Salomon Brother’s Hedge
Salomon Brothers Inc.’s publication by Dr. Youngblood, ‘An Introduction to Sterling 
Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes’, recommends an hedging strategy for sterling 
mortgage-backed securities that is intended to eliminate foreign exchange rate risk 
exposure. This publication claims that ‘US dollar investors can gain access to sterling 
mortgage-backed FRN (floating rate notes) without incurring significant currency 
exposure.’[28] This section shows that this strategy is weak and is economically 
inefficient when hedging foreign exchange risk over multiple periods.
An investor is advised to exchange dollars at the spot rate equal to the amount he will 
invest in the SMBS, and to simultaneously sell sterling three months forward equal to
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the principal value of the SMBS and the interest payment he will receive from the 
SMBS in the next quarter. Upon reaching the next quarter, the investor is advised to 
sell the SMBS. The proceeds are used to cover the balance due on the forward contract 
that was sold in the previous period, which was not covered by the sterling interest and 
prepayment cash flow. He is then advised to buy back the SMBS and to sell sterling 
three months forward in an amount equal to the remaining principal and the future 
interest payment, thus rolling over the forward contract. We illustrate this strategy in 
Table 19.
Table 19 
SALOMON’S HEDGE
Quarter Transaction
0 Exchange US$ for UK£ is equal to principal investment 
Buy SMBS
Sell UK£ forward to next quarter = to principal + interest payment.
1 Sell SMBS
Settle Forward contract
Exchange US$ for UK is equal to remaining SMBS principal balance 
Buy SMBS
Sell UK£ forward is equal remaining principal + interest payment.
. .
. .
N Sell or receive final payment from SMBS on payment date. 
Settle forward contract and receive US$.
The Salomon’s hedging methodology is based on the Forward Parity Theorem, which 
is weak when tested empirically.
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8.3.1 Forward Parity Theorem
The Forward Parity Theorem[29] (Equation 8.1), an extension of the interest rate parity 
theorem, simply states that the forward rate will equal the future spot rate.
XJo=Xx (Eq. 8.1)
where
Xfo = the current forward exchange rate 
Xx = the future spot exchange rate
The forward parity theorem has been criticised by many academics and fails when 
tested. Dr. Kaveh Alamoutinia (1981) applied rigorous testing to the parity conditions 
and found that forward rates are poor predictors of future spot rates. He found that in 
the short run, inflation rate differentials are weakly related to exchange rate movement: 
there was no evidence that forward rates would predict future spot rates. This is better 
illustrated by the following graph, Figure 33, which compares the expected future spot 
rate determined by the forward rate and actual exchange rate of US$ and sterling.
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Figure 33
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Our test will further show why one should not rely on the rolling over of forward 
contracts as a hedging methodology for multiperiod hedging.
8.4 The Test Model
8.4.1 Structure
In this section we shall test the effectiveness of Salomon’s hedging strategy. We shall 
track a million pound investment in a SMBS over the following three time frames, 
using the corresponding prepayment assumptions:
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TIME FRAME PREPAYMENT PER 
QUARTER
June 1978 to September 1988 
September 1982 to January 1988 
January 1986 to September 1988
£250,000
£500,000
£250,000
Using these three time frames, we compare the Salomon’s hedge to a no hedging 
strategy and a perfect hedging35 strategy to test the effectiveness of the SBI hedge. 
The total cash flow will be stated in terms of net present value (NPV), using the current 
US$ LIBOR rate as the discount rate. The present value of the cash flow is rolled 
back to the previous quarter until it reaches the security’s origination data. We use 
the actual LIBOR rate from the quarter over which we are discounting.
35 A perfect hedge is one whereby an investor would not have incurred any change in wealth due to foreign exchange 
movements. This analysis would require the forward rate hypothesis to hold true —  i.e., that forward rates are perfect 
predictors of future spot rates.
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8.4.2 The Models
In this section we derive the models used to test the proficiency of the SBI hedge. In 
formulating the no hedge model, the SBI hedge and the perfect hedge, we shall use 
the following notation:
N  = total number of quarters 
n = current quarter
in = London Interbank Offer Rate (Sterling) at instant of time n 
/„ = London Interbank Offer Rate (US dollar) at instant of time n 
P = purchase price in sterling 
Sn = spot exchange rate (US$ per £) at time n
Fn_1 = three month forward rate (US$ per £) negotiated at time n -  1 for delivery 
at time n.
Dn_x = three month forward rate (US$ per £) derived from the interest rate 
differentials at time n - 1
C = Commission rate for trading the SMBS
For all three equations PVn is defined by
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8.4.2.1 NO HEDGE
We derive our no hedge equation by first determining the principal value of the SMBS
(n — 1) payments of principal have been made, the outstanding balance is
Note: This is the position at time n only before the n — th payment is made
Next we compute the interest we receive from the SMBS. We multiply the principal 
value by LIBOR at time n-1. Notice, we divide LIBOR by four to give us the quarterly 
return The point is at time n - 1, in _ x is set in the market. The interest is received at 
time n.
Equation 8.3 gives us our total sterling cash flow for the period by adding the interest 
payment to the principal repayment. We assume that the principal repayment is static. 
(However, as we discussed in Section 7.1, mortgage prepayments are not static and 
are difficult to predict with any accuracy.)
1 Pat time n — 1. Each period we repay - -  th part of the principal, i.e. -. Therefore, at
p  _ p (N-n  + \) Eq. (8.1)
N
'p N — n +1  ^in-i
N J T
Eq. (8.2)
r N - n  + l U - i  P
< N  J  4 +N
Eq. (8.3)
174
SECURITIZATION AND THE GLOBAL MARKET
Equation 8.4 produces the US dollar cash flow by exchanging the sterling cash flow 
into to US dollars at the current spot rate.
(r
\ \
N - n  + l 
N 4 N
Eq. (8.4)
Equation 8.5 discounts the dollar cash flow using US$ LIBOR from the previous 
quarter as the discount rate.
PV.
(r
w
N - n  + l 
N y
Eq. (8.5)
Equation 8.6 sums the discounted cash flow over the time period. This gives us our 
No Hedge equation.
N
I
n = 1
PV.
( f
w
N - n  + l 
N y 4 N y
Eq. (8.6)
8.4.2.2 SBI HEDGE
To derive the SBI hedge we must alter the exchange rate we used in Equation 8.4. 
Instead of exchanging our cash flow at the current spot rate, we exchange it at the 
forward rate that was negotiated in the previous quarter.
(r
\ \
N - n  + l 
N y
i*-1 P_
4 N F.-i
Eq. (8.7)
Next, we must account for the change in cash flow caused by rolling over the 
remaining principal balance of the SMBS. We take the principal balance of the SMBS
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and multiply it by the difference between the spot and our prenegotiated forward rate. 
We receive US$ at the forward rate and exchange them at the spot rate in an amount 
equal to the repurchase price, i.e. the principal balance.
r/’p N - n  + l ^
\ \ N /
In- 1 P 
4 N
„ n N — n
F n - l + P  N  (  n —1 *^n)
Eq. (8.8)
Transactions cost also affect our cash flow when we roll over our investment We 
must pay a commission when we sell the SMBS to settle our forward commitment 
and when we repurchase it for the next holding period. Therefore, costing us two 
commissions.
(r
\ \
,N - n  + l 
N /
P
4 +N
„ ~n  ^^
K - i + p — (Fn-i-Sn) -2C N
Eq. (8.9)
By discounting and summing Equation 8.10, we derive the SBI hedge, Equation 
(8.10).
p v . N - n  +1 
N
H -i 
4 + N
Eq. (8.10)
8.4.2.3 PERFECT HEDGE
We construct the perfect hedge by taking the cash flow of our SMBS and exchange 
it at the forward rate created by the interest rate differential. We assume the Forward 
Parity Hypothesis (see Section 8.3.1) holds true and the spot price of the next period 
will equal the forward price from the previous period. Therefore, we create an
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hypothetical exchange rate data series based on this assumption to construct the 
perfect hedge. We use our new forward rate to determine the $US cash flow in Eq. 
8 . 11 .
( r  N - n  + l '
\ \ N
in-± P_ 
4  + N
D
Eq. (8.11)
n -1
We also roll over our principal value in this hedge, but we do not experience any 
change in cash flow, because our forward rate and spot rate are always equal. 
Therefore, we only include the transaction cost.
( f  . N - n  + l ' '
\ \ N
i n - l  P _  
4 + N
( ,N - n  '  
N
Eq. (8.12)
Equation 8.13 is the perfect hedge. We sum the discounted cash flow to determine 
the net effect of our perfect hedge.
N
I
n = 1
r r
PVn\
[ Iv
N - n  + l 
N y
i n - 1 P_
4 +N
D „ - t - 2 C
N
Eq. (8.13)
These models are structured to resemble the ‘real world’ but we must make some 
assumptions to simplify an already difficult test The first assumption is the fixed 
transaction costs. Traders normally charge between 1/8% and 1/2%; therefore, we 
use the intermediate price of 1/4%. The second assumption is that SMBS yield 
LIBOR. These instruments trade at LIBOR plus a small margin ranging from 15 to
177
SECURITIZATION AND THE GLOBAL MARKET
25 basis points. Making a slight increase over the index will not significantly affect 
the results of this test because the aggregate value of the SMBS is rolled over and a 
small fraction of one percent is insignificant. Therefore, the premium is omitted.
8.4.3 Empirical Results
The results of our test are presented in the following three sections. The interest rates, 
foreign exchange rates and results of our test are listed in Appendix B.
8.4.3.1 Test from 1978-1988
For our first test we determine the affects the hedging methodologies would have on 
a SMBS with a ten year life. Our research started in 1988, therefore we will assume 
all our SMBS mature in 1988. For this test we assume we purchase a SMBS for 
£1,000,000 and hold it for ten years. Additionally, we assume a 2.5 per cent rate of 
prepayment per quarter. If we did not hedge our investment we would have received 
a total cash flow of $1,935,926 in 1978 net present value terms. If we had implemented 
the SBI hedge in January 1978 and held the SMBS full term for ten years, we would 
have a NPV of $1,848,637. A perfect hedged position would have generated a NPV 
of $ 1,870,112. The cash flow from these hedges are illustrated in the following figure.
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Figure 34
TEST FOR 1978-1988
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This graph compares the dollar cash flow from the no hedge strategy, the SBI hedge 
strategy and a perfect hedge strategy. Notice how volatile the SBI hedge is compared 
to the other two models. This test shows that the SBI hedge actually increased the 
volatility of the position as opposed to lowering the cash flow volatility. The opposite 
of its intent.
8.4.3.2 Test from 1983-1988
In this test we purchase a SMBS for £1,000,000 and hold it for five years. As we 
explained in Chapter 7, SMBS prepay at different speeds. This simulation tests the 
effects the hedges would have on a SMBS with a fast prepayment. We double the
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prepayment speed by assuming a 5 per cent prepayment rate per quarter, which 
reduces the life by half. If we did not hedge this investment we would have received 
$1,579,979 in 1978 net present value terms. If we had implemented SBI hedge in 
January 1978 and held the SMBS full term for five years, the NPV of the cash flow 
would have been $1,897,505. A perfectly hedged position would have returned a 
NPV of $2,149,949.
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Figure 35
TEST FOR 1983-1988
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This graph compares the effects foreign exchange rate movements had on the cash 
flow of the no hedge strategy, the SBI hedge strategy and the perfect hedge strategy 
on a £1 million SMBS held from January 1983 to January 1988. Notice again in this 
model, the SBI model generates the most volatile cash flow.
8.4.3.3 Test from 1986-1988
In this test we purchase a SMBS for £1,000,000 and sell it eleven quarters later. Since 
SMBS are actively traded, we want to test the effects of the hedges when trading out 
of our position versus holding the investment full term. We use our standard 
prepayment speed of two and a half percent. On 2 September 1988 we cash out our
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position. Using the rolling hedge in our SBI and perfect models, we setde our forward 
contacts in September 1988 including the settlement as a part of the cash flow. If 
we did not hedge this investment, we would have received $1,703,028 in 1986 net 
present value terms. If we had used the SBI hedge in January 1986, we would have 
received $1,517,140 in net present value. A perfectly hedged position would have 
generated a NPV of $2,204,187.
Figure 36
TEST FOR 1986-1988
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The above graph compares the effect foreign exchange rate movements had on the 
three hedging strategies used when investing in a £1,000,000 SMBS held for two 
years from January 1986 to September 1988. Again the SBI hedge creates the most 
volatile cash flow.
8.4.4 Post 1988
The world has experienced some radical changes since 1988. East and West Germany 
were reunited followed by the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. Exchange rates 
are experiencing more volatility because of these dramatic changes. These changes 
are affecting the pound and US dollar exchange rates, especially during the period 
when the UK removed its currency from the exchange rate mechanism in 1992. The 
forward markets could not have anticipated these events and it would have dramatically 
affected the results of our tests. For instance, during the 1992 decline of the pound 
relative to the US dollar, the forward exchange rate for the dollar relative to the pound 
would have increased because of the interest rate differential. Nonetheless, it would 
not have been enough to compensate for the radical move we saw in sterling during 
the third quarter of 1992.
Additionally, another event has taken place since our testing period. Property prices 
plummeted and mortgage foreclosures increased generating substantial losses for the 
mortgage industry. Even though none of the SMBS experienced any default or delay 
in paying their commitments, they were affected by these events, forcing prices down 
and therefore driving up yields. The SBI model assumed a par price when we rolled 
the SMBS, but now we would have to account for the price fluctuation in any post 
1988 trials. The yield spread above LEBOR for SMBS increased from 15 basis points
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to 75 basis points due to the increased UK mortgage default rate. When the SMBS 
was rolled over we would experence a capital loss, which would lower the NPV of 
the SBI hedge. Again, this would have increased the volatility of the rolling hedge 
methodology, further weakening this approach to hedging SMBS.
8.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we undertook a sensitivity analysis of hedging SMBS using threee 
alternative strategies. In each case the Salomon Brothers strategy proved to be totally 
inferior to the others. Therefore, we have shown that the Salomon Brothers Inc. hedging 
strategy is not an effective method for hedging sterling mortgage-backed securities over 
long periods. In fact, this strategy does the opposite of its intent by increasing the 
volatility of the cash flow in all three tests.
The SBI hedge was ineffective because the foundation on which it is built is unsound. 
A hedging strategy that involves rolling over forward contracts will not offset FX 
movement, because forward rates in practice do not equal future spot rates. As currency 
markets become more volatile, the predictability of the forward rate becomes even less 
useful. Therefore, the Salomon Brother’s Inc. hedge should not be used because, as 
we have shown in this chapter, an investors risk is increased (i.e. more volatility) while 
his net return decreases. However, the hedging methodology presented in the next 
chapter provides an economical, sound and robust approach to minimising foreign 
exchange rate risk for foreign investors who want to invest in sterling mortgages.
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CHAPTER 9 
THE UK MULTICURRENCY COLLATERALISED MORTGAGE 
OBLIGATION
9.1 Introduction
In this chapter we propose the development of a UK multicurrency collateralised 
mortgage obligation (MCMO). We shall describe the construction of an instrument 
which explicitly is designed to remove foreign exchange rate risk for foreign investors. 
This is achieved by creating a CMO with a foreign currency (FX) tranche. We explain 
how to structure this instrument based on a UK prepayment model. Using the results 
from our model, a PAC tranche size is identified and swapped into a foreign currency.
Currently, this instrument does not exist. However, as the global market develops, it 
should only be a matter of time before we see the introduction of an instrument similar 
to the one introduced in this chapter. SMBS have saturated the sterling FRN market 
and avenues to new capital sources are needed. Our new financial instrument, the 
MCMO, opens avenues to all foreign capital markets by eliminating foreign exchange 
rate risk in a cost effective manner.
This chapter is presented in five sections. The first section provides an overview of the 
chapter. Section 9.2 demonstrates the need for the MCMO. Section 9.3 discusses the 
development of a UK prepayment model, which is crucial to the structure of the MCMO. 
Section 9.4 presents the structure for a MCMO, and the final section, Section 9.5, 
summarises the chapter.
185
SECURITIZATION AND THE GLOBAL MARKET
9.2 The Need for a UK Multicurrency Mortgage-backed Security
We mentioned earlier that the UK has the fastest growing MBS market in the world. 
Sterling mortgage-backed securities (SMBS) account for approximately 50 per cent of 
the total sterling floating rate note (FRN) market. Given the rapid growth in the supply 
of SMBS, the FRN market is approaching saturation and SMBS need new avenues for 
placement These are being found in other markets, such as the $350 million Mortgage 
Asset Euro-Securities (MAES) program that was introduced by Canadian Imperial Bank 
of Commerce (CIBC) in March of 1990.
CIBC formed MAES, a special-purpose company, to buy CIBC’s mortgages. MAES 
issued US$ Euro-commercial paper in order to fund the purchase. Commercial paper 
(CP) is high quality short term debt (less than 365 days), which trades in a liquid market. 
MAES did not issue sterling CP because The Bank of England requires a large capital 
base before a company can issue sterling CP. The cost of capital makes a sterling CP 
structure cost prohibitive. Additionally, the US$ CP market is larger and more liquid. 
The MAES structure uses steriing/US$ forward contracts to hedge against foreign 
exchange rate risk. Note the hedge is effective because it is for a single, short-term 
period. The CP matures at the same time the forward contact comes due. CIBC is not 
the only lender starting to access the US$ market. National Home Loans is issuing US$ 
domestic CP backed by UK mortgages.
The US market can easily absorb new US$ issues because its mortgage-backed securities 
market is over $1,000,000,000,000 in size, thus offering more liquidity than the 
£9,000,000,000UK mortgage-backed market. Additionally, there are other large capital 
markets, like Japan, that have a keen interest in the UK mortgage market, which is
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exhibited by foreign investments in floating rate notes issued by UK building societies. 
Hedging foreign exchange risk on FRNs issued by building societies is simple because 
of their finite maturity and fixed principal repayment. Currency swaps can easily be 
used to offset any currency risk. However, as was shown in the previous chapter, 
hedging foreign exchange rate risk on SMBS is not a simple task. However, if one 
were to develop a long-dated dollar or yen denominated instrument supported by UK 
sterling mortgages, it would be easy to sell the instrument in the US and Japanese capital 
markets because of their greater liquidity.
9.3 Prepayment of Principal
As we explained in Chapter 7, prepayment of principal from MBS resembles a series 
of embedded call options. The mortgagor has the right to prepay his mortgage at any 
time during the life of the loan without suffering penalty. According to Youngblood 
(1987), United Kingdom prepayment rates are usually determined by demographic 
conditions, whereas prepayment rates in the United States are highly sensitive to interest 
rate movements. Most mortgages are variable interest rate instruments in the UK, not 
fixed as in most US mortgages, so they offer no economic incentive for the mortgagor 
to prepay his loan when rates drop. The primary incentive to prepay arises when one 
moves house.
However, it is interesting to note that with the sudden rise in interest rates during 1990 
and 1991, lenders introduced low-start mortgages, which caused many UK mortgagors 
to remortgage their loans in order to lower their monthly mortgage payment. Therefore, 
in the future a rational expectation would be for UK mortgage prepayments to rise
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relative to interest rates. While in the US, mortgage prepayments remain inversely 
related to interest rate movements. This presents a fundamental difference between the 
UK and US mortgage market.
Prepayment trends for SMBS do not exist because of their recent introduction. To 
address prepayment uncertainty, an actuarial table could be drawn from building society 
data. An effective table could be drawn from building societies’ loans that are similar 
to those in the mortgage pool. The amount, loan-to-value ratio, mortgage age, 
mortgagor’s age and property location would all have to be considered. Unfortunately, 
this approach would not produce a practical model because the UK mortgage industry 
has experienced fundamental changes in the past ten years, as we explained in Chapter 
3, Section 3.3.1.1. Therefore, one must look to another source of data. The following 
section presents a mortgage prepayment methodology that is used for structuring the 
MCMO.
9.3.1 UK Prepayment Model
Developing a functional prepayment model is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
However, leading researchers’ prepayment modelling methods are examined, and 
using their modelling approaches, we shall produce a mortgage prepayment model 
that can use UK data. Unfortunately these data do not exist but are currently being 
collected by the National Opinion Poll (NOP). The data base should be complied and 
ready for use by the end of 1993. The following section explains the foundation for 
our prepayment model.
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9.3.1.1 Mortgage Prepayment Research
Green and Shoven (1986) modelled mortgage prepayments using information 
gathered on 3,938 residential fixed-rate mortgages issued since 1962 by two 
California savings and loans (equivalent to UK building societies). They reviewed 
the prepayment history on these mortgages from 1975 to 1982 to determine the effect 
mortgage aging has on prepayment in relation to ‘lock-in’ (the ratio of the difference 
between the book value and market value of the mortgage divided by an estimate of 
the current house value). They modelled these prepayments using the proportional 
hazards model36 that was developed by Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980). Green and 
Shoven’s research served as a foundation for future research but is not applicable to 
UK mortgages because the ‘lock-in’ ratio does not affect the UK mortgagor’s 
prepayment decision. UK mortgages are not assumable, therefore they are 
non-tradeable and do not affect the value of a property. This is in contrast to assumable 
US fixed-rate mortgages, which add value to property when mortgage market rates 
are greater than the pre-existing assumable mortgage rate.
However, Quigley (1987) expanded on Green and Shoven’s (1986) model by 
introducing household mobility factors as influencing prepayment. Additionally, he 
found that mobility is not independent of homeowner’s length of residency; thereby 
disproving a critical assumption used in the proportional hazards model. He cites
36 See Appendix C for a further discussion of the proportional hazards model.
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Dynarski (1985) in arguing that household’s attachment to its neighbourhood 
increases over time. To compensate for this weakness, he uses a nonproportional 
hazards model37 as developed by Cox (1972).
Using data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, Quigley determines that 
household income, age, size, changes in size, and changes in head of household 
affected the mortgagor’s propensity to move, thus triggering a mortgage prepayment. 
He reports that
1. increase in household size increases mobility,
2. the age of the household head is inversely correlated with mobility,
3. the education of the head of household is positively correlated with mobility
and
4. there is weak evidence that home owner mobility rate varies by race.
Giliberto and Thibodeau (1989) expand on Quigley’s research by analyzing micro- 
and macro-economic variables that motivate prepayment when the mortgagor does 
not move house. The micro-economic data base was collected by the MIT/Harvard 
Joint Center for the housing research consumer mail panel (see Appendix E for a 
copy of survey). This database, which was compiled in 1986, consists of a national 
stratified random sample of 4,000 households.
37 See Appendix D for a further discussion of the nonproportional hazards model.
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This survey collected the following information:
Mortgage information
1. Origination date
2. Loan amount
3. Contract rate
4. Monthly payment
5. Whether monthly payment included hazard insurance or property taxes 
(rates)
6. Type of mortgage interest rate (fixed or variable)
7. Whether the interest rate was below-market
8. Type of loan (conventional, FHA or VA)
Household characteristics
1. Household size
2. Age and education of head of household
3. Marital status
4. 1983 and 1986 household income
5. Had the household moved since 1983
6. Other extensive demographic data
Giliberto and Thibodeau (1989) tested the influence the following variables have on 
mortgage prepayment when the mortgagor does not move house:
1. Lock-in
2. Household income
3. Interest rate volatility
4. Household size
5. Marital status
6. Age of head of household
7. Geographic location
They found that all of these variables, except marital status, have an impact on 
prepayment. Their findings are intuitively logical, considering that many couples 
choose to share a home before getting married. As long as the mortgagors remain in 
the home, prepayment is not affected by marital status.
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At the time of writing, Giliberto and Thibodeau’s (1989) paper is the most recently 
published research on mortgage prepayment using survey data. When interviewed 
during the Allied Social Science Associations conference in December 1989, Dr. 
Michael Giliberto said that he saw no reason why his model could not be adapted for 
use in the United Kingdom.
9.3.1.2 NOP’s Survey
Our hypothetical mortgage prepayment model can produce a practical working model 
once NOP has completed its survey. The National Opinion Poll has agreed to collect 
the data by modifying their survey to include the pertinent variables as identified by 
our research. NOP’s current survey, reference number 5702 (see Appendix F), 
includes most of the data needed to derive a UK mortgage prepayment model. 
However, some key statistics are missing, and the following modifications are being 
made in NOP’s survey:
1. Specific month and year the mortgagor last moved house
2. Question 78 is being changed from categories to specific year and quarter
3. Question 84 is being expanded to include the year and quarter the changes 
were made
4. Regions are broken down by postal code
Once these data are collected, a multivariable discriminate analysis will be applied 
to the mirco- and marco-economic data to determine the influence each variable has 
on prepayment. The intercept of this model will give the expected life of the mortgage 
and a weighting can be assigned to each critical economic variable, establishing the 
basis for a working model. However, for this dissertation we shall use the results 
obtained by Giliberto and Thibodeau in developing our prepayment model.
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9.3.1.3 The Mortgage Prepayment Model
The prepayment model is used to structure the MCMO, thus broadening the investor 
base for sterling mortgage-backed securities by a providing a tranche issued in a 
foreign currency. We are using a simple model to demonstrate the application and 
it is not intended to serve as a functional application. We realize that using the results 
from the Giliberto and Thibodeau work on US prepayment to identify UK prepayment 
is unrealistic. We just use their numbers instead of making up random estimates. 
We in no way want to imply that the results from our model are applicable to the UK 
mortgage prepayment speed. We only use these data to show how to formulate and 
structure a multicurrency mortgage obligation.
Table 21 is a variation of Giliberto and Thibodeau’s Table 1. We are using their 
estimates, but we have omitted LOCKIN, LOGY, VOLATILE and DHHSIZE. The 
first three variables were omitted because they relate to fixed-rate mortgages. 
DHHSIZE was omitted in order to simplify the model. We anglophiled the REGION 
variables in the model by placing the UK regions in parenthesis. A functional model 
would consist of more detailed variables such as household size, defined regions, 
tenure, age of the head of household, level of education, marital status and income. 
We provide a listing of these variables in Appendix G for those researchers who may 
wish to apply our model once the data collection is complete.
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Table 21
Estimate Std Error
Intercept 12.99 2.94
REGION
New England (Greater London) -3.06 1.10
East North Central (South West) -2.65 0.95
West North Central (South East) -2.96 1.03
South Atlantic (Midlands) -2.04 1.00
East South Central (North East) -1.86 1.50
West South Central (North West) -1.17 1.20
Mountain (Wales) -1.04 1.48
Pacific (Scotland) -2.48 0.98
AGE
30-39 years -2.13 0.21
40-49 years -2.11 0.21
50-59 years 0.23 0.02
> 59 years 2.37 0.24
MARRIED -0.68 2.17
Using the above intercept and coefficients we ran a simulation of 10,000 trials on a 
pool of the fifty mortgages shown in Table 22, each being worth £100,000. Because 
the regression model is at best only a linear approximation to a very complex 
relationship, we decided to undertake a sensitivity analysis via simulation and to try 
to reflect the type of real constraints on the variables. As a consequence, we assumed 
that the intercept arose from a log normal distribution and the other factors from 
normal distributions. Table 22 shows the characteristics of the mortgage pool and 
demonstrates one trial in our simulation. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we 
randomly generated new estimates for each trial which produced the histogram in 
Figure 34.
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Table 22 
The Mortgage Prepayment Model
Number of Estimate Std Err Total
Mortgages
Intercept 50 12.99 2.94 649.50
REGION
Greater London (New England) 16 -3.06 1.10 (48.96)
South West ( East North Central) 4 -2.65 0.95 (10.60)
South East (West North Central) 6 -2.96 1.03 (17.76)
Midlands (South Atlantic) 9 -2.04 1.00 (18.36)
North East (East South Central) 5 -1.86 1.50 (9.30)
North West (West South Central) 4 -1.17 1.20 (4.68)
Wales (Mountain) 1 -1.04 1.48 (1-04)
Scotland (Pacific) 5 -2.48 0.98 (12.40)
AGE
30-39 years 10 -2.13 0.21 (21.30)
40-49 years 15 -2.11 0.21 (31.65)
50-59 years 16 0.23 0.02 3.68
> 59 years 9 2.37 0.24 21.33
MARRIED 28 -0.68 2.17 (19.04)
Average Life of Mortgage Pool (sum of the total column divided by 50) 9.59
For our assumed tranche structure, our simulation produced the results presented in 
Appendix H. The histogram of the Average Life of the Mortgage pool is shown in 
Figure 34. The histogram provides the expected prepayment speed fro the MCMO. 
The mean life is 9.58 years with a standard deviation of 3.17 years. This provides 
us with the basis of the framework in which to divide the prepayments into different 
tranches. This task is non-trivial and is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, we 
shall outline the main ingredients of the exercise which must be undertaken. This 
should demonstrate the complexity of the problem.
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The key feature of the "static" tranche, or PAC, is that is it should be structured in 
such a way that the probability of any one of its associated covenants being breached 
is extremely small. Essentially, there must be sufficient cash at each coupon date for 
no default to take place. It does not matter whether the cash arises from prior 
pre-payments or prepayments made just as a coupon is due. What is important is that 
there should be an appropriate reserve so that, except for the most unlikely of events, 
the covenants will be satisfied.
Broadly, the determination of this reserve requires determining the probability of 
various out comes which will lead to a default and the subsequent relationship between 
initial, intermediate and final coupon date. Clearly, this results in a significant exercise 
in conditional probability analysis as the various permutations and combinations 
leading to default must be determined. A key element of the calculation is the average 
life, which we have estimated via our simulations.
In passing, it should be noted that it may be that the required mathematical problem 
might be simplified if one considered the problem as a binary one as in the traditional 
hazard function literature. One could assume that the satisfaction of a coupon 
corresponded to success and the non-satisfaction to failure. It is then likely that the 
combinatorial problem is then one related to the Binomial Distribution and that one 
might be able to ‘lift’ results from that field. To implement this idea, we would make 
the assumption that the probability of success equals the expected prepayment speed.
We conclude this section by noting that there does not appear (1993) to be knowledge 
expounded in the public domain on this problem. Further, our simulations indicate
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that the standard deviation, for our expository tranche, is very large. The 95% 
confidence interval for the expected prepayment speed is approximately (3.24,15.92). 
In practice, this would seem to be too large to safely initiate the proposed static 
tranche. The view of the writer of this dissertation is that investment bankers might 
be willing to accept a much higher risk of default, and consequentially a small 
confidence interval. Noting that the 62.27% confidence interval (mean +/- one 
standard deviation) is (6.41,12.75), then commencing within year six would be 
acceptable for this tranche.
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Figure 34
Forecast: Avg. Life of Mortgage Pool 
Frequency Chart 10,000 Trials Shown
.04 360
12.50 18.75
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9.4 The M ulticurrency Collateralised Mortgage Obligation
We now describe the structure of our multicurrency collateralised mortgage obligation 
(MCMO) in this section. The MCMO will combine many of the financial structuring 
techniques presented in this dissertation. Throughout this dissertation we identified all 
the elements used to build this instrument. We bring all these elements together in this 
section to develop an instrument that will aid in the globalization of capital markets. 
We create this instrument by structuring a UK collateralised mortgage obligation 
(CMO) (see Section 2.3.3), with a planned amortizing class (PAC) (see Section 2.3.3.3) 
and swapping the sterling cash flow from the PAC into a foreign currency (see Section 
6.2.6). Through these combinations, we create a multicurrency mortgage-backed 
security.
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As we explained in Section 2.3.3, CMOs were developed to manage prepayment risk, 
and PACs evolved to better manage prepayment risk, which is inherent in 
mortgage-backed securities. However, before we can establish the size of the PAC 
(i.e., the value of the PAC) we have to have a sound prepayment model on which to 
base our predictions. Earlier in this chapter, Section 9.3, we explained why it is not 
practical to use US mortgage prepayment history when evaluating UK mortgage 
prepayment. To do so can be disastrous, as was proved by Bear, Steams & Company 
when it failed to place its UK fixed-rate MBS that assumed US prepayment history.[30] 
However, we do provide a theoretically sound prepayment model based on US research 
that will be viable once the UK data are collected.
Our MCMO is structured with four tranches. The first three are a fast-pay, a 
medium-pay, and a slow-pay tranche denominated in sterling; the fourth tranche is the 
foreign currency tranche. The foreign currency tranche must have a stable principal 
cash flow to enable it to be swapped into another currency. The size of the PAC is 
established through the boundaries generated by our prepayment model.
As a means of easing our exposition, we describe our procedure through the following 
example. Based on our prepayment model, we issue a £5,000,000 MCMO with three 
£1,000,000 sterling tranches and one £2,000,000 PAC that we swap into US dollars or 
any other currency that may be deemed desirable at the time. The mortgage pool consists 
of the same fifty mortgages we used to generate the frequency chart in Figure 34. As 
we explained in Section 8.2, securitized mortgages are endowment-linked. The
199
SECURITIZATION AND THE GLOBAL MARKET
principal is paid when the mortgage is paid off. We illustrate the standard principal 
repayment from the three sterling tranches and the PAC in Figure 35, using the expected 
prepayment speed derived from our prepayment model.
Figure 35
Standard Prepayment
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Our illustration shows how the first tranche pays through the eighth year. Also within 
the same time frame, the PAC begins to pay in the first quarter of the six year through 
to the first quarter of the twelfth year. The second tranche starts paying in the eighth 
year after the first tranche has matured. Then the last tranche pays from the twelfth 
year until the last payment is received. The data used to generate this graph and the 
flowing graphs are in Appendix I.
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As long as there are enough prepayments to meet the principal debt service of the PAC, 
the integrity of the MCMO remains intact. However, if the prepayments are too rapid 
or too slow, there will not be enough cash to honour the currency swap and the PAC 
would default on its swap obligation. There are special insurance providers that will 
insure the risk of such a default if the credit rating agencies require it. For our MCMO, 
we assume that the rating agencies would give us the rating without the insurance.
In the US, the prepayment speed at which the integrity of the PAC is intact is called 
the PAC band. Normally it is stated as a percentage of PSA i.e. 75% to 150% PSA (see 
Chapter 7, Section 2 for a definition of this index). (To establish a standardized 
prepayment index for the UK is beyond the scope of this dissertation, and we shall leave 
this task to future researchers.) Nevertheless, to demonstrate the robustness of our 
structure, we conduct a sensitivity analysis. We increased the speed of the prepayments 
until the upper boundary of our PAC was touched and illustrate the cash flow in Figure 
36. The standard prepayment rate during the PAC time period, year six through twelve, 
is 2.76% principal payment per quarter. We increase the prepayment speed by 16.64% 
to a rate of 3.22% per quarter. Even with this increase, the PAC is able to meet its swap 
obligation. We illustrate this increased prepayment speed in Figure 36.
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Figure 36
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To determine the lower band of our PAC or the lower end of our sensitivity analysis, 
we reduce the quarterly prepayment speed by 42%, down to 1.6% per quarter. At this 
prepayment speed, only the PAC would receive principal repayments. If the prepayment 
dropped below this level, the PAC would default on the swap obligation. This gives 
us our minimum prepayment speed as shown in Figure 37.
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Figure 37
Slow Prepayment
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By superimposing the maximum prepayment boundary over the minimum prepayment 
boundary, one visually sees the robustness of this structure in Figure 38. We show that 
the quarterly prepayment speed can fluctuate by over 58% without affect the integrity 
of the PAC. This demonstrates the effectiveness of our structure.
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Figure 38
Fast & Slow Prepayment
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It is our belief that our MCMO offers a sound basis for practical development. Given 
that there are approximately £200 billion worth of mortgages outstanding in the United 
Kingdom, this structure will allow secondary market underwriters to tap international 
markets, thus broadening the investor base. Through this instrument, non-sterling 
investors are able to take a long dated position in UK mortgages without exposing 
themselves to currency exchange rate risk.
9.4.1 Uncertainty of Income Stream
The second source of uncertainty is the income stream. All sterling mortgage-backed 
securities are indexed to the three-month London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) plus
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a percentage ranging from 0.20 per cent to 0.50 per cent pre 1988. However, as we 
mentioned in Section 8.4.4, these interest rate spreads are increasing due to the 
mortgage market problems. However, if we wanted to create a medium-term fixed-rate 
instrument, we could easily enter into an interest rate swap as opposed to a currency 
swap with the PAC. Our fixed-rate sterling tranche could serve as a high quality 
fixed-rate sterling instrument.
9.4.2 Multicurrency ABS
The hedging methodology presented in this chapter is not just limited to 
mortgage-backed securities. As we explained in Chapter 4, there are many types of 
receivables that are securitizable, and they could also benefit from issuing 
multicurrency issues. In fact, many AB S have relatively small prepayment uncertainty. 
This then would allow for a large percentage of the issue to be swapped so as to take 
advantage of the most appropriate funding (e.g., variable rate, fixed-rate or currency.)
9.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we offer some insight into the future developments in securitization. We 
showed how securitization can be used to tap non-domestic sources of capital, which 
can add to the development of the global market. By introducing a specially constructed 
tranche, we can undertake an FX swap which achieves this objective. The success of 
this methodology will depend on the effectiveness of the prepayment model, which 
may be ready for application by 1994. Even if this model does not prove to be an 
effective predictor of prepayment speed, we believe that securitization, as a form of 
financial intermediation, will grow as technologies and the global community continue 
to evolve.
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CHAPTER 10 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSION
The essence of this dissertation is to present a new financial product that will further 
help to build the global financial market. We show a financial instrument can be 
structured to allow foreign investors to participate in the UK mortgage market without 
being exposed to foreign currency exchange rate risk. Our work is a single example of 
how securitization can be used as a conduit to channel funds between countries. We are 
confident that this financial process can help the global market to become more efficient.
Our objective for this work is to demonstrate how securitization can be used efficiently 
to source capital beyond domestic markets. By bringing together two derivative 
securities — a PAC and a swap, we eliminate currency risk for foreign investors. The 
PAC substantially reduces prepayment uncertainty, which is inherent in all MBS. The 
PAC provides a stable cash flow that is swapped into a foreign currency and sold to 
foreign investors. The foreign currency tranche opens a channel for investment in 
mortgages between countries.
We explained in Chapter 2 how securitization plays a similar role in the United States 
when MBS serve as a conduit to pierce fundamental barriers that restrict interstate capital 
investment. The growth of the US MBS market was fueled in the 1980s by the expanding 
home growth in the south and west which was funded by the wealthy north-east. We 
just expand this process by extending it beyond national boundaries through the 
elimination of currency risk.
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Securitization of mortgages is a funding tool that is used in many countries in addition 
to the US. We discuss these non-US markets in Chapter 3 to show that the foundations 
are already laid for these established MBS markets to start cross-pollinating. 
Additionally, as we explain in Chapter 4, securitization is a robust form of financial 
intermediation that is applicable to a host of receivables. The only fundamental restriction 
for foreign investors is the foreign exchange (FX) rate risk.
We discuss the evolution of the derivatives markets to establish a thorough understanding 
of how and why hedging instruments are used. It is important to understand how these 
instruments evolved so one can appreciate the efficiency they bring to the current global 
market. The history presented in Chapter 5 and the application of modem hedging 
instruments discussed in Chapter 6, should give a foundation on which to understand 
the core concept of the thesis. Also, we hope that with this understanding of derivative 
financial products, the reader can share our excitement in the potential for the compound 
derivative instrument created in Chapter 9. This compound derivative manages FX rate 
risk and prepayment risk. To the best of our knowledge, no one has ever efficiently 
managed these risks simultaneously.
Most investors are not comfortable exposing their investments to FX rate risk. Therefore, 
they tend to limit their investment universe to instruments denominated in their home 
currency. They do not have the expertise or systems to manage FX risk, and it is not 
economically feasible for them to obtain the management ability. However, there are 
some large institutional investors that are willing to expose their investments to FX risk
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or are able to manage it. These investors require a higher return on their capital to 
compensate for the risk or hedging cost, which raises the cost of funds that flow between 
countries.
Many international investment banking institutions have attempted to solve this hedging 
problem with respect to MBS. In Chapter 8 we test the effectiveness of the Salomon 
Brothers hedging methodology. They claim their hedging method will eliminate FX risk. 
However, we prove through empirical tests that this method fails to protect foreign 
investors from exchange rate risk over multiple periods. In fact, over some periods, it 
enhanced the risk. The Salomon model is effective for a single period investment which 
allows the foreign investor to invest for only three months. Its weak point is when the 
investors rollover their position. Transaction costs plus the discrepancy between the 
forward rate, which the investor receives, and the current spot rate the investor pays 
prohibits investors from using the Salomon model for any time period extending more 
than three months. Foreign investors require a hedging methodology that is effective 
over intermediate and long term periods.
Chapter 9 provides a major contribution to the developing global capital market by 
providing an efficient instrument for multinational transactions. We show how the data 
might be collected to derive a prepayment model, which is used to construct a robust 
cost efficient multicurrency financial instrument. The multicurrency collateralized 
mortgage-backed obligation (MCMO) provides a FX tranche that opens the sterling 
mortgage market to foreign investors without exposing them to FX risk. This 
methodology is not limited to the UK or to mortgages, but can be used as a a conduit to 
channel funds across national boundaries.
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Furthermore, in Chapter 9 we described how a UK prepayment model can be developed. 
This model would be useful to not only those who securitize their mortgages, but to the 
whole housing financial market. Our model can be used better to predict prepayment, 
which should lower the uncertainty of future cash flow. As this uncertainty decreases, 
so should the mortgage cost. As we explained in Chapter 3, intermediaries are paid for 
taking risks, and if the risk decreases so should the cost.
Our thesis creates a way to lower funding cost by broadening the investor base. Securities 
backed by foreign assets, that pay in home currency, would be attractive to investors. 
The technique of securitizating assets then swapping the cash flow into different 
currencies will help to propagate the global financial market. This technique of 
structuring a swap imbedded in a asset/mortgage-backed security will serve as a conduit 
to channel funds between countries. As the cash flow increases through this conduit, 
the capital cost will drop as a result of reduced friction (i.e. cost) of global financial 
intermediation.
Much has happened since 1988 that only further supports our thesis. The UK property 
market collapsed and mortgage default rates reached record levels. Nevertheless, not 
a single investor experienced a delay in payment from their sterling MBS. This supports 
the robustness of the securitization process as a form of efficient financial intermediation. 
This is the second time securitization has proved itself as a sound system for funding 
mortgages. The US also suffered from a collapsing real estate market that crippled the 
savings and loan industry in that country. Still, the mortgage-backed securities market 
continues to thrive requiring no bail outs from the government.
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Just as developed economies are benefiting from securitization, so can newly developing 
countries. Since the fall of communism, Eastern European countries are in need of capital 
to rebuild their economies. These countries cannot fund their capital needs internally. 
Therefore, these countries are prime candidates for securitization. Since capital markets 
are just starting to evolve in these countries, the securitization process is even simpler 
to introduce than it was when applied in the UK. In the UK, securitization had to compete 
with an established system and forms of regulation that were not conducive to the 
securitization process. As we discussed in Chapter 3, existing systems and legal 
structures had to be changed to allow securitization. In Eastern Europe, the laws, 
technology and systems could be introduced from the start, thus providing an efficient 
conduit for capital from foreign investors.
Our process can be applied to any national market in a relatively short period of time. 
Survey data bases can be compiled usually within two years. Our work shows that a 
relatively efficient prepayment model can be produced from that survey data. Based on 
the prepayment model, we can further refine the efficiency of our mortgage or asset 
backed security by creating a PAC tranche from the pool of receivables. This defined 
and static cash flow is then swapped for the investors currency of choice.
Our work raises many questions that are not answered in the thesis. Using the variables 
in Appendix G, we suggest that the NOP data be evaluated and applied to our model to 
determine the UK mortgage prepayment rate. Once a functional model is built, it can 
then be used as an index for prepayment speed. The market is in need of a yardstick,
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similar to the US PS A prepayment rate. Not only would our model help to develop such 
an index, but as we demonstrated, it could be used to build the MCMO, a financial 
product that can attract foreign investors who are concerned about the pound.
Another element that is crucial to the development of securitization is homogeneity. If 
the UK Government or a professional agency standardized UK mortgages, the market 
could grow more quickly as it did in the US. Currently, only large mortgage originators 
are securitizing their own mortgages. If a standard were developed and accepted, then 
small building societies and mortgage bankers could originate and sell their mortgages 
on the open market. Standardization would eliminate the flexibility that mortgage lenders 
have if they wanted to sell the mortgage on the open market. However, this would not 
limit the mortgage lender. He could continue to originate and hold mortgages that did 
not meet the standards set for the securitizable mortgages.
There are some gaps in our work because of the large number of financial concepts and 
instruments we discussed. We hope that we provided enough information for the reader 
to grasp the various elements we used to structure the MCMO, and to see that 
securitization, as a form of financial intermediation, canserve a primary function in the 
development of the global market.
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APPENDIX A
TABLES OF MBS
SUMMARY OF STERLING MORTGAGE-BACKED
FLOATING-RATE NOTES ISSUED
Issuer
Issue
D ate
M aturity
Date
Amount 
in £ 
(millions)
LIBOR Reset 
Margin (bp)1
Type2
Citibank 2/85 February
2010
£50 37.5 
3 month
End
NHL First 
Funding
1/3/87 September
2013
50 20 
3 month
End
TMC Mortgage Sec. No. 1 31/3/87 September
2014
200 25 
3 month
End
HMC Mortgage Notes 1 16/7/87 June
2017
150 25/50 
3 month
End
TMC Mortgage Sec. No. 2 26/8/87 November 2014 100 37.5/50 
3 month
End
NHL Second 
Funding
8/10/87 November 2014 111 27.5/50 
3 month
End
TMC Mortgage Sec. No. 3 30/10/87 April
2015
100 37.5/50 
3 month
End
TMC Mortgage Sec. No. 4 30/11/87 May 2015 100 37.5/50 
3 month
End
NHL Third Funding 30/11/87 November
2014
100 25/50 
3 month
End
DOMUS 4/12/88 December
2014
100 35/50 
3 month
End
h m c  n 23/2/88 February 2015 150 35/50 
3 month
End
MFC I 31/3/88 M arch
2015
175 42.5/50 
3 month
End
TMC Mortgage Sec. No. 5 7/4/88 September
2015
125 35/50 
3 month
End
TMC Mortgage Sec. No. 6 29/4/88 October
2015
100 32.5/50 
3 month
End
RPS #1 18/5/88 May
2018
200 35/50 
3 month
End
TMC Mortgage Sec. No. 7 15/6/88 November
2015
100 32.5/50 
3 month
End
HMC III 12/7/88 July
2015
150 32.5/50 
3 month
End
1 Basis points (1/100 of 1%)
2 Endowment type mortgage
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STERLING MORTGAGE-BACKED FLOATING-RATE NOTES (continued)
Issuer
Issue
Date
Maturity
Date
Amount 
in £ 
(millions)
LIBOR 
Reset M argin
Type
TM C M ortgage Sec. No. 8 18/7/88 December
2018
100 32.5/50 
3 month
End
MAES 25/7/88 July
2018
200 32.5/50 
3 month
End
RPS II 27/7/88 July
2018
200 32.5/50 
3 month
End
MFC II 31/8/88 August
2023
115 32.5/50 
3 month
End
Exclusive Finance No. 1 5/9/88 November
2015
135 30/50 
3 month
End
TM C M ortgage Sec. No. 9 20/9/88 February
2019
200 32.5/50 
3 month
End
TM C M ortgage Sec. No. 10 18/10/88 March
2019
200 30/50 
3 month
End
M FC III 21/10/88 October
2023
120 30/50 
3 month
End
NHL Fourth  Funding 31/10/88 October
2015
100 27.5/50 
3 month
End
F irst M ortgage Securities I 14/11/88 October
2023
200 30/50 
3 month
End
TM C M ortgage Sec. No. 11 20/12/88 March
2020
500 Special
CM O
End
Source: Moody’sInvestor Services
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APPENDIX B
EMPIRICAL TEST RESULTS
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ASSUMPTIONS 
US$ investment 1,823,000
POUNDS 1,000,000
COMMISSION 025%
PERIODS 40
June 78 through Set*. 88_____
TABLE OF RESULTS
P e r io d  June  78 - S e p t . 88 P e rio d  S e p t . 82“Jan 88 P e r io d  Jan . 86  -  S ep t 88
T o ta l PV T o ta l PV T o ta l PV
SLB 3 ,1 1 5 ,0 5 1 1 ,8 4 8 ,6 3 7 SLB 2 26 9 ,0 3 3 1, 8 9 7 ,5 0 5 SLB 1 ,7 9 2 ,5 7 6 1 ,5 1 7 ,1 4 0
P e r f e c t 3 ,0 9 9 ,2 1 4 1, 870, 112 P e r f e c t  2 6 45 ,104 2, 149, 949 P e r f e c t 2 ,5 7 6 ,9 9 1 ,2 0 4 ,1 8 7
No Hedqe 3 ,0 1 9 ,4 9 7 1 ,9 3 5 ,9 2 6 No Hedqe 1 9 36 ,005 1 5 7 9 ,9 7 9 No Hedqe 1 ,9 9 5 ,9 7 1 ,7 0 3 ,0 2 8
Forward Rolling Salomon PV of SLB PV of Perfect PV of No
Rate £/Srale Forwards Hedge Hedge Perfect Hedge Hedge No hedge Hedge
125194 125230 15230 1,848,637 1,870,112 1,935,926
12374 12495 15194 -42,245 1539,409 84,611 1,834,591 98,452 1588593
12997 2.0200 15081 9,398 1587,890 81,707 1,807,636 96,660 1,847,986
1.9975 2.0220 1.7899 84,343 1586,789 93,464 1,789,867 110,878 1,814,492
2.0403 2.0745 1.7682 33,217 2,040,184 90543 1,777,650 111529 1,782,364
22256 22500 1.7390 -83,143 2518,323 84592 1,775,531 115576 1,749,779
22551 22375 1.7202 109,562 2511,705 91,491 1,766,435 124,614 1,706,366
22480 22285 1.7337 155,579 2,132,154 101,786 1,725,371 136517 1,628,805
2.3526 2.3410 1.7489 61,478 2,147,633 104,812 1,682,834 145,736 1541,858
2.4421 2.4135 1.7576 87,113 2,140,050 99,320 1,645,831 141,793 1,457,162
2.4150 2.3815 1.7784 180,163 2,021,413 97,070 1596,079 135,094 1,363,961
22128 2.1940 15034 283,687 1,783507 91573 1540,718 115528 1579.123
12446 12290 15188 301,030 1522,857 83528 1,492,338 92,366 1515,937
125591 125430 15335 158,206 1,401,771 84,314 1,444,399 88505 1,157,370
1.9365 12090 15496 53503 1,383,450 85,746 1,395514 91,919 1,094,747
125535 125385 15762 156,335 1561,485 92,025 1,337,852 93597 1,028,648
125031 1.7960 15915 116,954 1,176,659 84518 1587,708 82,872 971574
1.7233 1.7280 15990 120,311 1,089,625 81,391 1542,735 76,734 922,729
1.6195 1.6105 15938 129,239 993,074 74,139 1505,878 65,439 884572
12175 1-5125 12044 117,701 896,167 72527 1,158,301 59574 843528
12753 15650 12106 33,823 884,328 73,181 1.113,535 62,041 802,180
12017 1.4955 12232 95,166 806,019 70,435 1,064,326 56,665 760506
1.4117 1.4070 1.9312 95,446 727,071 68,614 1,017,498 51,674 724,705
1.4757 1.4710 12377 22511 718502 66,692 971,156 52589 686,909
1.3951 1.3855 12439 85,037 647579 65,125 924,696 47,886 652524
12890 12735 12574 92,393 566,722 66,449 874,718 44,493 619,349
1.1662 1.1545 12812 90,700 484523 68,032 819,808 40,701 587,939
1.0926 1.0725 2.0013 68,452 423566 66,403 766,086 36,490 560543
12841 12680 2.0388 -14,431 444,748 72,601 705,695 46,124 523,354
1.3389 1.3255 2.0647 31514 421595 69,390 649,095 45,471 487,369
1.4555 14390 2.0856 17,898 411,668 67584 593,783 47538 449,045
14727 14540 2.1094 46,300 372,765 67,162 537590 47,113 410,001
12124 15050 2.1365 39551 339563 66,808 479,633 47,810 369,173
12017 14960 2.1470 47,018 299,323 63,069 425,707 44,600 331,611
14970 14905 2.1552 44543 260548 62,437 372,184 43,743 294512
12913 15900 2.1645 31,303 235,373 62,380 318,411 46,327 255,302
12293 1.6310 2.1664 40,398 200,859 60,599 265,772 46,047 215,638
12593 1.6540 2.1640 42,053 163,482 58,465 213,495 45,020 175,638
125811 125785 2.1710 33,400 133,735 58,135 160,130 50573 128590
1.7774 1.7740 2.1740 51,604 84,910 56,574 106,884 46,318 85,352
1.7973 1.7950 2.1781 45,390 41598 55,638 53,484 45502 41537
1.7021 15835 2.1810 42,150 54587 42,088
3,115,051 1548,637 3,099514 1,870,112 3,019,497 1535,926
Rate £/5 rate Forwards SLB Hedge Perfect Hedge No hedge
1.7233 1.7280 15990 1597,505 2,149,949 1579,979
1.6195 15105 15938 235583 1,719,147 141,305 2,073,142 126,810 1500,568
12175 15125 12044 213,632 1541,512 138,793 1,977,758 113504 1,418,084
12753 15650 1.9106 69,179 1510,148 139,118 1,887,157 117534 1,335,337
12017 1.4955 12232 173,017 1,365,918 134,183 1,788,948 107547 1553544
14757 1.4710 12312 123,879 1569,998 130,826 1,694,740 102,602 1,176595
14117 1.4070 12374 143,180 1,151526 125540 1,601,371 94,093 1,104,808
12951 1.3855 12439 107,431 1,066,820 125,715 1507,683 92,006 1,034,899
12890 12735 12574 162,101 923,722 126,353 1,408,186 84541 969,092
1.1662 1.1545 12812 156,689 780589 128,687 1,300,622 76,666 906563
1.0926 1.0725 2.0013 119,085 673583 125,818 1,194,924 68,833 852,160
12841 12680 2.0388 -7,542 692,165 135547 1,078,721 85590 780,151
1.3389 1.3255 2.0647 63,421 641589 129525 968,348 84,775 709517
1.4555 1.4390 2.0856 45,690 607,724 126,778 859,878 88,768 634,163
1.4727 14540 2.1094 86,668 531576 125,706 749,623 87,768 557,789
12124 15050 2.1365 77,460 463577 124,727 637,663 88,831 478,459
12017 1.4960 2.1470 86570 385544 119,139 530,680 83,800 403,780
14970 1.4905 2.1552 83,356 310561 117592 424500 81531 330,303
12913 15900 2.1645 71,115 246,320 116556 317,454 86,077 251,865
1.6293 1.6310 2.1664 81523 171,155 113,545 211,845 85,768 172,394
12593 15540 2.1640 83,145 91594 110,478 106599 84535 91,872
125811 15785 2.1710 94,050 108,675 93,925
2569,033 1597505 2,645,104 2,149,949 1536,005 1579,979
Forward Rolling
Rate £/$ rate Forwards SLB Hedge Perfect Hedge No hedge
1.4555 14390 2.0789 1517,140 2504,187 1,703,028
14727 1.4540 2.1026 112,375 1,432,026 162,515 2,081579 118552 1,615,377
12124 15050 2.1296 81577 1,374,439 162,709 1,954,017 118555 1524,634
12017 1.4960 2.1401 117527 1582,712 148576 1,842589 107,199 1,446,498
14970 14905 2.1482 111,651 1,197,920 148,652 1,732512 106,000 1,370,786
12913 15900 2.1576 34541 1,191,383 151,607 1,620,665 114579 1587,907
1.6293 1.6310 2.1594 79,038 1,142,131 146527 1,514,957 113,183 1506,923
12593 1.6540 2.1571 87,312 1,081,409 137,984 1,412542 108,390 1,126,632
12581 1 15785 2.1640 -24,034 1,129,606 141,123 1,302,675 125515 1,026,590
1.7774 1.7740 2.1670 175,123 977558 134,325 1,195,420 112,318 935,606
1.7973 1.7950 2.1712 99520 898,614 133568 1,087,182 112,349 842546
1.7021 1.6835 2.1740 917,148 1,109,605 860530
NO. DATE 
0 02/06/78
01/09/78 
05/01/79 
02/03/79 
01/06/79 
07/09/79 
04/01/80 
07/03/80 
06/06/80 
05/09/80 
10 02/01/81
11 06/03/81
12 05/06/81
13 04/09/81
14 01/01/82
15 05/03/82
16 04/06/82
17 03/09/82
18 07/01/83
19 04/03/83
20 03/06/83
21 02/09/83
22 06/01/84
23 02/03/84
24 01/06/84
25 07/09/84
26 04/01/85
27 01/03/85
28 07/06/85
29 06/09/85
30 03/01/86
31 07/03/86
32 06/06/86
33 05/09/86
34 02/01/87
35 06/03/87
36 05/06/87
37 04/09/87
38 01/01/88
39 04/03/88
40 03/06/88
41 02/09/88
£ Liber 
9.688% 
9.375% 
12.563% 
12.375% 
11.719% 
14.031% 
17.000% 
18.063% 
16.875% 
16.375% 
14.750% 
12.625% 
13.063% 
13.719% 
15.844% 
13.531% 
125138% 
10.875% 
10.656% 
11.156% 
10.313% 
9.875% 
9.375% 
9.000% 
95)38% 
105)38% 
10.313% 
14.000% 
12.406% 
11.688% 
11.844% 
12.032% 
9.626% 
9.938% 
11.031% 
10.344% 
8.876% 
10.251% 
8.876% 
9.157% 
8.782% 
12.500%
Sept 82 through Jan. 88
PERIODS= 
NO. DATE
0 03/09/82
1 07/01/83 
04/03/83 
03/06/83 
02/09/83 
02/03/84 
06/01/84 
01/06/84
8 07/09/84
9 04/01/85
10 01/03/85
11 07/06/85
12 06/09/85
13 03/01/86
14 07/03/86
15 06/06/86
16 05/09/86
17 02/01/87
18 06/03/87
19 05/06/87
20 04/09/87
21 01/01/88
20
£ Libor 
10.875% 
10.656% 
11.156% 
10.313% 
92575% 
9.000% 
9.375% 
95)38% 
105)38% 
10.313% 
14.000% 
12.406% 
11.688% 
112544% 
12.032% 
9.626% 
95)38% 
112)31% 
10.344% 
82576% 
10231% 
82576%
January 86 through Sept 88
NO. DATE
0 03/01/86
1 07/03/86 
06/06/86 
05/09/86 
02/01/87 
06/03/87 
05/06/87 
04/09/87
8 01/01/88
9 04/03/88
10 03/06/88
11 02/09/88
£ Libor 
112544% 
12.032% 
9.626% 
95)38% 
11.031% 
10.344% 
82576% 
10251% 
82576% 
9.157% 
8.782% 
12.500%
USS Libor 
10.500% 
115)38% 
16.750% 
17.438% 
18.625% 
18.563% 
13.750% 
14.438% 
14.813% 
11 -500% 
9.000% 
9.125% 
9.750% 
10.125% 
95)38% 
10.188% 
11.313% 
12.000% 
8.376% 
92513% 
7.625% 
8.188% 
8.000% 
7.688% 
7.125% 
6 .000% 
6.188% 
6.375% 
7250% 
7.563% 
7.188% 
6.813% 
7.625% 
8.376% 
9251% 
10.001% 
9.313% 
8.938% 
8.313% 
8.375% 
8250% 
8.000%
USS Libor 
12.000% 
8.376% 
92513% 
7.625% 
8.188% 
7.688% 
8.000% 
7.125% 
6 .000% 
6.188% 
6.375% 
7250% 
7.563% 
7.188% 
62513% 
7.625% 
8.376% 
9251% 
10.001% 
9.313% 
85)38% 
8.313%
USS Libor 
7.188% 
62513% 
7.625% 
8.376% 
9251% 
10 .00 1 % 
9.313% 
8.938% 
8.313% 
8.375% 
8250% 
8 .000%
1,792,576 1,517,140 2,576,991 2204,187 1295,971 1,703,028
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APPENDIX C
THE PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL
There are many survival distributions for modelling the survival experience of a 
homogeneous population. Usually, however, there are explanatory variables upon which 
failure time may depend. It is of interest, therefore, to consider generalisations of these 
models to take account of concomitant information on the individuals sampled.
Consider failure time T > 0 and suppose a vector Z = (Zl5 ...,Zn) of explanatory variables
(or coraniates) has been observed. Note that Z may include both quantitative variables 
and qualitative variables, such as first time home owner; the latter can be incorporated 
through the use of indicator variables. The principal problem that we deal with is that 
of modelling and determining the relationship between T and Z. Certain of the covariates 
are usually of primary interest, such as those specifying particular demographic groups. 
One then wishes to evaluate, for example, mortgage prepayments effects, while 
accounting for heterogeneity in the individuals sampled.
If we take the hazard function to be a constant, that is <|>(x) = ^  > 0, over the range of T,
then the instantaneous failure rate is independent of t so that the conditional chance of 
failure in a time interval of specified length is the same regardless of how long the 
individual has been on trial (this is referred to as the memoryless property of the 
exponential distribution.) The survivor function and density functions of T are, 
respectively,
F(t) = exp(-A,r) and f(t)  = -\exp{-fo)
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We can generalise the exponential distribution to obtain a regression model by allowing 
the failure rate to be a function of the covariates of Z.
The hazard function at time t for an individual with covariates Z can be written 
A(r;Z) = A(Z).
Thus the hazard for a given Z is a constant characterising an exponential failure time
distribution, but the failure rate depends on Z. The X(Z) function may be parametrised 
in many ways. If the effect of the components of Z is only through a linear function, 
Zg, one has
X(t'yZ) = Ac(Zp)
where pr = (pl 5 pn) is a vector of regression parameters, A, is a constant and c is a
specified functional form. A common functional form for c is c (x) = exp(x) which then 
enables, us to write
A(f;Z) = Aexp(ZP)
A further generalisation is to make X a function of time t. If we now write the hazard 
function as
A (r^) = Ao(r)exp(Zp)
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where Ao(f) is an arbitrary unspecified base-line hazard function for continuous T. Aq(f)
is referred to as a base-line function because it is the hazard function if the value of each 
covariate is simultaneously zero. In other words if Z = (0,..., 0), the null vector is taken 
as the base for all analyses.
As Ao(.) is arbitrary, the proportional hazards model is very flexible and has been applied
to many alternative applications. There are, however, two important generalisations that 
do not substantially complicate the estimation of p.
First, the nuisance function \>(t) can be allowed to vary in specific subsets of these data.
Suppose that the population divided into r strata and that the hazard A i s  the jth  
stratum depends on an arbitrary shape function Aty(r) and can be written
Xjit'JZ) = Xqj exp(ZP) for; = 1,..., r.
Such a generalisation is useful, for instance, if some explanatory variable or variables 
do not appear to have a multiplicative effect on the hazard function. The range of such 
variables can then be divided into strata with only the remaining regression variables 
contributing to the exponential factor.
The second important generalisation allows the regression variable Z to depend on time 
itself.
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APPENDIX D
THE DISTRIBUTION OF PREPAYMENT -TIMES AND HAZARD FUNCTIONS
Suppose that we have a population of mortgages, each mortgage characterised by a 
non-negative random variable, X, called its PREPAYMENT-TIME. The random 
variable, X, is non-negative and there are in practice two main cases to consider
a) There is a positive constant, /z, such that the only possible values of X 
a r e { 0 , / z , 2 / z , a n d
b) The random variable has an (absolutely) continuous distribution over the infinite 
range (0, <*>), its distribution being determined by a probability density function 
(p.d.f.).
A probability density function is an expression giving the frequency of a variate value 
X  as a function of X ; or, for continuous variates, the frequency in an elemental range. 
Unless the contrary is specified the total frequency is taken to be unity, so that the 
frequency function represents the proportion of aviator values X. From a more 
sophisticated standpoint the frequency function is most conveniently regarded as the 
derivative of the distribution function.
The cumulative distribution function gives the probability that the life of the mortgage 
does not exceed some pre-specified level, X, say. In other words, the cumulative 
distribution function = probability (X <jc). We usually denote cumulative distribution 
functions by capital letters and probability density functions by lower case letters. Hence, 
for example,
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F(x) = Prob(X <x) 
and/(x) = F'(x) 
where the prime represents differentiation.
For some purposes it is slightly more convenient to work with the function 
complementary to F(x). This is the SURVIVOR FUNCTION, H(x)t
H(x) = Prob (X > x) = Prob(x < X )
= 1 ~F{x)
giving the probability that a mortgage has not repaid up to time X.  Clearly 
H(0) = l , / / ( o o )  = 0 and H{x) is a non-increasing function of X.  Also
f{x) = -H \x )
Another function equivalent to f{x) is the AGE-SPECIFIC FAILURE RATE or
HAZARD FUNCTION, <J)(jc) ,  defined as follows. Consider a mortgage known not to 
have been repaid at time x and let <])(x) be the limit of the ratio to Ax of the probability 
of repayment in the time interval (x ,x + Ax). That is, in the usual notation for conditional 
probability
. . .  Prob(x <X <x + Ax |x  <X)
<J)(x) =  lim ----------------- -------------------
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Thus, roughly speaking, <|)(x) gives the probability of almost immediate repayment of a
mortgage know to be of age x. This function is widely used in actuarial work. Now for 
any two events A and B ,
™ Prob(A andB)
Prob (A \B) = — p . , Pv Prob(B)
Butthe event ‘x <X <x+Ax  and x  < X ’ is the same as the event ‘jc <X <x +Ax \  Thus
N Prob(x<X<x+Ax)  1
<^ (j: )=  lim -------------- ------------------ ---— —----- —Ax —»o+ Ax Prob{x <X)
fix)
H{x)
Because/(x) = -H'{x) we can rewrite <J)(x) as 
H'{x)
♦(*) = “ H{x)
= ~ { ln tf (x )} .dx
Hence, on using the condition H(0) = 1 and integrating, we have 
H(x) = exp{-Jo (J)(p.)rf|i}.
By differentiating this expression for H{x) we obtain
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/(jr) = <K*)expj-J^ 
showing that (|)(jt) uniquely determines the p.d.f.,/(jt).
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APPENDIX E
Copy of the
MIT/HARVARD JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING RESEARCH CONSUMER
MAIL PANEL
SECURITIZATION AND THE GLOBAL MARKET
(N879: 6 3 -7 4 ,8 7 -9 8 )
Dear Panel Member:
In the p a st s e v e r a l  y e a r s , you have helped us by com pleting  one or more housing  
q u e s t io n n a ir e s . I am now sending you another housing q u es tio n n a ir e  to  f i l l  o u t. The 
answers to  t h i s  new q u estion n a ire  are very im portant, s in c e  a purpose o f  t h i s  study i s  
to  lea rn  more about changes over time in your hou sing.
This q u e s t io n n a ir e  about housing i s  being sen t to  the men and women a c ro ss  th e  country  
who p r e v io u s ly  returned  housing q u estion n a ires. When we began t h is  s tu d y , h a lf  o f  the 
su rveys were se n t to  men, h a lf  to  women. In your ca se  the male head o f  household  was 
asked to  respond. This same male head  o f  household should  a ls o  f i l l  out th is  
q u e s t io n n a ir e .
Dear Male Head o f  Household:
A purpose o f  t h i s  study i s  to  learn more about changes over tim e in  your h ou sin g . This
q u es tio n n a ir e  thus in c lu d es some questions you have answered p r e v io u s ly  and some, new 
q u e s t io n s . S in c e  w e .a ls o  hope to learn more about housing p r e fe r e n c e s , some o f  the new 
q u estio n s  are about you and your fam ily. Your answers are e s p e c ia l ly  im portant to  the  
su c c e ss  o f  t h i s  s tu d y , s in c e  you have responded w ith  in form ation  about your housing in  
the p a s t .
P le a se  read each q u estio n  c a r e fu lly . You w i l l  se e  th a t most q u es tio n s  can be answered 
by c ir c l in g  th e  number which corresponds to  your answer.
As my way o f  sa y in g  thank you, once a l l  the q u e s tio n n a ir e s  are checked in ,  I w i l l  be
sending you a sm all g i f t .  In add ition , th ere  w i l l  be a s p e c ia l  drawing fo r  th ose  who
retu rn  q u e s t io n n a ir e s  by June 9th. Fourteen cash  p r iz e s  in  a l l  w i l l  be awarded:
A fter  you have com pleted your qu estion naire, p le a se  retu rn  i t  to  me in  th e  p o sta g e  paid  
en velop e I have e n c lo se d .
One: F ir st p r ize  o f  $100
Three: Second p r iz e s  o f $50 each
Ten: Third p r izes  o f $25 each
Thank you.
C o r d ia lly ,
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• V
(N879: 5 1 -6 2 ,7 5 -8 6 )
Dear Panel Member:
In the p ast s e v e r a l  y e a r s , you have helped us by com pleting one or  more housing  
qu estion n a ires. I am now send ing you another housing qu estion naire  to  f i l l  o u t . The 
answers to  t h i s  new q u es tio n n a ir e  are very im portant, s in ce  a purpose o f  t h i s  stu dy  i s  
to learn more about changes over time in  your housing.
This q u estio n n a ire  about housing i s  being sen t to  the men and women a c ro ss  th e  country  
who p rev iou sly  returned  housing q u e s tio n n a ir e s . When we began t h is  s tu d y , h a l f  o f  the  
surveys were se n t  to men, h a lf  to  women. In your case the female head o f  household  was 
asked to respond. T his same female head o f  household should a ls o  f i l l  ou t t h i s  
qu estion n a ire.
Dear Female Mead o f  Household:
A purpose o f t h i s  stu dy  i s  to  lea r n  more about changes over time in  your h o u s in g . T his  
q u estion naire thus in c lu d e s  some q u estio n s you have answered p r e v io u s ly  and some new 
q u estion s. S in ce  we a ls o  hope to  learn  more about housing p r e fer en ce s , some o f  the  new 
questions are about you and your fa m ily . Your answers are e s p e c ia l ly  im portant to  th e  
success o f th is  stu d y , s in c e  you have responded w ith inform ation about your housing in  
the p ast.
Please read each q u es tio n  c a r e f u l ly .  You w i l l  see  that most q u estio n s can be answered 
by c ir c l in g  the number which corresponds to  your answer.
As my way o f say in g  thank you, once a l l  the q u estion n a ires are checked in ,  I w i l l  be 
sending you a sm all g i f t .  In a d d itio n , th ere  w i l l  be a sp e c ia l drawing f o r  th o se  who 
return q u estio n n a ir es  by June 9 th . Fourteen cash  p r ize s  in  a l l  w i l l  be awarded:
One: F ir s t  p r iz e  o f $100
Three: Second p r iz e s  o f  $50 each
Ten: Third p r iz e s  o f $25 each
A fter you have com pleted your q u es tio n n a ir e , p le a se  return i t  to  me in  th e  p o s ta g e  paid  
envelope I have e n c lo se d .
Thank you.
C ord ia lly ,
iv \o jua-
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1. Please c ir c le  the number below which best describes the building in which you 
l iv e .  (PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER ONLY. )
One family house, detached from any other
, house...................................................................................
One family house, attached to one or more
other houses ..............................................................
A Building For:
2 to 4 fa m ilie s  ......................................................
5 or more fa m ilies  ..............................................
Mobile home sin g le-w id e  .........................................
Mobile home m ulti-w ide ...........................................
Boat, van, e t c ...................................................................
Other _____________________________________________
(SPECIFY)
2. Is your current dwelling u n it . . .  (PLEASE CIRCLE THE ANSWER WHICH BEST APPLIES.)
(X^ ned by you or someone in your household . .  1
Rented for cash .....................................................................  2
OR, Occupied without payment o f cash r e n t   3
3. Is your dwelling unit . . .
Part of a cooperative (property owned as 
a corporation where each shareholder
occupies an ind ividu al un it) ............................... 1
Part of a condominium ...................................................... 2
OR, N e ith e r .......................................................................................... 3
4. Can you enter your dwelling un it . . .
D irectly  from the outsid e ......................................... 1
Through a hallway, lobby or other
shared entryway ........................................................... 2
OR, Either way ................................................................................ 3
5. How many flo o rs are there in  th is  building? (INCLUDE BASBENT AND ATTIC IF FUR­
NISHED FOR LIVING PURPOSES.)
(WRITE IN FLOORS): ____________
6. When was the structure you l iv e  in  bu ilt?  (IF NOT SURE, GIVE YOUR BEST 
ESTIMATE.) (INDICATE WHEN THE BUILDING WAS FIRST CONSTRUCTED, NOT WHEN IT WAS 
REMODELLED, ADDED-TO, OR CONVERTED.)
(WRITE IN YEAR): _______________
7. What month and year did you move in to  th is  current residence?
MONTH: _____________ YEAR:______________
8. Approximately how many m iles from the downtown or central business area of the 
la rg e st  c ity  within 50 m iles i s  your residence located?
MILES: __________________________
9. How many square fee t of l iv in g  space does your household have in th is  dw elling  
unit? (DO NOT COUNT UNFINISHED PORTIONS OF BASEMENT OR ATTIC) (IF  NOT SURE, 
PLEASE GIVE YOUR BEST ESTIMATE.)
_____________  SQUARE FEET
10. How many rooms are there in  your residence? (DO NOT COUNT BATHROOMS, PORCHES, 
BALCONIES, HALLS, FOYERS OR HALF ROOMS.)
1
1
3
4
5
6
7
8
NUMBER OF ROOMS:
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Page 3
11. Which o f the rooms or areas on the l i s t  below do your l iv in g  quarters have? De­
f in e  the rooms or areas by the way they are used. For example, i f  one of your 
bedrooms is  usually used as a study, count i t  as a study. I f  you have any rooms 
or areas that are not on the l i s t ,  p lease  add them in the spaces provided. (EACH 
ROOM OR AREA SHOULD BE COUNTED ONLY ONCE.)
Have These 
 Rooms
Kitchen ..........................................
Walk-in Pantry .........................
Eating area in kitchen . . .  
Bathroom 1 (include half
baths) ........................................
Bathroom 2 ...................................
Bathroom 3 ...................................
Entry ha ll ..................................
Living room-dining room 
combination ...........................
Separate liv ing  room ..........
Separate dining room ..........
Bedroom 1 .....................................
Bedroom 2 .....................................
Bedroom 3 .....................................
Bedroom 4 .....................................
Bedroom 5 .....................................
Family room ................................
Recreation/game room ...........
Den/study .....................................
O ffice ............................................
Have Thes 
 Rooms
Separate laundry room .....................  1
Woodworking room/shop ..................... 1
Storage room ............................................. 1
Unfinished basement ( a l l  or
part) .......................................................  1
Unfinished a t t i c  (do not count 
crawl space) ..................................... 1
Enclosed porch (windows or
screens) ................................................ 1
Covered porch ..........................................  1
Balcony ..........................................................  1
Deck .................................................................. 1
Patio .........................................................    1
Garage ............................................................. 1
Other enclosed parking space . .  1
Carport .......................................................... 1
Other 1
(SPECIFY)
Other 1
(SPECIFY)
1 2 .
13.
Which o f the following do you have in  your kitchen?  
APPLY.)
(PLEASE CIRCLE ALL THAT
Cooking stove or range ..........
Microwave oven ..............................
Convection oven ...........................
Washer and/or dryer ..................
Dishwasher .......................................
Garbage disposal .........................
Instant hot water dispenser
Trash compactor ...........................
R efrigerator ..................................
Freezer  .....................................
Enough o u t le ts  .............................. 1
Adequate vo ltage ........................  1
Enough counter space .............. 1
Enough shelving ........................... 1
Table for  .eating ........................  1
Counter for eatin g  ................... 1
Ceramic counter t i l e  .............. 1
Custom cabinets ...........................  1
D e s k .......................................................  1
Computer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1
Does your house or apartment have any o f the follow ing?  
APPLY.)
(PLEASE CIRCLE ALL THAT
S ta ll  shower(s) ................................
Whirlpool tub .....................................
Hot tub ....................................................
Sauna .........................................................
Bay window ............................................
Greenhouse window(s) ....................
S k y ligh t(s) ..........................................
D ouble/trip le  pane insulating
windows ...............................................
Storm windows .....................................
Storm doors ..........................................
Patio or slid in g  glass d o o r ...
Smoke detectors ................................
Fireplace ...............................................
Wet bar ..................................................... 1
H igh/sloped c e i l in g s  ................... 1
Hardwood flo o rs  ................................  1
Linen c lo s e t  ........................................ 1
Bedroom/walk in  c lo s e t  .............. 1
Cable T V ..................................................  1
Burglar alarm system ................... 1
P assive so lar  ...................................... 1
Ceramic t i l e  f lo o r s  ...................... 1
Ceramic t i l e  w a lls  ........................  1
Track lig h tin g  ................................... 1
Recessed lig h tin g  ........................... 1
C eiling f a n ........................................... 1
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14a. What type o f foundation does your dw elling have? (PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER ONLY. )
Structure with basement ................................................................................................ 1
Building at ground level with crawl space only .........................................  2
Building at ground level on concrete slab ..................................................  3
OR, Building on.p i e r s .............................................................................................................. 4
14b. What type of exterior  does your dw elling have? (PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER ONLY. )
Wood sid ing ..........................................  1 Brick or masonry........................................ 6
Wood sh in gle siding ....................... 2 Concrete ......................................................... 7
Vinyl siding ........................................ 3 Stucco .............................................................. 8
Aluminum siding ................................  4 Other________________________________ 9
A sbestos siding ................................. 5 . (PLEASE SPECIFY)
14c. What type of roof does your dw elling have? (PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER ONLY.)
Asphalt sh ingle   1 Metal ..............................................................  5
T ile  s h in g le ........................................ 2 Composition or b u ilt-u p  roof-
S la te  sh ingle .....................................  3 ing (asphalt type) ............................ 6
Wood sh ingle ........................................ 4 Other___________________________ 7
(PLEASE SPECIFY)
14d. Is the roof of your dwelling f la t?
Yes .................................... 1 N o ...........................................  0
14e. What type flo o r  or floor covering does most o f your dw elling  have? (PLEASE
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER ONLY. )
Carpet on w ood  1 T ile  ................................................................. 4
Carpet on c o n c r e te   2 Other  ___________________________ 5
Hardwood .................................................. 3 (PLEASE SPECIFY)
15. Do any o f the rooms in your house or apartment have any o f the fo llow ing? (EX­
CLUDE UNFINISHED PORTIONS OF BASEMENT OR ATTIC. PLEASE CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY.)
Yes
Exposed wiring, i . e . ,  NOT concealed in walls or metal coverings
(DO NOT COUNT appliance cords or extension cords) ........................................... 1
Broken lig h t  fix tu res, i . e . ,  NOT in  working order ................................................... 1
Open cracks or holes in the in te r io r  w alls or c e ilin g  (DO NOT
COUNT hairline  cracks) ..................................................................................................................  1
Holes in the f l o o r ................................................................................................................................. 1
Any area o f broken plaster on the c e ilin g  or in sid e  w a lls  which is
larger than th is piece of p a p e r ........................................................................................... 1
Any area o f peeling paint on the c e ilin g  or insid e w alls which i s
larger than th is piece o f p a p e r ........................................................................................... 1
Any broken or boarded-up windows .............................................................................................  1
16. Which, i f  any, of the following have you experienced with th is  house or apartment 
during the past year? (PLEASE CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY.)
Yes
A leaky roof ........................................................................... 1
A leaky basement ................................................................. 1
Times when there i s  not enough hot water . .  1
Heating equipment not in working order . . . .  1
Drafts from windows or doors ..................................  1
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17. Please ind icate below the main heating equipment used for your d w ellin g . (PLEASE 
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER ONLY. )
Main
Equipment
Steam or hot water system ..................................................................... 1
Central warm-air furnace with ducts to individual
rooms (do not count e le c tr ic  heat pumps here) ............. 2
E lec tr ic  heat pumps ....................................................................................  3
Other b u ilt - in  e le c tr ic  u n its (permanently in sta lled
in w all, c e ilin g  or baseboard) ................................................... 4'
F loor, wall or p ip eless furnace .....................................................  5
Room heaters with flu e  or vent, burning gas, o i l
or kerosene (not portable) .............................................................  6
Fireplace or heating stove ..................................................................  7
Portable room or space heaters ........................................................ 8
Other (SPECIFY)
    9
18. Which type o f fu e l is  used by your main heating equipment? (PLEASE CIRCLE ONE 
ANSWER ONLY.)
Main
Fuel
Gas from underground pipes serving the neighborhood . . .  1
Gas, LPG (b ottled  or tank gas) ............................................................. 2
Fuel o i l  ................................................................................................................... 3
Kerosene or coal o i l  ............................................................................  4
E le c tr ic ity  ........................................................................................................... 5
Coal or coke ........................................................................................................ 6
Wood ............................................................................................................................  7
Solar c o lle c to r s  .............................................................................................. 8
Other (SPECIFY)
___________________   9
19. How i s  your water heated?
O il   1 S o la r ................................................... 4
Gas .................. 1  2 Other (SPECIFY)
E le c tr ic ity    3   5
Do not have hot water . . . .  6
20. P lease ind icate the type of coo ling  equipment you use. (PLEASE CIRCLE AS MANY
AS APPLY.)
Evaporation c o o le r   1 Ceiling f a n s .................................  1
Central a ir  conditioning . . . .  1 Window f a n s .................................... 1
Room or window a ir  con- A ttic/gable f a n s ...................... 1
d itio n er  ............................................ 1
Portable flo o r  f a n s   1 No cooling equipm ent  1
THE LAND
These next questions are about the parcel o f  land the building you l iv e  in  i s  on. For 
condominiums, cooperatives, m ulti-fam ily  build ings and mobile homes, th is  parcel 
includes the land your family uses e x c lu s iv e ly  and the land you share w ith the other 
resid en ts. (IF THIS PARCEL OF LAND IS THE SAME SIZE AS THE BUILDING YOU LIVE IN, 
PLEASE "X" THIS BOX (ZD AND SKIP TO Q.23a; OTHERWISE CONTINUE.)
21. How large is  th is  parcel of land? (IF NOT SURE, PLEASE GIVE YOUR BEST ESTIMATE.)
ACRES - OR - SQUARE FEET
(IF YOU DO NOT KNOW THE EXACT NUMBER OF SQUARE FEET, MULTIPLY APPROXIMATE WIDTH 
OF LOT BY APPROXIMATE LOT DEPTH (WIDTH X DEPTH -  ANSWER )
22. Which o f the follow ing items are on th is  parcel of land? (PLEASE CIRCLE AS MANY 
AS APPLY.)
Trees or woode?^areas .............................  1
Grassed area ....................................................  1
Patio or other stone, cement area
(excluding deck) ..................................... 1
Driveway or o f f  s tree t parking ___ 1
On street parking .....................
Garden or flower beds ...........
Swimming pool ................................
Tennis courts, g o lf  course 
Play equipment .............................
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HOW MUCH IT COSTS TO LIVE IN RESIDENCE I
IF YOU OR SOMBONE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD OWNS THIS DWELLING UNIT PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING 
QUESTIONS. RENTERS SKIP TO Q.27a:
23a. Do you have a mortgage, deed o f t r u s t ,  contract to purchase, or sim ilar  debt on 
th is  property?
* Yes, mortgage, deed o f trust or
sim ilar  debt ..............................................  1
Yes, contract to  purchase ..................  2
N o .............................................................................. 3—►SKIP TO Q.27a
23b. This question i s  about the mortgage that you obtained when you bought th is  pro­
perty. Please provide the requested information below. (IF YOU STILL HAVE A 
CONTRACT TO PURCHASE, SKIP TO Q.24a; OTHERWISE PLEASE WRITE IN ANSWER UNDER Q. 23b 
BELOW.)
23c. Do you now have a d ifferen t f i r s t  mortgage on th is  property than you i n i t ia l l y  
had? If so , please provide the requested information below. (PLEASE WRITE IN 
ANSWER UNDER Q.23c BELOW.)
Q.23b Q. 23c
Current F irst Mortgage 
In it ia l  Mortgage If D ifferent from I n it ia l  One
Year o b ta in e d ................ 19   19____
I n it ia l  amount
(princip al) ..................  $_______________  $______
Interest r a t e    %  \
23d. Do you have a second or junior mortgage on th is  property?
Yes ........................  1
N o .........................  0  ►PLEASE SKIP TO Q.24a
23e. Did you obtain your second mortgage . . .
To help purchase your dwelling ...............................  1
OR, By borrowing aga in st your equity at some
time a f te r  purchase ...................................................... 2
24a. How much i s  your to ta l regular monthly payment on a l l  mortgages (including second 
or jun ior), contract to purchase or sim ila r  debt on th is  property?
$ __________________  EACH MONTH
- OR -  |
No regular payment required ...................... Q — ►PLEASE "X" THIS BOX AND SKIP
TO Q. 25
24b. Does your regular monthly payment (amount entered in Q.24a) include payments 
for: (PLEASE CIRCLE AS MANY AS APPLY.)
Yes
Real E state Taxes .................................... 1
Fire and Hazard In su ran ce   1
Maintenance or Homeowners 
A ssociation  Fee .................................... 1
25. Of the current mortgage or m ortgages, how much o f the principal remains to be 
paid? (PLEASE WRITE IN EXACT AMOUNT. DO NOT COUNT INTEREST.)
$ _________________
26. I f  you were to s e l l  th is  house or  apartment and lo t  today, what do you think i t  
would s e l l  for? (IF NOT SURE, PLEASE RECORD YOUR BEST ESTIMATE.)
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IF YOU RENT YOUR DWELLING UNIT CONTINUE; OWNERS SKIP TO Q.28a
27a. How much does i t  cost you each month to rent th is  dw elling un it?  ( PLEASE 
WRITE IN EXACT AMOUNT.)
» $ a month
27b. Does th is  include . . .  (PLEASE CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY.)
Heating ............................................................. 1
E lec tr ic ity  ...................................................  1
Gas or f u e l ................................................... 1
W ater.................................................................. 1
Parking ............................................................. 1
O ther_____________________   1
(SPECIFY)
27c. Are you paying a lower rent because the Federal, S tate or lo ca l government is  
paying part of the cost?
Y e s .......................  1 No   0
OWNERS AND RENTERS
28a. What, i f  anything, i s  your vearly payment for property or real e s ta te  taxes? (DO 
NOT INCLUDE TAXES IN ARREARS FOR PAST YEAR.)
a year
28b. How much, i f  anything, is  the yearly  co st for f ir e  and hazard insurance?
$   a year
28c. How much, i f  anything, is  your maintenance or homeowners a sso c ia tio n  fee  each 
month?
$ a month
28d. About how much did you pay for the follow ing u t i l i t i e s  in  an average month during 
the past year?
E lec tr ic ity  ............................................... $ a month
G a s................................................................... $ a month
Fuel o i l  ....................................... .............. $ a month
Water .............................................................. $ a month
Garbage c o lle c t io n  ............... ............. $ a month
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CHANGES/REPAIRS MADE
The next questions ask about the changes you have made in your current house o r apartm ent.
29a. OWNERS: Which, i f  any, of the jobs on the l i s t s  below have you done o r had someone do in  the  past S years (
you moved in , i f  chat was less chan S vears ago)? (DO NOT COUNT JOBS DONE ON PROPERTY YOU RENT TO 0
( INCLUDE JOBS DONE FOR YOU OR BY YOU BEFORE YOU MOVED IN.) ( INCLUDE JOBS NOW UNDERWAY AND SCHEDULED FOR CCi
WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.) (PLEASE ANSWER UNDER Q.29a BELOW.)
RENTERS: Which, i f  any, of the jobs on the l i s t s  below have you or your landlord  done o r  had someone do in 1
S years (o r since you moved in , i f  chat was le ss  chan S years ago)? (INCLUDE JOBS DONE FOR YOU OR BY YOU BE:
MOVED IN.) (INCLUDE JOBS NOW UNDERWAY AND SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.) (PLEASE ANSI
UNDER Q.29a BELOW.)
29b. 0WNQ1S: Which, i f  any, of the jobs on the l i s t s  below have you done o r had someone do in  the past vear (■
you moved in , i f  th a t was less  chan 1 year ago)? (DO NOT COUNT JOBS DONE ON PROPERTY YOU RENT TO OTHERS.)
JOBS DONE FOR YOU OR BY YOU BEFORE YOU MOVED IN.) (INCLUDE JOBS NOW UNDERWAY AND SCHEDULED FOR CCMPLETIC:. 
THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.) (PLEASE ANSWER UNDER Q.29b BELOW.)
RENTERS: Which, i f  any, of the jobs on the l i s t s  below have you or your landlord done o r  had someone do in
vear (or since you moved in , if  chac was le ss  chan 1 year ago)? (INCLUDE JOBS DONE FOR YOU OR BY YOU BE!
MOTED IN.) (INCLUDE JOBS NOW UNDERWAY AND SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.) (PLEASE ANS
UNDER Q.29b BELOW.)
29c. OWNERS AND RENTHtS: Approximately how much did you spend on the jobs you did o r  had someone do in the past
sin ce  you moved in , i f  that was less than 1 year ago)? (REFER TO ANSWERS GIVEN IN Q .29b.) (INCLUDE COST OF
AND MONEY PAID TO CONTRACTORS OR OTHERS.) (PLEASE ANSWER UNDER Q.29c BELOW.)
29d. OWNERS AND RENTERS: Thinking of a l l  the jobs thac were done in each category in  th e  p a st year (REFER TO
GIVEN IN Q.29b), how much of th is  work did you or a member of your household do — most o r  a l l  o f i t ,  about
l i t t l e  or none of i t?  (PLEASE ANSWER UNDER Q.29d BELOW.)
0.29c
Approximate Q. 29d
Cost to You Amount of Work Done
Q.29a 0.29b or Your bv Household Member!s'
Done in Last Household Most L i tt le
S 1 fo r Work Cone o r About or
Years Year in Past Year A ll Half None
MAJOR ADDITIONS
Build a g'arage ........................................................ 1 s 3 2 1
Add porch or breezeway ........................................ 1 s 3 2 1
Add new room or wing ............................................ 1 S ........... " 3 2 1
MAJOR R MODELING
Remove a wall to make one room out of two ... . .  1 1 $ 3 2 1
Move w alls to change floor p l a n ................. 1 S 3 2 1
Remodel a k i tc h e n ............................................. 1 s 3 2 1
Remodel bathroom(s) .............................................. 1 s ' 3 2 1
Remodel o ther room(s) .......................................... 1 s 3 2 I
Convert garage to liv ing  space ........................ 1 s 3 2 1
Finish a basement room(s) .................................. 1 $ 3 2 1
Finish an a t t i c  room(s) ...................................... 1 s 3 2 1
ASIDE ROM JOBS REPORTED ABOVE, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING 
HAVE YOU DONE?
C. REPLACE OR REPAIR OUTSIDE OF DWELLING
Replace a l l  or part of roof  .........................
Add, replace o r repa ir siding .......................
Painting or s taining ex terio r walls ...........
Repairing e x te rio r walls .................................
Repairing chimney ...............................................
Repairing or replacing porches,.balconies,
or decks ............................................................
Replace windows (except storm windows) . . .
Add o r replace storm windows.........................
Replace house entrance doors .........................
Caulk o r w e a th e rs tr ip .......................................
D. REPUCE OR REPAIR UTILITIES
Replace furnace, heating system ................. ..
Replace cen tra l a i r  conditioning .................
Replace water heater .........................................
Replace o r upgrade e le c tr ic a l w ir in g .........
Replace o r upgrade plumbing ...........................
E. REPUCE OR REPAIR INSIDE
Panel in te r io r  walls .........................................
Paint in te r io r  walls .........................................
Paper in te r io r  w a l l s .........................................
Other resurfacing of in te r io r  walls ...........
Repair or replace flooring:
Ceramic t i l e   .......................................
Wood.....................................................................
Carpeting ...........................................................
Vinyl ...................................................................
Other flooring  .................................................
Add in su la tio n  .....................................................
F. ADD OR REPAIR AMENITIES OF LOT
Repair, resurface or reseal driveway
Add, re p a ir  or resurface walks ...........
Add o r  replace f e n c e   ...................
P lant tre e s  or shrubs .............................
Seed o r lay  sod on en tire  law n ...........
Build o r in s ta l l  new storage building 
Add o r replace pa tio   .........................
Other (SPECIFY)_________  i  i  $___________  3 2 1
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30. Now think about a l l  the jobs that have been done in each "category" labeled  i
Q.29 and a lso  l is te d  below. For each category:
30a. OWNERS AND RENTERS: Which, i f  any, o f these types of jobs do you need to do c
have done to your dwelling u n it?  (PLEASE CIRCLE AS MANY AS APPLY UNDER Q.3C 
BELOW.)
30b. OWNERS ONLY: Which of these do you plan to do or have someone do in  the nex
year or two? (PLEASE CIRCLE AS MANY AS APPLY UNDER Q.30b BELOW.)
»
30c. OWNERS ONLY: Which o f  these do you plan to have someone do over the next
years, but not in the next year or two? (PLEASE CIRCLE AS MANY AS APPLY UNDE 
Q.30c BELOW.T-
Q.30b Q. 30c 
Q.30a W ill be done in n e x t: 
Need to do 2 Years 5 Years
A. Major Additions   1 1 1
B. Major Remodeling   1 1 1
C. Replacing/Repairing O itsid e
of D w ellin g .............  1 1 1
D. Replacing/Repairing U t i l i t i e s .  1 1 1
E. Replacing/Repairing In side . . .  1 1 1
F. Add/Repair Amenities o f  Lot . .  .1  1 1
SATISFACTION WITH HOME OR APARTMENT
31. How sa t is f ie d  are you with the p a rticu la r  aspects of your housing l is t e d  belov. 
(CIRCLE ANY NUMBER FRCM "1" TO "5", WHERE "1" IS EXTREMELY SATISFIED AND "5" I 
EXTREMELY DISSATISFIED FOR EACH ASPECT.)
Extremely Extremely
S atisfied  D is s a t is f i
A) O verall, how sa t is f ie d  are you with
your house or apartm ent  1 2
How sa t is f ie d  are you with . . .
. . .  cost to l iv e  here  1 2
. . .  quality  of un it   1 2
. . .  sa fety  from burglars   1 2
B) How sa t is f ie d  are you with the follow ing  
aspects of the inside of your house or 
apartment:____________________________
Age ..................................................................................  1 2
Overall condition ...............................................  1 2
Number of rooms ....................................................  1 2
Amount of inside space ..................................  1 2
Layout (use) of in sid e  space ..................  1 2
S ize o f k it c h e n ..................................................... 1 2
S ize  of main bedroom ........................................ 1 2
S ize  o f main bathroom .....................................  1 2
Amount of p r iv a c y ................................................ 1 2
OWNERS ONLY: Amount o f  maintenance
n e ed ed ...................................................................... 1 • 2
C) The ex ter ior  of your house or  apartment:
C on d ition .................................................................... 1 2
OWNERS ONLY: Amount o f  maintenance
needed  ............................................................... 1 2
D) The yard or open space around your house 
or apartment:___________________________________
Condition .................................................................
Amount of space ..................................................
Layout o 2 4 2 c e ..................................................
Amount of privacy .............................................
Safety from crime .............................................
OWNERS ONLY: amount o f  maintenance
needed ......................................................................  1
SECURITIZATION AND THE GLOBAL MARKET
| neighborhood]
Page 10
32. How long have you lived  in  th is  neighborhood? _________________
33. Is your neighborhood . . .
Predominantly r e s id e n tia l  .....................................................................  1
Mixed r es id en tia l and com m ercial/industrial ........................ 2
Mixed r es id en tia l and agricu ltu ra l ............................................... 3
Predominantly com m ercial/industrial ............................................  4
OR, Predominantly a g r icu ltu ra l ................................................................... 5
YEARS
34a. Are most of the dwelling u n its  in  your neighborhood 
SWER ONLY UNDER Q-*4* BELOW)
? (PLEASE CIRCLE ONE AN-
34b. What other types o f dwelling u n its are there in your neighborhood? 
AS MANY AS APPLY UNDER Q.34b BELOW.)
Q. 34a
Most
Units
35.
One-family houses detached from other houses
Units in m ulti-fam ily bu ild in gs ..............................
Mobile homes ................................................................................
(PLEASE CIRCLE
Q. 34b 
Other 
U nits
1
1
1
How does your dwelling un it compare with other dw elling u n its near yours . . .
In Terms Of: My Dwelling Unit Is:
Age .................................
Overall Condition 
Quality .......................
N ew er................... 1
B etter  ................ 1
Higher ................ 1
Amount Of Outside Space 
Amount Of Inside Space. 
Value .........................................
Larger ...........
L a r g e r ...........
Worth more .,
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
Same
2 Older ..................... 3
2 Worse ..................... 3
2 Lower ..................... 2
2 Sm aller ...............  3
2 Sm aller ...............  3
2 Worth le s s  . . .  3
36. How sa t is f ie d  are you with the follow ing aspects o f your neighborhood?
A) O verall, how s a t is f ie d  are you with 
your neighborhood
. . .  as a place to  l iv e  ................................
. . .  as a place to ra ise  c h i ld r e n . . . .
Very
S a tisfied
Very
D is s a t is f ie d
B) How sa t is f ie d  are you with:
Public schools .......................................
P olice and f ir e  protection . . . .
Public transportation .....................
Other c ity  serv ices ..........................
A c ce ss ib ility  to shopping ...........
Ease of gettin g  to  work ................
F riendliness of neighbors ...........
A ttractiveness of neighborhood 
Upkeep o f other property .............
Safety from crime ...............................
Prestige of neighborhood .............
Property taxes ......................................
Sa les or income tax ..........................
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CHANGES IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD WHILE IN CURRENT DWELLING
37a. Including y o u rse lf , how many people liv ed  in your household when you f i r s t  moved 
in to  th is  house or apartment?
TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE:________________________
37b. How many, a t that time, were . . .
0 to 5 years .......................................................... #_ _____________________
6 to 18 years ....................................................... #_ _____________________
19 to 34 years ..................................................... #_ _____________________
35 to  64 years .............................................    #__________________
65 and over ............................................................ t _ _____________________
(BE SURE TO INCLUDE YOURSELF)
38. As far as you can r e c a ll, what was your to ta l household income before taxes when 
you f i r s t  moved into th is  house or apartment?
Less than $6,000 ..........  1 $17,500 - $19,999   6 $50,000 - $69,999 .............11
$6,000 -  $9,999 ............. 2 $20,000 - $24,999 ............  7 $70,000 - $89,999 .............12
$10,000 - $11,999 ____3 $25,000 - $29,999 ............  8 $90,000 -  $119,999 _____ 13
$12,000 - $14,999 ____4 $30,000 - $39,999 ............  9 $120,000 or m o r e .............14
$15,000 - $17,499 . . . .  5 $40,000 - $49,999 ............. 10
39. Since the time you f ir s t  moved into  th is  house or apartment, do you fe e l  your 
household i s  now . . .
Much b etter  o f f  f in a n c ia lly  ................................ 1
Somewhat b etter  o f f  f in a n c ia lly  .....................  2
About as w ell o f f  f in a n c i a l l y ..........................  3
Somewhat worse o f f  f in a n c ia lly  ........................ 4
Or, Much worse o f f  f i n a n c i a l l y .................................. 5
YOUR RESIDENCE IN SEPTEMBER, 1983]
40a. Is the dw elling unit you occupied in  September, 1983 the one that i s  . . .
Your current dwelling u n i t .........................................  1 »» PLEASE SKIP TO Q.45a
Or, A d iffe r e n t  dwelling unit  ...............................  2-------- ►CONTINUE
40b. What i s  the f u l l  address of the dw elling unit you occupied in  September, 1983?
Number, S treet: ________________________________________________________________________
C ity , S ta te: ___________________________________________________________________________
Zip Code: _______________________________________________________________________________
40c. Was the September, 1983, dwelling un it . . .
Your parents' household ......................................................- . . . .  1 ■ ► PLEASE SKIP TO Q.48a
Owned by you or someone e ls e  in your household . . . .  2
Rented for c a s h ....................................................................................... 3
Occupied without payment of cash rent ..................................  4
40d. P lease c ir c le  the number which best describes the build ing in  which you liv e d .
One fam ily house, detached from any other house . . .  1
One fam ily house, attached to one or more other
houses ........................................................................................................  2
A building for:
2 to 4 fam ilies ...............................................................................  3
5 or more fam ilies ........................................................................ 4
Mobile home ................................................................................................. 5
Boat, van, e tc ............................................................................................ 6
Dormitory, barracks or other group q u a r te r s   7 -  ■►PLEASE SKIP TO Q.48a
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YOUR RESIDENCE IN SEPTEMBER, 1983 (CONT'D.)
41a. Was the dwelling unit you occupied in September, 1983 —
Part o f a cooperative (property owned as a corporation
where each sharehold occupies an individual un it ..........  1
Part o f a condominium.................................................   2
Or, N either.................................................................................................................................. 3
«
41b. When was the structure you lived  in bu ilt?  (IF NOT SURE, MAKE YOUR BEST ESTI­
MATE.) (INDICATE WHEN THE BUILDING WAS FIRST CONSTRUCTED, NOT WHEN IT WAS RE­
MODELLED, ADDED TO, OR CONVERTED.)
(WRITE IN YEAR): ____________________
41c. What month and year did you move into your September, 1983 residence?
MONTH: ________________________ YEAR:_______________________
41d. Approximately how many m iles from the downtown or cen tra l bu siness area of the 
la r g e s t  c ity  within 50 m iles was th is residence located?
MILES:
41e. How many square fee t of liv in g  space did your household have in th is  September,
1983 dw elling unit? (DO NOT COUNT UNFINISHED PORTIONS OF BASEMENT CR ATTIC.)
(IF NOT SURE, PLEASE MAKE YOUR BEST ESTIMATE.)
  SQUARE FEET
41f. How many rooms were there in th is  residence? (DO NOT COUNT BATHROOMS, PORCHES,
BALCONIES, HALLS, FOYERS OR HALF ROOMS.)
NUMBER OF ROOMS:
41g. How large  was the parcel of land your September, 1983 build ing was on? (IF NOT 
SURE, GIVE YOUR BEST ESTIMATE.) For condominiums, coop eratives , m ulti-fam ily  
b u ild in gs and mobile homes, th is  parcel includes the land your fam ily used 
e x c lu s iv e ly  and the land you shared with the other r es id en ts . (IF  THIS PARCEL 
OF LAND WAS THE SAME SIZE AS THE BUILDING YOU LIVED IN PLEASE "X" THIS BOX [ J 
AND SKIP TO Q.42.)
ACRES 1 - OR - SQUARE FEET
IF YOU DO NOT KNOW THE EXACT NUMBER OF SQUARE FEET, MULTIPLY APPROXIMATE WIDTH OF 
LOT BY APPROXIMATE LOT DEPTH (WIDTH X DEPTH -  ANSWER__________)
42. OWNERS OF SEPitMBER, 1983 DWELLING UNIT: If you had sold your September, 1983
house or apartment and lo t  in September, 1983, what do you think i t  would have 
so ld  for? (PLEASE GIVE YOUR BEST ESTIMATE.)
$__________________________________ ►PLEASE SKIP TO Q.44
43a. RENTERS OF SEPitMBER, 1983 DWELLING UNIT: How much did i t  co st you each month to
rent your September, 1983 dwelling unit? (PLEASE WRITE IN EXACT AMOUNT.)
$ ______________________________a month
43b. RENTERS OF SEPTEMBER, 1983 DWELLING UNIT: Did th is  include . . .
(PLEASE CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY.)
Heating................................................. 1 Water.......................................................... 4
E le c tr ic ity ....................................... 2 Parking......................................................5
Gas or Fuel.......................................3 Other 6
(P lease  Specify)
44. Were most o f the dwelling un its in your September, 1983 neighborhood...
(PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER ONLY)
245 One-family houses detached
from other houses ................................... 1
Units in m ulti-fam ily b u i ld in g s   2
OR, Mobile homes ............................................................... 3
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CHANGES IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD SINCE SEPTEMBER, 1983
45a. Including y o u rse lf , how many people lived  in your household in  September, 1983?
TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE:_________
46b. How many, at that tim e, were:
0 to 5 years....................................#__________
6 to 18* years................................. It__________
19 to 34 years...............................#__________
35 to 64 years.............................. It__________
65 and over...................................... It__________
(BE SURE TO INCLUDE YOURSELF)
46. As far as you can r e c a ll ,  what was your to ta l household income before taxes in 
September, 1983?
Less than $6,000 . . . . .  1 $17,500 $19,999 . . . . .  6 $50,000 - $69,999 . . . . .11
$6,000 - $9,999 ____ ? $20,000 - $24,999 . . . . .  7 $70,000 - $89,999 . . . .1?
$10,000 - $11,999 . . . .  3 $25,000 - $29,999 . . . . .  8 $90,000 - $119,999 . ..1 3
$12,000 - $14,999 . . . .  4 $30,000 - $39,999 . . . . .  9 $120,000 or more . . . , .14
$15,000 - $17,499 . . . .  5 $40,000 - $49,999 . . . . .1 0
47. Compared to September, 1983, do you fe e l  your household is  now . . .
Much b e tter  o f f  f in a n c ia lly ........................................1
Somewhat b etter  o f f  f in a n c ia lly ..............................2
About as w ell o ff  f in a n c ia l ly .................................. 3
Somewhat worse o f f  f in a n c ia lly ................................4
Or, Much worse o f f  f in a n c ia lly ..........................................5
fYOUR RESIDENCE IN SEPTEMBER, 19781
48a. Is the dwelling unit you occupied in September, 1978 the one that i s  . . .
Your current dw elling u n it .................................................................................1“|
Your September, 1983 dw elling u n it (as described in j-^PLEASE SKIP
Q.40a - Q .44).................................................................................................................2J  TO Q.SSa
Or, A d iffe re n t dw elling u n it ...................................................................................3
48b. What i s  the f u l l  address o f the dw elling unit you occupied in  September, 1978?
Number, S tr e e t:________________________________________________________________
C ity, S ta te:___________________________________________________________________
Zip Code:_____________________________________________________________________
49. How long did you l iv e  in th is  dw elling unit?
MONTHS:_________(IF LESS THAN ONE YEAR) - OR - YEARS:_________
50. Was the September, 1978 dw elling u n it . . .
Your parents' household.............................................................1— ►PLEASE SKIP TO Q. 5‘
Owned by you or someone e ls e  in  your household ..2
Rented for cash..................................................................................3
OR, Occupied without payment o f cash rent........................4
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51. P lease c ir c le  the number which b est d escrib es the bu ild ing in which you lived  in  
September, 1978.
One fam ily house, detached from any other house......................... 1
One family house, attached to one or more other h o u s e s . . .2
A building for:
2 to 4 fa m ilies ..................................................................................................3
5 or more fa m ilie s ..........................................................................................4
Mobile home......................................................................................................................5
Boat, van, e tc ..............................................................................................................6
Dormitory, barracks or other group quarters...................................7-^PLEASE SKIP TO Q.57
52. Was th is  dwelling unit . . .
Part of a cooperative (property owned as a corporation
where each shareholder occu p ies an ind ividal u n it ......................1
Part of a condominium........................................................................  2
OR, N either........................................................................................................................................ 3
53. Approximately how many m iles from the downtown or cen tra l business area o f the 
la rgest c ity  within 50 m iles was your September, 1978 residence located?
M ile s :______________
54a. How many square fe e t  of liv in g  space did your household have in th is  dw elling
unit? (DO NOT COUNT UNFINISHED PORTIONS OF BASBfENT OR ATTIC.) (IF NOT SURE,
PLEASE GIVE YOUR BEST ESTIMATE.)
__________________ SQUARE FEET
54b. How many rooms were there in your September, 1978 dw elling un it?  (DO NOT COUNT
BATHROOMS, PORCHES, BALCONIES, HALLS, FOYERS, OR HALF ROOMS)
NUMBER OF ROCMS: _______________
CHANGES IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD SINCE SEPTEMBER, 1978
55a. Including you rse lf, how many people liv ed  in your household in September, 1978?
TOTAL Niff-IBER OF PEOPLE:____________
55b. How many, at that time, were:
0 to 5 years.....................................1_________
6 to 18 years...................................#_________
19 to 34 years________________I_________
35 to 64 years..............................____________
65 and over........................................I_________
(BE SURE TO INCLUDE YOURSELF)
56a. As far as you can r e c a ll , what was your to ta l household income before taxes in  
September, 1978?
Less th an  $6,000 . . . .. 1 $1 7 ,5 0 0 -  $19,999 . . . . .  6 $50,000 - $69,999 . ___ 11
$6,000 - $9,999 ___ . ? $2 0 ,0 0 0 -  $24,999 .. . . .  7 $70,000 - $89,999  . ___12
$10,000 - $11,999 . . . .  3 $2 5 ,0 0 0 - $29,999 . . . . .  8 $90,000 -  $119,999 ___ 13
$12,000 - $14,999 . . . .  4 $3 0 ,0 0 0 - $39,999 . . . . .  9 $120,000 or more . . ___ 14
$15,000 - $17,499 . . . .  5 $ 4 0 ,0 0 0 - $49,999 . . . . . 1 0
56b. Compared to September, 1978, do you fe e l  your household i s  now . . .
Much b etter  o ff  f in a n c ia l ly ........................................1
Somewhat better  o f f  f in a n c ia l ly ..............................2
About as w ell o ff  f in a n c ia l ly ...................................3
Somewhat worse o f f  f in a n c ia l ly ................................4
Or, Much worse o ff  f in a n c ia l ly ...........................................5
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HOME AND HOUSEHOLD CARE IN THE PAST
The fo llow in g  questions about home and household care in  the past re fe r  to  whatever 
dwelling or dw ellings you lived  in during each time period indicated below.
57. For each of the three time periods 1970-78, 1979-83, and 1984-86, which o f the 
fo llow in g  changes or uses of your dwelling occurred? (PLEASE CIRCLE ALL THAT 
APPLY FOR EACH GIVEN TIME PERIOD BELOW.)
1970-1978 1979-1983 1984-1986
A ltered  or changed the structure 
o f dw elling to  make i t  more convenient
(such as adding 1st flo o r  bathroom)... 1 1  1
A ltered  use o f a room to make i t  
more convenient, without changing 
the structure (such as making a 
1st f lo o r  den into a bedroom)..........
Closed o f f  a room or part of the dwelling
u n it fo r  a l l  or part o f the year  1 1  1
Took on boarders or rented out
part o f  the dwelling u n it ............................ 1 1  1
58a. For each o f the years 1970, 1978, 1983, and 1986, which o f the groups o f  people
l i s t e d  below helped with upkeep of the in ter io r  of your dw elling un it ( ie :  
c lea n in g , maintenance)? (PLEASE CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY FOR EACH YEAR.)
1970 1978 1983 1986
Your household..................................................... 1 1 1 1
R e la tiv e /fr ie n d s................................................ 1 1 1 1
Paid help .................................................................. 1 1 1 1
S o c ia l programs ( f r e e ) ................................. 1 1 1 1
58b. For each o f the years 1970, 1978, 1983, and 1986, which of the groups o f people
l i s t e d  below helped with the outside of your dwelling ( ie :  lawn care, yard
work)? (PLEASE CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY FOR EACH YEAR.)
1970 1978 1983 1986
Your household..................................................... 1 1 . 1 1
R e la tiv e /fr ie n d s ................................................ 1 1 1 1
Paid help .................................................................. 1 1 1 1
S o c ia l programs ( f r e e ) ................................. 1 1 1 1
59a. For each of the years 1970, 1978, 1983, and 1986, which of the groups of people
l i s t e d  below helped with the preparation of meals (including buying and bringing
food home)? (PLEASE CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY FOR EACH YEAR.)
1970 1978 1983 1986
Your household..................................................... 1 1 1 1
R e la tiv e /fr ien d s...............................................  1 1 1 1
Paid help .................................................................. 1 1 1 1
S o c ia l programs ( f r e e ) ................................. 1 1 1 1
59b. For each of the years 1970, 1978, 1983, and 1986, which o f the groups o f people 
l i s t e d  below helped with health care of household ( i e :  taking care o f  i l l ,  d i s ­
abled household member)? (PLEASE CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY FOR EACH YEAR.)
1970 1978 1983 1986
Your household.....................................................  1 1 1 1
R e la t iv e /fr ie n d s ................................................  1 1 1 1
Paid help .................................................................. 1 1 1 1
S o c ia l programs ( f r e e ) .................................  1 1 1 1
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SECOND HCME
60a. Do you own a second, vacation, or retirement home?
Y e s ..................  1 No ................. 0 ------- ►PLEASE SKIP TO Q. 61a
60b. How many square fe e t  o f liv ing  space does th is  dwelling have? (DO NOT COUNT UN­
FINISHED PORTIONS OF EASEMENT OR ATTIC.) (IF NOT SURE, PLEASE GIVE YOUR BEST 
ESTIMATE.)
________________  SQUARE FEET
60c. What i s  the current market value of th is  home? (IF NOT SURE, PLEASE GIVE YOUR 
BEST ESTIMATE)
$ ____________________
61a. Are you considering buying a second home?
Y e s  1 No ................. 0 -----►PLEASE SKIP TO Q. 62a
61b. How large w i l l  your second home be?
Less than 1000 square fe e t  ................................ 1
1000 to 1500 square f e e t ................... ................. 2
OR, More than 1500 square fee t ........... 3
61c. How much are you w illin g  to pay for your second home?
Less than $10,000 ..................................................... 1
$10,000 to $25,000 ................................................... 2
$25,000 to $50,000 ................................................... 3
OR, More than $50,000 .....................................................  4
61d. W ill your second home . . .  (PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER ONLY. )
Be used for vacations only ............................... 1
Be used for vacation now and as a
permanent home a fter  retirement ............. 2
Be used as rental property  ............................ 3
OR, Be used for another purpose
_______________   4
(Please Specify)
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS!
62a. What was your m arital status in 1978 and in 1983? (PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER ONLY 
FOR EACH YEAR UNDER Q. 62a BELOW.)
62b. What i s  your current marital status? (PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWDl ONLY UNDER Q. 62b 
BELOW.)
Q.62b
Q. 62a Current M arital
1978 1983 Status
S in g le , never married . . . .
Married ...........................................
Living with someone,
but not married ..................
Widowed ...........................................
Divorced ........................................
OR, Separated ...................................
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3
4 4 4
5 5 5
6 6 6
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63. WOMEN ONLY: At the beginning of each o f the years 1978, 1983, 1986, how many 
children had you given b irth  to  by th a t time?
1978:   1983:   1986: ______
64. On the chart below, please l i s t  a l l  the  people who liv e  in your household now and 
th e ir  ages. Begin with y o u rse lf . L is t  other household members from o ld est to  
youngest , "providing the age for  each . DO NOT GIVE WEIR NAMES. PLEASE LIST 
THB4 BY THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO YOU.
Relationship to you Age Relationship to you Age
1. RESPONDENT (SELF)   5._______________________________  ____
2.     6 .   ___
3.     7. ______________________________  ____
4. _________________________    8._______________________________
65a. Where did you l iv e  when you were fou rteen  years old? (PLEASE WRITE-IN ANSWER 
UNDER Q. 65a BELCW.)
65b. MARRIED ONLY: Where did your spouse l iv e  when he/she was fourteen years old?
(PLEASE WRITE-IN ANSWER UNDER Q. 65b BELOW.)
Q. 65a Q.65b
Respondent Spouse
Zip Code:   Zip Code:______________
City or Town:   City or Town:_ __________
County: ■ County:________________________________
State: State: _______ _____________
65c. Which o f the phrases l is te d  below b est describes where you lived  the longest 
while you were growing up? (PLEASE ANSWER UNDER Q.65c BELOW.)
65d. MARRIED ONLY: Which of the phrases l i s t e d  below best describes where your spouse
lived  the longest while he/she was growing up? (PLEASE ANSWER UNDER Q.65d BELOW.)
Q.6Sc Q. 65d
Respondent Spouse
Large urban a r e a   1 1
Small urban a r e a   2 2
Small to w n   3 3
Rural to w n   4 4
66a. How many times have you moved since the beginning of 1978?
TIMES MOVED: _________________
66b. For each year l is te d  below, p lease  w r ite  the number of times you moved that year.
1978: _________ 1981:   1984: _________
1979: _________ 1982:   1985: _________
1980: _________ 1983:___________
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67a. What was your to ta l household income la s t  year (1985) from a l l  sources—wages, 
dividends, socia l secu rity , and so fo r th —before taxes?
Less than $6,000 . 
$6,000 -  $9,999 . .  
$10,000 -  $11,999 
$12,000 -  $14,999 
$15,000 -  $17,499
1 $17,500 - $19,999 .......... 6
2 $20,000 - $24,999 .......... 7
3 $25,000 - $29,999 .......... 8
4 $30,000 - $39,999 .......... 9
5 $40,000 - $49,999 ...........10
$50,000 - $69,999 ...........11
$70,000 - $89,999 ...........12
$90,000 - $119,999 _____13
$120,000 or m o re ...............14
67b. Excluding any equity you may have in your current residence, what i s  the current 
value of your assets? (INCLUDE VALUE OF STOCKS, BONDS, SAVINGS ACCOUNTS, PRO­
PERTY, FURNISHINGS, CARS, ETC.)
Less than $5,000 ............................... 1
$5,000 to $9,999 ............................... 2
$10,000 to $24,999 .......................... 3
$25,000 to $49,999 .......................... 4
$50,000 to $99,000 .......................................  5
$100,000 to $249,999 ..................................  6
$2S0,000 or m o re ............................................. 7
67c. Compared to  November 1984, i s  your household now . . .
Much better o ff  f in a n c ia lly .........................................1
Somewhat better o ff  f in a n c ia lly ...............................2
About as well o ff  f in a n c ia lly ....................................3
Somewhat worse o ff  f in a n c ia lly .................................4
Or, Much worse o ff  f in a n c ia lly ............................................S
68. During each year since 1978, which o f the fo llow ing changes did your household
experience? (PLEASE CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY UNDER EACH YEAR.)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
You started  new j o b ..................... 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Spouse started new j o b   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
You r e t ir e d ........................................... 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Spouse r e tire d ...................................  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Spouse or companion d ied   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Spouse or companion le f t  
household (divorced,
separated, broke-up) .............  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
New spouse or companion moved 
in  (marriage, new re la tio n ­
sh ip ) ..................................................  1 1 1 1 1 . 1  1 1 1
Other person moved i n ................ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
69. For each o f the years 1970, 1978, 1983, and 1986, was anyone in your household
(INCLUDING YOURSELF) unable to care for  h im se lf /h e r se lf  because of ser iou s i l l ­
n e ss , d isa b ility  or handicap? (PLEASE CIRCLE ALL YEARS THAT APPLY.)
1970 1978 1983 1986
1 1 1  1
70. For each of the three time periods 1970-78, 1979-83,. and 1984-86, which of the 
fo llow in g  types of people ceased liv in g  in  d w ellin gs fa ir ly  c lo se  to you because 
they moved away or died? (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY FOR EACH TIME PERIOD.)
1970-1978 1979-1983 1984-1986
R elatives .................................... 1
Close f r ie n d s .......................... 1
Neighbors you had 
grown attached t o   1
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71a. During each year since 1978, what phrase below describes your employment status  
best? (PLEASE CIRCLE -ONE EMPLOYMENT STATUS ONLY FOR EACH YEAR UNDER Q.71a BE­
LOW. IF MORE THAN ONE STATUS APPLIES, CIRCLE THE ONE HELD FOR THE LONGEST PERIOD 
DURING THAT YEAR.)
71b. What is  your current employment sta tu s?  (CIRCLE ONE EMPLOYMENT STATUS ONLY UNDER 
Q. 71b BELOW.)
Q. 71a Q. 71b
Or,
72a.
72b.
1978
Working for  someone e ls e  .
fu ll-tim e  ............................... 1
Temporarily unemployed . . . .  2
Self-employed.................................  3
Working for  someone e ls e
part-time only ..................  4
Retired and not em ployed... 5
Disabled, student, e t c . ,
and not employed  6
Full-tim e homemaker..................  7
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Current
Status
1 
2
3
4
5
6 
7
MARRIED ONLY: During each year sin ce  1978, what describes your spouse's employ­
ment statu s best? (PLEASE CIRCLE ONE EMPLOYMENT STATUS ONLY FOR EACH YEAR UNDER 
Q. 72a BELOW. IF MOPE THAN ONE STATUS APPLIES, CIRCLE THE ONE HELD FOR THE LONG­
EST PERIOD DURING THAT YEAR.) (ANSWER ONLY FOR YEARS IN WHICH YOU WERE MARRIED.)
MARRIED ONLY: What i s  your spouse's current employment status?
ONE EMPLOYMENT STATUS ONLY UNDER Q.72b BELOW.)
 Q. 72a___________
Or,
73a.
73b.
1978
Working for someone e ls e  .
fu ll-tim e  ............................... 1
Temporarily unemployed . . . .  2
Self-employed...........................  3
Working for someone e ls e
part-time on ly ............. 4
Retired and not em ployed... 5
Disabled, student, e t c . ,
and not employed............ 6
Full-tim e homemaker............. 7
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
(PLEASE CIRCLE
Q. 72b 
Current 
Status
For which years since 1978, i f  any, d id  you experience more than 4 weeks of tem­
porary unemployment? (PLEASE ANSWER UNDER Q.73a BELOW.)
MARRIED ONLY: For which years sin ce  1978, i f  any, did your spouse experience
more than 4 weeks of temporary unemployment? (PLEASE ANSWER UNDER Q. 73b BE­
LOW.) (ANSWER ONLY FOR YEARS IN WHICH YOU WERE MARRIED.)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Q.73a: S e lf  Unemployment  1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Q.73b: Spouse's Unemployment 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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74a. This question i s  about your current job, and jobs you held in 1978 and 1983. For
each of these job s, p lease provide the requested information. (IF YOU HAD MORE 
THAN ONE JOB DURING A YEAR, PROVIDE INFORMATION FOR THE ONE HELD THE LONGEST 
DURING THAT YEAR.) (IF YOU HAD TIE SAME JOB FOR 2 OR ALL 3 OF THESE YEARS, ONLY 
PROVIDE ANSWERS TO "MILES FROM HONE" FOR PREVIOUS YEAR OR YEARS.) (IF YOU WERE 
NOT EMPLOYED FOR ANY YEAR, LEAVE SPACES FOR THAT YEAR BLANK.) (PLEASE ANSWER 
UNDER Q.74a BELOW.)
74b. MARRIED ONLY: This question i s  about your spouse's job, and h is  or her jobs in
1978 and 1983. For each o f  these jobs, please provide the requested informa­
tio n . (ANSWER ONLY FOR YEARS IN WHICH YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE WERE MARRIED.) (IF 
YOUR SPOUSE HAD THE SAME JOB FOR 2 OR ALL 3 OF THESE YEARS, ONLY PROVIDE ANSWERS 
TO "MILES FROM HONE" FOR PREVIOUS YEAR OR YEARS.) (IF YOUR SPOUSE WAS NOT EM­
PLOYED FOR ANY YEAR, LEAVE SPACES FOR THAT YEAR BLANK.) (FLEASE ANSWER UNDER Q. 
74b BELOW.)
Q. 74a Q. 74b
Respondent1s Spouse1 s
Employment History Employment H istory
A. CURRENT JOB
Year began ...........
M iles from home.
C. jl978 JOB!
M iles from 1978 home (ANSWER 
EVEN IF 1978 JOB WAS SAME AS 
1983 J0BJ7..........................................
Is th is  job ...(CIRCLE ONE 
ANSWER BELOW:)
•  In the la rg e st  c it y  or town
w ith in  50 m iles from your
home............................................................ 1 1
•  In a c ity  next to /very  c lo se
to th is  la rg est c i t y  (but not
a suburb)............................................... 2 2
•  In a suburb o f th is  largest
c i t y ............................................................ 3 3
• In another c ity  or to w n   4 4
•  In a rural area.................................... 5 S
B. 11983 JOB)
Year began........................................................................................................... .........................
Miles from 1983 home (ANSWER 
EVEN IF 1983 JOB WAS SAME AS
CURRENT JOB)...................................................................................................
Was th is  job . . .  (CIRCLE ONE 
ANSWER BELOW:)
• In the la rg est c i t y  or town
w ith in  50 m iles from your
1983 home............................................... 1 1
•  In a c i t y  next to /very  c lo se
to  th is  la rg est c it y  (but not
a suburb)...............................................  2 2
•  In a suburb o f th is  largest
c i t y ............................................................ 3 3
•  In another c it y  or to w n   4 4
•  In a rural area..................................... 5 5
Was th is  job . . .  (CIRCLE ONE 
ANSWER BELOW:)
• In the la rg e s t c ity  or town
w ithin  50 miles from your 
. 1978 home  1 1
• In a c i ty  next to /very  close
to th is  la rg e s t c i ty  (but not
a suburb)  2 2
• In a suburb of th is  large«u-
c i t y .................................................2 5 3 . .  3 3
• In another c i ty  or to w n   4 4
• In a ru ra l a rea   5 5
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75. During the past year have you done any o f the fo llo w in g ...?  (PLEASE CIRCLE AS
MANY AS APPLY BELOW.)
Yes
Look a t advertisem ents for  houses or apartments.......................................... 1
Call a rea l e s ta te  agent...................................................................................................  1
V is it  a model un it or go to an open house......................................................... 1
Look a t  any houses or apartments for sa le  or ren t....................................... 1
Talk to a bu ilder or arch itect about a new home...........................................  ,1
V is it  a mobile home show room....................................................................................... 1
Make an o f fe r  to purchase or rent............................................................................. 1
Make an a p p lica tio n  for mortgage financing...................................................... 1
OWNERS ONLY: Did y o u  ?
. . .  have your current home appraised in antic ip ation  of s e l l in g . 1
. . .  l i s t  your house or apartment with a broker............................................ 1
. . .  a d vertise  your house for sa le  in a newspaper....................................... 1
76. How many dw elling u n its  have you looked at the inside o f ,  during the past year?
LOOKED AT____________UNITS INSIDE-----------------►PLEASE ANSWER Q. 77
(Write in  I)
NONE.....................................................0  ►PLEASE SKIP TO Q. 80
77. During the past year did you look at the inside o f . . .
Units to rent and u n its to purchase........................................  1
Units to rent on ly ................................................................................  1
Units to  purchase on ly ...................................................................... 1
78. What types o f u n its  did you look at the inside o f , during the past year? (PLEASE 
CIRCLE AS MANY AS APPLY.)
LOOKED AT INSIDE
One-family house detached from other houses............................
Condominium.............................................................................................................
Unit in  sm all m ulti-fam ily building (2-4 u n its ) ....................
Unit in  large m ulti-fam ily building (5 or more u n it s ) . .
Mobile home.............................................................................................................
79. What was the fa r th est distance from your dwelling that you looked at the in sid e  o f  
a u n it during the past year?
_________________ MILES
80. IF YOU CONSIDERED UNITS TO RENT: Why were you considering renting rather than
buying? (PLEASE CIRCLE AS MANY AS APPLY BELOW)
Did not have money for Did not want r e sp o n s ib ility  fo r  main-
down payment   1 taining home ........................................................... 1
In terest rates too h i g h   1 Not sure how long I (we) could
Could not find su itab le  mort- l iv e  in area ........................................................... 1
gage terras ......................................... 1 Did not see kind of home I (we) wanted 1
Could not q u a lify  for mortgage 1 Good, affordable ren ta l housing was
Could not afford  closin g  costs 1 availab le ..................................................................  1
Did not want long-term debt . .  1 Could not find home in  area in  which
Did not have enough money for I (we) wanted to l i v e ...................................  1
maintenance costs and mortgage O ther________   • • 1
payments   1 (PLEASE SPECIFY)
81. IF YOU CONSIDERED UNITS TO PURCHASE: Why were you considering buying rather than
renting? (PLEASE CIRCLE AS MANY AS APPLY BELOW)
Wanted to own property for investment purposes. 1 Found very a ttr a c t iv e
Wanted to own property for tax reasons  1 residence for  sa le   ................ 1
Wanted to s e t t l e  down, have roots  1 Worried about ren ts going up. 1
Worried about house prices going up, making Wanted to own my own house,
i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  buy la te r ................................................. 1 d id n 't want to pay someone
Found good, affordable mortgage plan  1 r e n t .........................................................  1
Did not want to be dependent on landlord  1 Wanted to accumulate equ ity
• - for  p o ssib le  use during
254 retirem ent.......................................... 1
Other   . 1
(PLEASE SPECIFY)
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MOVING
82. Have you moved since November 1984?
Yes ..................................................................... 1---------►PLEASE ANSWER Q. 83
No...........................................................................2 ---------►PLEASE SKIP TO Q. 92
83. How long did you a c tiv e ly  look for housing? (HOW LONG WAS IT FROM LOOKING AT THE 
INSIDE OF A UNIT FOR THE FIRST TIME UNTIL YOU MADE AN OFFER TO PURCHASE OR RENT 
THIS DWELLING UNIT?)
MONTHS SINCE LOOKED AT INSIDE OF FIRST UNIT.
84a. What were the most important sources o f  inform ation you. used in searching for a 
home? (PLEASE RANK IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE BY GIVING A "1" TO TIE MOST IMPORTANT, 
"2" TO THE NEXT MOST IMPORTANT, ETC.) (PUT "0" NEXT TO SOURCES YOU DID NOT USE.)
Real e sta te  agent/Relocation s e r v ic e s . .________
Newspaper advertisement/Magazines ................
Knew the s e l le r ............................................................................
S ign s.....................................................................................................
Friends/people at work...........................................................
Other________________________________________
(PLEASE SPECIFY)
84b. What was the one source which led you to  the dw elling un it you f in a l ly  chose? 
(PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER ONLY. )
Real e sta te  agent/Relocation s e r v ic e s . .  1
Newspaper advertisement/Magazines  2
Knew the s e l le r ........................................................... 3
S ign s.................................................................................... 4
Friends/people at work.........................................  5
Other_________________________________________  6
(PLEASE SPECIFY)
85. How did you obtain the major appliances l i s t e d  below, i f  any, for  your house or 
apartment? (PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER FOR EACH APPLIANCE BELOW.)
Moved in 
Appliance from 
Previous Unit
R efr ig e ra to r .. . .
S tove .
Dishwasher..............
C lothes washer.. 
Clothes d r y e r .. .
Freezer......................
Microwave oven ..
Bought New 
Appliance 
for th is  Unit
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
New
Appliance Came 
with th is  Unit
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Used
Appliance Came Do not have 
with th is  Unit th is  Appliance
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IF OWN 
86a.
86b.
86c.
86d.
87a.
87b.
87c.
87d.
87e.
87f. 
88 .
CURRENT DWELLING UNIT ANSWER Q.86a-88; OTHERWISE SKIP TO Q.89a 
Did you purchase th is dwelling un it or in h e r it  it?
Purchase................................. 1 In h erit........................................... 2
When did you or someone in  your household purchase or in h er it th is  house or 
apartment?
%
MONTH: YEAR: _____
What was the purchase price of your house or apartment? (IF UNSURE PLEASE GIVE 
BEST ESTIMATE.)
$__________________
How much was your down payment? (IF UNSURE, PLEASE GIVE BEST ESTIMATE.)
$__________________
What type of financing, i f  any, do you have on th is  house or apartment? (PLEASE 
CIRCLE ONE ANSWER ONLY. ) (IF MORE THAN ONE MORTGAGE, PLEASE DESCRIBE FIRST MORT­
GAGE.)
No mortgage/no financing............................. 1-^SK IP TO Q. 89a
Private mortgage................................................  2
FHA mortgage..........................................................  3
VA mortgage............................................................. 4
Fanners Home Administration mortgage.5
O ther_____________________________________. 6
(PLEASE SPECIFYJ
Who holds the mortgage on th is  house or apartment? (PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER 
ONLY.)  (IF MORE THAN ONE MORTGAGE, PLEASE DESCRIBE FIRST MORTGAGE.)
Commercial bank........................................... 1 Mortgage company.....................................4
Savings bank...................................................2 Previous owner..........................................S
Savings and loan a sso c ia t io n .. .3  Other  6
(PLEASE SPECIFY)
Did you assume the mortgage or mortgages held by the previous owner?
Yes....................................................1 No...........................................................0
What i s  the monthly payment on th is  mortgage or loan?
$______________
How frequently is  the in terest rate on your mortgage renegotiated or adjusted?
Never, rate i s  f i x e d ...........................................    0
Renegotiated or adjusted every _______________years
(.WRITE-lR)
Do you have a mortgage with a reduced in te r e s t  rate provided by a s ta te  or lo ca l  
housing financing agency?
Yes..................................1 No.
If  your mortgage in terest were not dedu ctib le  on your income taxes, would you 
have . . .  (PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER FOR EACH STATEMENT BELOW.)
Probably D efin ite ly  
D efin ite ly  Probably Would Would
Would Have Would Have Not Have Not Have
Bought th is  dwelling
unit anyway....................... 1 2 3 4
Bought a le s s  expensive
dwelling u n it  1 2 3 4
Rented a u n it ....................  1 2 3 4
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{YOUR PREVIOUS DWELLING UNIT]
PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING IF YOU HAVE MOVED SINCE NOVEMBER 1984 ONLY; OTHERWISE SKIP 
TO Q.92.
89a. How far i s  your previous dw elling from your current dwelling?
Less than 5 m ile s ................................  1
5 to 2S m ile s ........................................... 2
25 to 50 m iles ........................................ 3
50 to 500 m ile s .....................................  4
Over 500 m iles ........................................  5
89b. How does your previous un it compare to your current unit . . .  
In terms o f: My PREVIOUS dw elling unit was:
Age ......................................... Newer.......... 1 Same. . . . . .7 Older........ .3
Overall Condition ............ B e tte r ........ 1 Same.. . .. .7 Worse........ , 3
Amount Of Upkeep Needed . Less............ 1 Same.. . . . . 2 More.......... .3
Amount Of Inside Space . .  
Layout (Use) Of Inside
Larger........ 1 Same.. . . .  .2 Sm aller.. . .3
Space ................................. B e tte r........ 1 Same... .. .7 Worse........ .3
Amount Of O itside Space.. Larger........ 1 Same.. . . . . 2 Sm aller.. . .3
Cost To Live In ................ More............ 1 Same. . . . .  .7 Less.......... .3
Q uality ................................. Higher........ 1 Same.. . Lower........ .3
Value ..................................... Worth More. 1 Same. . . . . .7 . Worth Less .3
IF LAST DWELLING UNIT WAS IN SAME NEIGHBORHOOD AS CURRENT DWELLING UNIT, SKIP TO QUES­
TION 90a; OTHERWISE CONTINUE.
89c. How did your la s t  neighborhood compare to your current neighborhood . . .
In terms o f:  LAST Neighborhood HAD/WAS:
Public schools ........................
P o lice  and f ir e
B etter............. Same.. . . . . 2 Worse................
protection  ............................. B etter ............. Same.. . . . . 2 Worse................ .3
Public transportation . . . B etter ............. Same.. . . . . 7 Worse................ .3
Other c i t y  se r v ic es  ........... B etter ............. Same.. . . . . 2 Worse................ .3
Ease o f g e ttin g  to  work . 
A ttractiveness o f
B etter .............. Same.. . . . . 2 Worse................
neighborhood ........................
Upkeep o f other
More.................. .1 Same. . . . . . 2 Less................... .3
property ................................... B etter ............. Same.. . . .  .7 Worse................ .3
Safety from crime ................ Safer ................ Same.. . . . . 2 Less S a fe . . . .3
Property taxes ........................ Higher............. .1 Same.. . . . . 7 Lower................ .3
Density .......................................... Less Crowded.1 Same.. . . .  .7 More Crowded .3
Place to ra ise  ch ildren  . B etter............. .1 Same.. . . . . 7 Worse................
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SETT ING YOUR PREVIOUS DWELLING (PREVIOUS OWNERS WHO MOVED SINCE NOVEMBER 1984)
90a. Which of the fo llow in g  did you use in trying to s e l l  your home?
(PLEASE CIRCLE AS MANY AS APPLY.)
Real e s ta te  agent/R elocation  se r v ic e s .. 1 S igns......................................................  1
Employer...............................................................................  1 Friends/people at w o rk ... 1
Newspaper advertisement/M agazines  1 Other 1
Knew the s e l l e r ..........................................................  1 (PLEASE SPECIFY)
90b. How much money, i f  any, did you spend to f ix  up your dwelling u n it in  order to  
s e l l  i t ?  (IF UNSURE, PLEASE GIVE YOUR BEST ESTIMATE.)
Nothing....................................0______$________________________
90c. IF STILL TRYING TO SELL YOUR DWELLING UNIT: How long has your d w ellin g  u n it been
on the market?
_____________ I days-*-SKIP TO Q. 92
91a. IF YOU SOLD YOUR PREVIOUS DWELLING UNIT: How long did i t  take to s e l l  your house
a fter  you put i t  up for  sale?
______________ # days
91b. How much did you s e l l  i t  for?
$ _________
91c. Is th is  p r i c e . . .  More than you expected  1
About what you expected  2
OR, Less than you expected  3 ‘
91d. How much money did you make from the sa le  o f your home a fter  payments to r e t ir e  
mortgages, payment o f broker's commission and other expenses o f  s e l l in g  your 
home? (IF UNSURE, PLEASE GIVE YOUR BEST ESTIMATE.)
YOUR NEXT RESIDENCE
92. Are you currently  in  the process of moving or planning to make a mo v e . . . .
In the next year   1 In 4 to 5 years................... 5
In 1 to 2 years  2 More than 5 years
In 2 to 3 years  3 from n ow ..............................  6
In 3 to 4 years  4 Don't know.................................  7“WSKIP TO Q. 102
Have no plans to move.. 0.J
93a. What type o f  dw elling unit would you be most l ik e ly  to move to? (PLEASE CIRCLE 
ONE ANSWER ONLY UNDER Q.93a BELOW.)
93b. What other typ es, i f  any, would you consider? (PLEASE CIRCLE AS MANY AS APPLY 
UNDER Q.93b BELOW.)
Q. 93a Q. 93b
Plan to Would a lso  
to move co n sid er
One fam ily house, detached from any other house........................1 1
One fam ily house, attached to one or more other houses.. 2 1
A build ing for:
2 to 4 fa m ilie s ................................................... ».....................................  3 1
5 or more fa m ilie s ...............................................................................  4 1
Mobile home............................................................................................................ 5 1
O ther______________________________________________________________6 1
(PLEASE SPECIFY)
94a. If you were to move, where would you be most l ik e lv  to move? (PLEASE CIRCLE ONE 
ANSWER ONLY UNDER Q.94a BELOW.)
94b. What other op tion s , i f  any, would you consider? (PLEASE CIRCLE AS MANY AS APPLY 
UNDER Q.94b BELOW.)
Q. 94a  0 .94b
Plan to move to Would a ls o  consider
In the neighborhood you-i.’ *'e in n o w .... 1
Somewhere e lse  in  th is  25&-y/town  2
In a nearby c i t y  or town.................................... 3
Somewhere e ls e  in  th is  s ta te .......................... 4
In another s t a t e ......................................................... 5
(Xitside the U.S...........................................................  6
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95a . If you were to move, what kind of a p lace would you be most l ik e ly  to move to? 
(PLEASE CIRCLE ONE ANSWER ONLY UNDER Q.95a BELOW.)
95b. What other options, i f  any, would you consider? (PLEASE CIRCLE AS MANY AS APPLY 
UNDER Q.95b BELOW.)
0.95a  Q. 95b
Plan to move to Would a lso  consider
The central* part o f a large c i t y   1 l
The outer edges of a large c i t y ..................  2 l
A small c i t y ..............................................................  3 1
A suburb............................................................................ 4 1
A small town..............................................................  5 1
A rural area..............................................................  6 l
The next questions refer to the type of dw elling you think you would most l ik e ly  move 
in to  i f  you did move.
96. Compared to your current dwelling u n it, how would you describe the dw elling unit 
you would most l ik e ly  move into?
In terms of: NEXT dwelling u n it would most l ik e ly  be:
Age ................................................... Newer.............1 Same.. . . . . 2 Older........... .3
O verall condition ............... B etter...........1 Same.. . . . . 2 Worse........... .3
Amount o f upkeep needed . Less...............1 Same.. . , . .  2 More............. .3
Amount o f in sid e space . . Larger..........,1 Same.. . ___2 Sm aller .. . .3
Layout (use) of inside  
space ......................................... B e tter .. . . , 1 Same.. . . .  .2 Worse...........
Amount of outside space . Larger...........1 Same.. . . .  .2 Sm aller .. . .3
Cost to l iv e  in .................... More.............. 1 Same.. . . .  .2 L e ss . i . . . .
Q uality ......................................... Higher...........1 Same.. . . . . 2 Lower........... .3
Value .............................................. Worth More..1 Same.. . . . . 2 Worth Less .3
97. Would y o u ...
buy th is  u n it....................................................................................  1
rent th is  unit for cash...........................................................  2“U.PLEASE SKIP TO Q.99
OR, occupy th is  un it without payment o f cash r e n t .. 3J
98. Would you buy th is  unit as a condominium or cooperative?
No.................................................................................................................................................. 0
Yes, part of a cooperative (property owned as a corporation  
where each share-holder occupies an ind ividual u n i t ) . . . .  1 
Yes, part of a condominium development.......................................................  2
99.
100.
IF YOU PLAN TO RENT: If you moved today, how much do you think you would have to
pay each month for a unit lik e  the one you ju st described?
$__________-►(PLEASE SKIP TO Q. 101)
IF YOU PLAN TO BUY: What would the to ta l purchase p r ice  be for  a u n it lik e  the
one you ju st described?
101. ALL: Are there units in th is price range in or near the community you want to
l iv e  in?
Yes ...............................  1
No .................................. 0
Don't know  9
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102. As far as you know, over the next 5 years, w i l l  the number of people in  your fam­
i ly  or household
Increase................................. 1
Stay the same................. .. 2
Or, Decrease....................   3
103. As far as you know, which of the fo llow ing changes w i l l  your household experience 
over the next 5 years? (PLEASE CIRCLE AS MANY AS APPLY.)
%
Yes
You w il l  r e t ire /le a v e  labor force ............................................................  1
Spouse or companion w ill r e t ire /le a v e  labor fo r c e ..................... 1
You w il l  enter/re-en ter  labor force ....................................................... 1
Spouse or companion w ill  en ter/re-en ter  labor fo r c e   1
104. Which number, from 1 to 5, best descr ib es how much you agree or d isagree with  
each of the following statements?
Agree 
A Lot
Owning a home takes a lo t of time.................................................. 1
Renting makes sense i f  you plan to move
frequently........................................................................................................1
When you buy a home, i t  i s  smart to buy the  
most expensive home you can afford , even i f  i t  
means temporarily foregoing other e x p en ses .. . . . . . . .  1
These days i t  takes a two-income household
to afford a mortgage...............................................................................1
People lik e  me are better o ff  renting than
buying..................................................................................................................1
Owning a home or condominium is  a sign  o f
success................................................................................................................1
Buying real e sta te  is  the best investment
someone lik e  me can make today.......................................................1
The most important thing to consider in  buying
a home is  the quality of loca l sch o o ls ..................................1
Homes are not worth what they cost today..................................1
I t ' s  important to me to have a yard for
the private use of my household....................................................1
I e n jo y  gardening or working in the yard..................................1
I t ' s  important to me to have neighbors who 
are good fr iend s.........................................................................................1
I'd prefer to save some of my income for  
tra v e l, recreation or entertainment rather
than spend more on housing................................................................1
Owning a home makes sense because o f  the income
tax advantages..............................................................................................1
Disagree 
A lo t
5
5
10S. In the next two years, what do you think w i l l  happen to each of the follow ing in  
the neighborhood where you now live?
106.
In th is  area:
Increase  
A Lot
The co st o f liv in g  w il l .................. 5
Rental prices for apartments w i l l .  S
Purchase prices for housing w i l l . .  5
In terest rates on car loans and 
mortgages w i l l ...................................  5
Unemployment w i l l ................................. 5
Property tax rates w i l l ..................  5
Sales or income taxes w i l l ........... 5
Sex o f person f i l l in g  c^g^'niestionnaire:
FEMALE........................................... 1 MALE . . . .
Increase  
A L it t le
4
4
4
Stay
the
Same
3
3
3
Decrease 
A L it t le
2
2
2
Decrease 
A Lot
1
1
1
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP WITH THIS SURVEY I
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(reference number 5702)
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JOB NO®ER *1 1  0 2 . SERIAL toeacR
(1 -  5) (6 -  9)
ASX ALL (Savings)
ADULTS *aED 16- YEARS 2TTTON ANSWERED 
ADULTS ACID 16» YEARS SECTION REFUSE - 
OTHERS NTT APPLICABLE --------------------------
1 ASX Q1
— 2 CP TO NEXT
— 2 SECTION
DTHKVTDCR READ CUT TNIHXJUOTCN 
the serv ices they provide.
Now I  would l ik e  to  UK you acme questions about banka and bu ild ing  s o c ie t ie s  and
01.
02.
03.
Do you have a paracnal cur rant  account  w ith a check* 
book INCLUDE ANY JOINT ACCOUNTS BUT tXTtlTT. HUM 
INTEREST CHEOUE ACnXKTS
Did you open your vary  f i r s t  cu rran t acn-junt with a chegje 
book w ith in  the l a s t  12 months, o r  was I t  longer ago than th a t?
Yes ----------
No ------------
Don't know 
Refused ----
(26)
-  1 ASX Q2
Longer ago ----------------------
Within the la s t  12 months
3 00  TO 013
 4_____
6 CP TO 03
7 ASX C2a
(12 -  13 
SXXP TO 
CPL. 26
In which month d id  you open th a t  cu rran t acooint? 
WUTE IN BOXES. INTERVIEWER EXAMPLE :
tow many cu rren t accounts w ith cheque books do you have 
a t  present? PLEASE BKLUCE ANY JOINT ACCOUNTS
September i o n
(27X 28). 
‘ Si_
INTDtVTDER : IT CNLY CNE VTTTTTT ASK O*-06a ABOUT THAT X2PXNT. IT PCKE THAN ONE ACCDLNT ASX Q 4 -Q 6 a  ABOUT t f t I N  AYULANT 
AND SBCEYO AND THIRD ACCOUNTS. DO NTT ASX ABOUT M3RE THAN THREE ACTTXNTS.
WAIN ACCOUNT
Is  th i s  cu r r ent  account  J u s t  in  your nan* 
o r i s  I t  a jo in t  ac ocu tt w ith another person?
05. Mrs i s  the  cu rran t a r r a n t  w ith?
INTOT/TEMP: Please d is tin g u is h  between
Lloyds "CSdlnary" and Lloyds T i m i d ' .  
I f  in  doubt put ''Ordinary'’ .
CR FIRST SBCEND THIRD
ACCOUNT ACCOUNT ACDDLNT
(30) (34) (361
(31) (35) (39)
Atabey H rtlrrM l ft.il LAing Society 34 
9iasi
Barclay* Bank -------------------------------  2 -------------  2 ----- -------  2
c .
c
-----  7 -------------  7 ----- 7
1 Lloyds Bank n . m r  Aocosit ---- -----  8 ASX P5b - 8 ASX « b  8 ASK 05bim a i _ « c_l. ____  Q
n a u i i a i u i  /xxj.t IM cua-au-uxj . w as- a. a i Li--- - --. —_ a-- i. v
Royal Bank of Scotland
(32) (36) (40)
-----  2 -------------- 2 ------------- 2
Other (w rits  in  I  ring)
-  ASX Q5a o r AEBET NATTCKAL Q3WtWT ACCOUNT HXCBtS 
ONLY
-  ASX 05b CF LLOYDS CLASSIC EELEERS OLY 
-  dC TO 06
Refused/Don't know
OSa.
06.
Dirt you have a Ctmcfjm Save aocoLSit  w ith 
Abbey N ational bafis-a your cu n a t  acraunt?
Did you have a o i n e i t  ar r a n t  w ith Lloyds 
fry OpanlXk? yrrr C*\ AoOOUnt?
to rn  you opened th i s  a r u n f  w ith (n e *  a t  05) 
d id  you a lready  have any kind of savings or 
d ep o s it a r r a n t  w ith  than?
B e e  you cpanad th i s  n u r e i t  a ic c u it  w ith in  
the  l a s t  12 months o r was i t  longer ago?
IT ' LENDER ACD' SAY : tow long have you had 
th i s  n rrrww aooount w ith  (M m  a t  05)7
w ithin l a s t  12 ocntha
1 year bu t lees than 2 years
2 years but leas than 5 years 
5 years bu t le ss  than 10 years 
10 years o r more 
D en't know /C an 't
30
/
<4-1
DETAILS DETAILS 
FTTDW I 1 HELCW ;
Ycrrm ahd w u ie  in  h o t s MONTH | | j
| I i i i i
/
47
(42) (43)
Vm
(44) (45) 146) (47)
07. Hava yfxi paid any • o e n n t  ctiarg^a in  the  la a t  12 m t t i s (48)
cn yuur (Main) cu rran t aocxurt? 163 1U*
rwe * ft- L----- 1 '
08. Od ytxi have a chat^ja ca rd , I  wmmn « card  whldi guarmrt&aa* Yam A 48p*y^ant o f a c^agua erf up to  £50? 163 1
09. Hava yoj t w r  tra n a fa rra d  y o jr  (>ftin) cu rran t aaocunt, not ym
ju * t  a changa erf b u t to  a d lf fa rw it iM tl tu t lm ?
010. Whan d id  y o j Last tra n a fa r  ycur cu rran t account? Within l a s t  12 wontha -------------- ------- 8
OlOae And in  afiich m rrth d id  you tr a j* f a r  th a t  aoon**?
o /a r  a yaar ago ------ ------- 9 0D TO 013
49
Kami
i U  1
/
50
u a l  / t f l t  
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Q lC b.H ow  l o n g  d i d  y o u  h o ld  th e
previous account before you 
transferred it?
(51)
Less than 1 year----------- 1
1 year but less than 2 years. 2
2 years but less than 5 years.3
5 years but less than 10
years------------------- 4
10 years or more----------- 5
Don't know/Can't remember 6
B
51
Qll. Thinking about the last time 
you transferred your current 
account, who did you transfer 
it from? RECORD BELOW
Q12. Who did you transfer your 
current acoount to?
RECORD BELOW Qll Q12
Transfer Transfer 
from to
(52) (54) 
Abbey National Building
Society----------- 1 -------1
Barclays Bank--------2 -------2
Bank of Scotland-----3 -------3
Clydesdale Bank------4 -------4
Co-Operative Bank
(Co-Op)----------- 5 -------5
Girobank------------ 6 -------6
Lloyds Bank----------7 -------7
Midland Bank---------B -------8
Natiorfrd.de Anglia
Building Society 9 ------9
National Westminster
Bank--------------- 0   0
Royal Bank of Scotland
(William & Glyn's) —  X ------X
T.S.B. Bank---------- Y   Y
(53) (55)
Yorkshire Bank-------1 -------1
Other (write in & ring)
Don't know/Re fused 3 ------3
INTERVIEWER ASK : CAN I CHECK, YOJ 
HAD AN ACCOUNT AT (CODE AT Qll)
AND YOU TRANSFERRED IT TO (CODE 
AT Q12)
ASK ALL
Q13. Apart from transfers, have 
you ever closed any current 
acoount? INCLUDE ANY JOINT 
ACaOUNTS
(56)
Yes 1 ASK Q13 a
N o -------------- 2
Don't know 3 GO TO
Refused 4 Q13d/e
Q13a.How long ago did 
you close your 
last current 
acoount?
IF MORE THAN ONE 
CLOSED ASK ABOUT 
THE MOST RECENTLY 
CLOSED CURRENT 
ACOOUNT.
Within last 12 months - 
1 year but less than
3 years -----
3 years or more
---6 ASK Q13b
7 00 - 2<&3d/e
52
/
55
Q13b.V/ho v/as that current 
account with?
(57)
Abbey National Building Society. 1
Barclays Bank-----------------2
Bank of Scotland--------------3
Clydesdale Bank---------------4
Co-Cperative Bank (Co-Op)----- 5
Girobank--------------------- 6
Lloyds Bank------------------ 7
Midland Bank----------------- 8
Nationwide Anglia Building
Society------------  9
National Westminster---------- 0
Royal Bank of Scotland
(Williams & Glyn's)--------- X
T.S.B. Bank------------------ Y
(58)
Yorkshire Bank----------------1
Other (write in & ring)
Dcn't know/Refused ------
Q 13c.Hew lerg did you have that 
current account before 
' closing it?
(59)
Less than 1 year-------------- 1
1 year but less than 2 years —  2
2 years but less than 5 years - 3
5 years but less than 10 years. 4
10 years or more ------------ 5
Don't know/Can't remember---6
Q13d.ASK ALL WITH CURRENT ACCOUNTS 
(Ql oode 1). Just supposing 
you had to change your main 
current acoount from (name 
at Q5) who else would you 
go to? RECORD BELOW
Q13e.ASK ALL WITHOUT CURRENT
AOQOUNTS (Ql code 2,3,4).
Just supposing you were 
going to open a current 
acoount with a cheque book 
tomorrow, who would you go 
tD? RECORD BELCW
Q13d/Q13e
(60)
Abbey National Building
Society ------------  1
Barclays Bank----------2
Bank of Scotland------- 3
Clydesdale Bank-------- 4
Cb-Operative Bank
(Co-Op)--------------5
Girobank-------------- 6
Lloyds Bank------------7
Midland Bank-----------8
Nationwide Anglia
Building Society 9
National Westminster
Bank---------------- 0
Royal Bank of Scotland - X
T.S.B. Bank------------Y
(61)
Yorkshire--------------1
Other (write in & ring)
Dcn't kncw/Refused 3
57 
/
58
59
60
/
61
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ASX ALL
-c -Q14. gCW ORD 1 (PDJCI P la u e  would you look through 
th i s  book le t and t e l l  me I f  you have any of these  
bank accoun ts, including any Jo in t accounts.
(62)
Yes ----------------------------------------------------- 1 ASX 015 '
N o ------------------------------------------------------- 2 CD TO FILTER 62
D cn 't know 3 HJEKE Q22a
015. How many o f these  accounts do you have a lto g e th e r 
a t  p resen t?
016. SHOW ORD 1 Please would you g l\*  me the aode 
ra n te r  of the  account and the name o f .th e  Bank.
JNTUTVTEVER : RETTHD BEICW mkTT.S OF UP 70 4 A33XNIS 
ALTOGETHER, USING A SEPARATE COLO* FOR EACH AOQDUNT, 
ASX 017 -  020 FCR EUCT KXDUNT.
ACOOUNT NAAE
1. O rdinary D eposit ---------------
2 . Budget -------------------------------
3. Save A Borrow --------------------
4. High I n te r e s t  (Osaqua) A/C
5. Regular Income ------------------
6 . Term D eposit ----------------------
7 . Mortgage Saver ------------------
8 . Monthly Savings -----------------
9. Extra I n te r e s t  ------------------
0 . No N otice --------------------------
Accounts 
1 s t 2nd 3rd 4th 
(64) (6 8 ) (72) (76) 
— 1 — 1 — 1 — 1
— 2 — 2 — 2 — 2
— 3 — 3 — 3 — 3
— 4 — 4 — 4 — 4
— 5 — 5 — 5 — 5
— 6 — 6 — 6 — 6
— 7 — 7 — 7 — 7
— 8 — 8 — 8 — 8
— 9 — 9 — 9 — 9— 0 — 0 — 0— 0
X. I n te r e s t  Bearing CUl ib iL A/C   X — X — X — X
Y. Cashesrd -  based D eposit ----------  Y — Y — Y — Y
Other (W rite In  A ring ) (65) (69) (73) (77)
B arclays ------
C itibank  ------
Clydesdale — 
Co-Operative
Lloyds ---------
Midland -------
N ational Girobank -------------
N ational Westminster ——  
Royal Bank of Scotland 
(in c . Will (eras A G lyn 's) 
Bank c f  Scotland — — —— 
T rustee  Savings Bank --------
  1
(66) (70) (74) (78) 
— 1 —1 — 1 — 1 — 2 — 2 — 2 — 2
— 3 — 3 — 3 — 3
— 4 — 4 — 4 — 4
— 5 — 5 — 5 — 5— 6 — 6 — 6 — 6
- 7  — 7 — 7 — 7 
— 8  — 8 — 8 — 8
Western T ru st A Savings 
O ther (W rite in  A ring )
017. I s  th i s  ar r r m t  in  your 
crdy o r  i s  i t  a Jo in t 
w ith ano ther psraon7
— 9 — 9 — 9 — 9
— 0 — 0 — 0 — 0
— X — X — X — X
(67) (71) (75) (79)
— 1 — 1 — 1 _  1— 2 — 2 — 2 — 2
3 — 3 — 3 — 3
(11) (12) (13) (14)
Pe r s o n a l 
J o in t  ----
018. When d id  you open th is  
acoount? Was i t  . . . ?  
READ CUT
W ithin l a s t  6 months 
7 CD 12 months  ago — 
Longer ago ---------------
019. Have you paid any money in to  
th i s  acoount w ith in  the la s t  
6 months?
Yes
No
1 — 1 — 1 — 12 — 2 — 2 — 2
3 — 3 — 3 — 3
4 — 4 — 4 — 4
5 -  5 — 5 — 5
6 — 6 — 6 — 6 
7 — 7 — 7 — 7
020. Have you withdrawn any ncney 
frcm th i s  account In the la s t  
6 months?
79
ic a r d (S )I 10
r r  ORDINARY CEFOSTT ACCOUNT 3  WITH T5B.
ASX Q21 - OTHERS CD TO FILTER 5EFCRE 022a
021. I s  th i s  account w ith  the 753 . . . ?
READ OUT. (IS)
An O rdinary Passbook Savings/Serv ice Acoount. 1
A Deposit o r Investm ent A cco u n t______________ 2
D on 't know     _________3
ASX ALL WITH ANY 3ANX AaOOUNT -  OTHERS CD TO 023
ITTOERVTEWER SAY : Now I am going to  ask you about 
Cash D ispenser Cards supplied  by Banks.
0 2 2 a .SH » PHOTO A Which, i f  any, of the se  0 0  you 
have? RH3CRD BELLA.'
ASX 022b HR EACH AT Q22a -  OTHERS CD TP C23
022b.Have you ever used your . . .  card? RECORD EELOW
ASX 022c FCR FACT AT Q?7h - OTHERS GO TO 023
022c.And have you used your . . .  card  in  the  l a s t  4 
weeks? RECORD EELOW
C22a C22b 022c
Have Used 
(16) (18)
Bank of Scotland : 
Keycard - O rdinary 
Kaycard -  Deposit - 
B arc lays :
Barelaybank ----------
B arc layplus ----------
•Connect Card ---------
C lydesdale :
Autnbank (BLACX) — 
Autocash (MAROON) -
1 — 1 2 — 2
3 —
4 —
5 GO TO
Weeks(20)
— 1 
— 2
— 3
— 4
;22d
Co-O perative Bank E lectron
Girobank Link --------------------
Lloyds :
Cashpoint ----------------------
•V isa ------------------------------
6 — 6 
7 — 7 8—8 
9 — 9
0 — 0
X GO TO
Cashpoint -  Deposit 
Midland :
Autcbenk -----------------
Autnbank -  Access
Aubocheque ----------
Saver Plus ----------
— Y — Y 
(17) (19)
— 1 — 1 — 2 — 2 
- 3  — 3 
— 4 — 4
— 6
— 7
— 8 
— 9
— 0 
C22d
— Y (21)
— 1
N ational W estminster Serv laeaard :
•  -  Blue -------------------------------------
-  Orange (inc lude  cnshcard)
-  Bla ck (deposit)
5 GO TO
Royal Bank o f Scotland ( in c . 
Williams A G lyn 'a) : 
Caahlino (Current Acoount) 
C aahllne (Deposit)
T ru s te e  Savings Bank Speedbank
Y orkshire Bank Mini hank ----------
O ther (W rite in  and rin g )
6—6 
7 — 7
8—8
9 — 9 0—0 
X — X
022d 
— 6 
— 7
— 9
— 0 
— X
Noras o f these/N o
Y — Y — Y 
N — N — N
TF LLOYDS VISA BARCLAYS CXXfgTT CURD. CR 'JUT WEST 
ELUE 0  AT Q22a THEN ASK Qs22d AID e.
OTHERS 00 TO PAGE D.
QZ2d.Have you used y o u r   card fo r  any of the
f a l l o w i n g ?  READ OUT. REXXFD BELOW
C22a.And have you used i t  f a r  any o f th eme in  the 
l a s t  4 weeks? READ OUT. RETTED EEIOW
QfTTH C22e 
Ever L ast 4 
Used Weeks (22) kf ^
Cash Nichlne Withdrawal ------------
As payment f a r  goods and
se rv ic e s  where money is  taken 
d i r e c t ly  Cron your cu rren t 
account 1 — ---------
For cheque guarantee 
Nana of these 
D cn 't know/refused
Yes
No
8 — 8 — 8 — 8 
9 — 9 — 9 — 9
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ASK MX, 
SCW CARD (3TXZ) New I  would l i* »  ta  u k  ycu abou t B uild ing  S ocle  cy Accounts.
023. Co ycu have any sav ings  Accounts a t  a B u ild ing  S o c ie ty , in c lu d in g  those  held jo in t ly  w ith ano ther person?
Yes, do hold an acccun t a t  a B u ild in g  S ocie ty
No, do n o t ho ld  an acoount a t  a  B u ild ing  S ocie ty  
Q24. Now many B uild ing  S o c ie ty  eooounts do you have In  to t a l?
RUG ---------------------  1 ------------- 2--------------- 3 ---------
N ASK ??4N 03 ?0 037
a g r r o  t r a i n s  c r  n» ro  rrv g  a c to c k ts .  u s p c  a s z ta r a te  r rx c m  t c r  e x c t aocexjnt. the nopeer c r  c e l o n s  gypL E T sa
SHOULD EQUAL THE NIMEER RINGg) ^  C24. S g  rHSa t C TCCf S .
C2S. Which Building S o c ie ty  i s  th e  acoount w ith?
Abbey N ationa l
A llian ce  4 L e ic e s te r  
B radford 4 B ingley —
B r is to l  4 West ---------
S n ta r r u a  ■ ■ ■ ■
Cheltenham 4 G loucester 
— Gateway
I H alifax  --------------------------
Leeds Permanent ---------
Birm ingham M ldshires -
N ational 4 P ro v in c ia l
■ N atiora/ida A nglia ------
N orthern Roc* ------------
.^Woolwich ---------------------
Y orkshire -------------------
1s t  2nd 
<20 (29)
3rd
(34)
_ _ . i
4 th
(39)
— — 1
- 24
—— 4 - 4 ,
- - c ," 0 — —  o
- _ . 7  .
____ Q ____ a .
o n o a .“  w “ ““ *  U — — y  ——  y
Y Y Y Y
(25) (301 (35) (40)
— 2 ------ 2 ------ 2 ------ 2
-  3 ------ 3 ------ 3 ------ 3
-  S ------ 5 ------ 5 ____ 5
D
O ther (w rite  in  4 rin g )
25- CVTO 2 AGAIN Which a t  th e se  aco o tn ts  do you have w ith  th e  (name 
B u ll in g  S o c ie ty  in  d m  a t  025) inc lu d in g  any jo in t  aaooun ts?
Pieaae w-»ild you g ive  oe th e  qorie rasroer Iro n  the  ca rd .
1. O rdinary  Share
2 .  SAYE -----------------
3. S u b ae rip tlm /M a n tlly  Sav ings
4. Gold/Jta N otice Accounts --------
5. Seven Cfcy -
6 . E x tra  I n te r e s t  — ■
7 . Terra Share ■ ■
8 . L ife  A ssurance Linked
9. Cheque Book ----------------
0 . C r . i i t  C ird ----------------
X. Cash Card -------------------
Y. F lex  Account --------------
O ther (w rite  in  4 rin g ) (27)
1 (31) (36) (41) (46)
■ J
2*1
/1
—— 2
■ ■ • 
, a ——  1 — -  5
1 3 " 3 ■ 3
■ 4
——. 3 liQ
— — 4 _____ 4 _____ 4 ——  4
wo
— ^
- - - c ___  5 ____ 5 ____  53
■ 6 ___  6 - c - - 4a o
____ a ___  a ____ a ____  A------ o
____ q
------ 0
____ q
1 o 
. . . .  Q
1 o
——  91 7
- A ■ 1 0"™ ” U
—— X - . . x - x _____ x
- Y ____ v - y
1 (32) (37) (42) (47)
O cn 't know
ASK C27-31 fTR EACH ACTOOrr AT 026. ASX ALL 0UESTTLFS FCR FTRST AUXNT, 
THEN REPEAT FOR SECOO liT Y M T ETC.
(28) (3311 (38) (43) (48)
027. Is  th i s  accoun t in  your name only o r  i s P e r s o n a l ----- --  ■ ............ 1 i ____ 1 ------  1 ------  1
i t  a ^ o in t acoount w ith  an o th er person? J o in t  ------------------------------- —  2 ------ 2 ------ 2 ------  2 ------  2
028- Have you opened th i s  accoun t in  the w ith in  th e  la s t  6 months ■
la s t  6 monehs o r  w s  i t  la rg e r  ago? 7 to  12 months ago ■ ■■ ------ 4 ------  4 ------  4
Longer ago —---- ---------------—  5 ------ 5 ------ 5 ------  5 ------  5
029. Have ycu paid  any money in to  th i s  account Yes ----------------------------------- 6 6 ------ 6 ——  6 ——  6
m  the l a s t  6 months? No ------------------------------------ —  7 ------ 7 ------ 7 ------  7 ------  7
0 )0 . Have ycu withdrawn any money from th i s Yes ----------------------------------- ____8 ____ g ------  8
account in  th e  l a s t  6 months? N o ------------------------------------ —  9 ------9 ------9 ------  9 ------ 9
Q31. Is  th i s  your f i r s t  e v e r acoount w ith Yes —--------------------------------—  0 ------o ____ Q ____  q ____  0
a B uild ing  S o c ie ty ? N o ------------------------------------ —  X ------ X ------ X ------  X ------  X
TOR C m C T  USE ONLY
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E-
ASX ALL WTO HAVE AN AgPCKT WTTH A BUILD PC  SPOTTY AT fl?3 (CDCE 1 ) -  OTHERS OP TO 037
STOW PHOTO B. BUILDING SOCIETY CASH DISPENSERS
032. Which, I f  any o f  the** do you have?
ASX 033 FOR EACH AT Q32
033. Have you ever used your . . .  card?
ASX 034 FOR EACH AT 033
034. And have you used your . . .  card 
in  th e  l a s t  4 weeks?
A lliance 4 L e ice s te r  Card —
B ritann ia  Link (B ritann ia) 
Card cash (H a l i f a x ) ------------
Cashkey (Y orkshire)
Gateway (WoolwichI 
Morvevcard (Leeds) -
m
Have 
(51) 
_ _ ]
233 
Ever Used 
(S3)
2 2 i
4 Weeks
(55) 
__ 1
*» __ ->
_ _1 _"1J
I - 4 4
. . .  c J cj__c ___ co
__7 ________7 ____
----- - - O
_____ 7
__a _________ a ______  o
__Q
------------ s . -------
Q - . Oj * - — -  j __n _________  r \ ___ *
_ Y
------------ v ———
_ _ v
[ \ Y . _ , , _ . yif* 4
(52)
i
(54) (56)
1
—  2 2 --------- 2
Other (w rite  in  and ring)
Don'C know
 4 GO TO
  5 C3?
QO TO 037 - ASX ALL
037. SHOW CARD 3 (WKTTE) Do you hold any of the  follow ing? REXRD EELOW 
IT YES. ASX 038-041 FCR EACH SAVINGS HELD AT 037. IT  ICNE HELD GO TO 041 a
038. I s  th i s  accoun t/investm en t In ycur name only , o r  Is  I t  jo in t ly  held with another person? RECORD EZLCV
039. When was th i s  investm ent f i r s t  opened/purchased? Was i t  . . .  ? READ OUT REXRD BEt£M
040. Have you paid  any money in to ,  or added to , th i s  Investm ent in  the l a s t  6 norths? RECORD BELCV
041. Have you withdrawn money f ro a , o r cashed in  any p a r t  o f ,  th i s  Investment in  the la s t  6 months? RECORD BZXCW
Post O ffice  Savings Bank
- O rdinary ----------------------
- Inve s tme n t -------------------
037
Savings
Held
(SS)
National Ravings Certificates
-  Index Linked ------------------------
- Fixed I n te r e s t  ---------------------
Pr ealisn Bonds --------------------------
N aticnal Savings Income Bends -
N ational Savings D eposit Bonds
N aticnal Savings (SAYE)
(Save As You Earn) ----------------
N ational Savings Y early Plan
N ational Savinas Index Linked Inoone Bends 0
G overm ent G i l t  Edged S tocks ---------------------- X
M je  HUD ---------------------------------------------------------- N
041a SAVINGS CXUBS ----------------------------------------------- Y
Are you a merttoer o f a sav ings club  such 
as a ho lid ay  c lu b  o r  O o ls ta e s  club?
(IF "YES" CEEE 037 A.U ASX 038-041.
IF "NO** 03 TO 0421.
038 039
Within 7-12 
Per- la s t  6 months Longer
scrtal J o in t months ago aao
(59) (60) (61)
1   1 1 -2   2 2 -
5 ----  5
6   6
7 ----  7
3 —
4 —
5 —
6 —
7 —
8 — 
9 — 
0 —
X —
(62)
— 1 - 
-  2 -
— 3 -
— 4 -
— 5 -
— 6 -
— 7 ■
— 8 •
— 9 •
— 0 ■
— X ■
040
Yes No 
(64) (65)
2--
3 ----
4 ----
5 ----
6 --
8 --
9 ----
0 --
X ----
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042. gcw CARD 4 (WHITS) Her* Is  a l i s t  of o ther ways In which people can save. M uch, I f  any, a t  th e se  savings c r
investm ents do you personally  have -  including jo in t  accounts o r  jo in t  savings?
ASK 043-47 FEB EACH HELD AS RELEVANT
043. SHARE h a r m s  0M.Y: Did you co taln  your shares v ia  your en^ loyer or otherw ise?
044. Thinking of your savings in  . . .  are they in  your name on ly  o r  held  jo in t ly  w ith  ano ther p e r m ?  record BELOW
045. M en d id  you f i r s t  in v est In . . .  ? Was i t  . . .  ? READ CUT AM) RE3XRD BELCW
046. Have you ADDED to  your savings in  . . .  in  the l a s t  6 months? REJXRD BELOW
047. Have you WITHDRAM4 any money firm , or cashed in , any o f th e se  savings in  the l a s t  6 months? RECORD RFTnw
242 243 211 245 21i 21212 044 0
.Shares [Within 7-12
Savings I D ipl- Via P er- | la s t  6 months L arger'
Held ioyer o th e r ’sonal J o in t  {months ago aoo . Yi
(6 6 ) i (69) (70) (71 ) (72)
Pete
P r iv a t is e d  Stocks and Shares 
Aug 1987 B r i t is h  Air por t s  Auth. Shares 
B r i t i s h  Gas Shares  ....... .........Dec 1986 
Dec 1988 
198S 
Jim 1987 
Oct 1986
B r i t is h  S tee l Shares — 
B r i t is h  Telecom Shares
R olls  Royoe Shares -----
TSB Bank Shares ----------
O ther d e -m tlo n a lls e d  shares ----
Stocks and Shares (in  any o ther
organisation) .8
r
P ersonal Equity Plan (P .E .P .) — 9
Local A uthority  Bands --------------- 0
U nit T ru sts  ------------------------------  X
Investm ent T ru sts  --------------------- Y
(73) (74) (75)
No Yes No 
(76) (77) (78) (79)
2 — 2 L-
  3 *—  3 —  3 -j—
  4 —  4 —  4 4 -
  5  ---- 5   5 1—
__L_ a ____  a 1
— ----
—  6 ----
H 7 “, o - -
1 ]
1  '
■9if *
X
1 ' Y
1
— 2 — 2 — 2
— 3 — 3 — 3
— 4 _ 4 _ 4
— 5 — 5 _ 5
— 6 — 6 — 6
— 7 — 7 — 7
- 8 - 8 - 8
_ 9 __ 9 _ 9
— 0 — 0 — 0
X — X — X
— Y — Y — Y
None held N CD TD FX-TER BLFCKE 048
ASK ALL AGED 18 AM) OVFP -  OTHERS CP TO PACZ L. 0109
IVIERVDOER : Now I  are going to  ask you about R e ta il S to re A ccounts.
048. Do you have an acoount o r card with a shop o r s to re?  T h is does not 
inc lude personal loans o r h ire  purchase agreements.
(illYes ------------ -------------
No ---------------------------- 2 CD TO
D on 't know/Rafused -  3 056
049. SHOW FTOTO C Mil A  c f the following shops or s ta re s  do you have an 
account w ith? READ DOT EACH STORE EXAMPLE. 
r/TERVTDCH : RTC A SEPARATE CTLUtN FDR EACH CARD HELD.
1s t
Card
( 1 2 )
2nd
Card
(15)
3rd
CArd
(IS )
4th
Card
(2 1 )
___  1 .___  1 .___  1
-------------  3 -----  3 ■------ 3 ------  3
Hepworths/Next ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Burtons /Do rothy Perkins/Top Han/Top Shop/Evans /P r in c ip le s  /F en tons (Personal A cc ts). 
House o f F rase r (eg. D.H.Evens/Harrods/Army 1 Navy/Dickens A Jones)
S tyle/G oldberg* ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jchn  Lewis P artn e rsh ip     —
S ears (eg . Lrevls' s /S e lf  ridges/W allis/K iss S e lir td g * /F o s te rs )
D ix o n s -------------------------   - — ■ . . . .  ------
Q u a y 's
S to recard  (BFB/Ftotherca re/Kafaltat/Heal*/Richards)
O ther (w rite  in  A ring )
050. SMV CARD 5 (PINK) Please look a t the card and t e l l  me M uch type of
a c c a n t  you hold fa r  each card mentioned. DhERVXEJCR ; READ OUT TYPE OF 
CARD HELD
(13)
Have to  pay in  f u l l  a t  end cf each mcnth -----
Pay a f ixed monthly amount ---------------------------
Pay a l l  o r  p a r t  of the  balance as you choose 
D on't knew . ■ ...
051. Have you eve r used your
052. Have you used your . . .  acoount in the la s t  
4 weeks?
053. Have you opened th i s  acoount  in  the la s t  
12 months o r wes i t  longer ago?
054. I s  th i s  aooourrt in  your name only or is  i t  
a j o i n t  acooun t w ith  another person?
ASK 055 IT 050 CDCE 7 HEXP (Pav a l l  or part of the 
balance as you Choose) -  OTHERS G3 TO 056
055. Do you u su a lly  pay back the fu l l  anoint sheen 
an the  statem ent each month, o r do you pay 
beck over a period  of time?
Yes ----------------------------------------------  9A
------ 9 ------  9 ------ 9
__ A ____  A ■ A
V
1 U —— U 
____ V ____ Y ___  Y
.. V V V V
(14)i (17) (20) (23)
upenea in  i u l  i a ncnuis - 
L a g e r  *ao ----------------------- --------- 2
------ 3 ------  3 ------ 3
4 , A - 4 ____ 4
Pay back over a period  of 
Pay back f u l l  amount -------
tim e . 6 
--------  7
—— 6  ——  6 ___  6
D on 't know/Rafused
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ASK ALL AGED 18 CD OVER
OS6 . SKX PHOTO D New I an aoinq to  ask ycu about C red it C ards. Which, I f  any, of th e se  do you have? 
REEERD DETAILS OF UP TO 3 CARDS, USING A SEPARATE CD LON FOR EACH CARD. SEE INSTRUCT! UtC.
1 s t 2nd 3rd
Card Card Card
(24) (29) (34)
  2
--------------- 4
--------------- 5  6
--------------- 7 8
 0
--------------- X------  Y
American Express (GreenI
American Express (G o ld )--------------- -
Bank of Scotland P re m ie r---------------
Barclays Premier ■ • ■ . . . . . . .  - ........—
Diners C lu b -------------------——----------
Midland Bank Mastercard -----------------
N ational Westmin s te r  M astercard - —
•Access -------------------------------------------
•Bank of Scotland Visa --------------------
•Bank of Saotland/A.A. Visa ------------
•Barclaycard or Barclaycard V isa ----
•Chase Manhattan Bank Visa --------------
•Co-Operative Bank Visa 
•Girobank Visa -------------
•H alifax Building Society Visa -------------------
•The Leeds Permanent Building Socie ty  V isa 
•Save and Prosper C la ss ic  Card Visa
"Trustcerd c r  Trustcard Visa ----------
•Yorkshire Bank Barclaycard 
•Any o ther Visa
Any Hotel c red it card -------------
Any P etro l S tation  c re d i t  card 
Other (w rite  in  1 ring)
(25) 
— 1 
— 2
-  3
— 4
56 
7 B 
9 0
----------------------- 1 — ---------— 1
2*1~ _________1
~ 4 J
eJco
•7
H Q /a0
Q
o
7
T—, -r , - ■ r X
u
YA
V
I (30) (35) 
_______________1
_ *»
--------------- 3 ___
Z
3
None of these 
Refused --------
(26)
— 1 —
-  2 00 TO
— 3 064
-  4
-  5
-  6
-  7
-  B
-  9
-  0
(36)
057. When d id  you ob ta in  y o u r  card? Was i t  ......... ? READ X T
w ithin the la s t  6 months
7 to  12 months ago ---------
Longer ago ---------------------
058. Have you ever used your card as a c r e d i t  card?
— 4 —
— 5 —
— 6 —
Yes, have ever(to --------
059. Hove you used your . . . .  card as a c re d i t  card  in  th e  Lasrt month?
6 FILTER 8 FILTER 8 FILTER 
BEFCRE 063 BEFORE 063 BEJCKE 063
Yes, used In la s t  month 
(to, ------------------------------
060. Have you ever used your . . . .  card to  withdrew cash?
hrve ever used — — -  —Yes(to
Are you personally  respo nsib l e fa r  the repayments CO your . . .  
card  o r  1s  I t  a supplementary cord on r r a m t  e l a e 's  account  
o r  a oenpeury card?
Yes, reepcnaihla — 
(to, supplementary -
No, ocnoeny ----------
Don’t  know/Refuaad
(27) 
— 1 - — 2
-  3 -
— 4 -
(32) (37)
IF RESKXSTBLE TCP REPAY74ENTS. ASK 06? FIR EACT (•) CARD AT 056 -  OTHERS CD TO FHTS1 BETOtE 063
062. Do you normally pay beck the fu l l  anoin t shown on th e  statem ent each month, 
car do you pay back ewer a period of time?
(28) (33) (
Pay back over period ■ 1 1 ■   1 ■
Pay f u l l  amount ----------------------------------------------------   2   2 ----------------
I t  v a r ie s  --------------------------------------------- — —---------- 3   3 ----------------
Dcn’t knew/Refused    —■ 4 ----------------  4 ■■■——  
IF AGOSSS AT 056 ASK 063 - OTHERS CD TO 064
063. What i s  th e  name of the  bank on your Access card?
Clydesdale
Lloyds -----
Midland —
N aticnal W estm inster-----------------------------------
Royal Batik of Scotland (Williams 1 G lyn 's)
Other  -
Dcn't know----------
ASX ALL AGm 1H OR OVER
064. Are you cu rren tly  using ? READ OUT
Mail order c r  c re d i t  frcra a ca ta logue
Bank overdraft agreed w ith bank ---------
Check Trading (eg. Provident) -------------
(to, none of these --------------------------------
Refused -----------------------------------------------
(39) 
— 1 
-  2— 3
— 4
— 5
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ASK AH. 18-» (IDANS) H PUNCHING S K I P  TO C O L, u g(44)
Q65. Exclixting any nortgegee o r  o v e rd ra f ts ,  * r«  you paying b a te  any 
typa o f loana o r  h ire  pu rch ase , pe rso na l l y o r  J o in t ly ?
066. Bow aeny Loana o r  h i r e  purchase ag ree n an ts  do you h a w  a t  p is e a n t?
H
Q67. STOOBP 6 (BLOC) Wiich o f 9 m m  u a  you u sin g  th e  loan  to  buy, 
o r  pay o f f .  PLaaam anmmr  to e  each loan  th a t  you h a w .
Yea
No
1 ASK 06620 10
O on't know/Refused ----  3 076
1 s t Loan 2rri Loan 3rd Loan
Saw c a r  ----------------------------------
Seoorri Hand Car ---------------------
toCcrhDea   --------------------
Holiday ----------------------------------
E le c t r ic a l  Coeds eg . H i-F i — 
C en tra l H eating 
fy«iMa G lazing ■ — ■--
Kitchen o r  Bathrcu a F i G rants 
F u rn itu re  c r  F lo o r Co w r in g  - 
Gaa * * f -w «
O ther tone Improvement! -------
To pay o f f  o t t e r  lnam /detocs
Any o t t e r  purpose! 
Den11 know /refused
<16 ) S 2 > ( 5 8 *
_ i  . . . . . .
t  .
— f, .
-1
Q Q
A q q
A _ A
y y
( 411 ( S 3 < 5 9 >
-  2 --------------------  2 ------------------- 2
066. SHDVCTVTO 6A 1 * 0  do you repay fo r  t i l ls  loan?
44
45
46
63
B uilding S o d acy  -----------------------------------
Finance House c r  H ire Purchase Carpany
C ir O ealer/C arage ----------------------------------
-Sh np /R ata l ler/<~« 1 •mrmn , ■
C red it Card Ccspany ■■ - ■ — ■— — —
Faouly/Friands ---------------------------------------
DapXoyer* •— ■ ■ ■ —, ■ — ■
C tte r  (w rite  in  4 r in g )
3 ASK A 012. 3 ASK4 063. 3 ASK4 069
D cn't taow /refused
5 1
6 CD
76 TO 
9 070 0
5 7
6 CD
76 TO 
9 070 0
5 7
6 CD
7S TO)
9 070 0
XY
069. SrCVQBD 7 (SLOE) To U iich  B ate c r  B u ild ing  S ocie ty  do you repay 
th i s  loan?
Please c a l l  o u t acda.
INTERVIEWER : WRITE QXES IN BOXES eg . ' 6 ' i s  w r itte n :
U& l U a l  i i i L L i i  .U a  1
m
C an 't fcrow cede 99
070 SHXTAKO 7A tow d id  you a c tu a l ly  a rran g e  th i s  loan?
You answered an a d w r t  -----------------------
You answered a c i r c u la r  c r  s e l l - s h o t  
You v is i t e d  th e  lender
(SO)
You arranged i t  a s  pairt c t  th e  s a le
A representstiw visited you -----------
A fcrte e r  arranged the loan  — ——
At the im p /c a r  d e a le r  ---------------------
Other (w rite  in  and r in g )
Den't knew
(S 6 ) 
— 1 - 
-  2 -
— 3 -
— 4 -
— 5 -
— 6 - 
—  7  -
( 62)
071. tow long haw  you had th i s  loan? Is  i t .............. ? READ COT
6 scn th s  c r  Is 
7 - 1 2  ten t hs
(51) 
— 1 - 
— 2 -
(S 7)
Longer — ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------■ 3 -------------- 3 -------------
072. Is  th a t  a personal loan  o r  a J o in t  loan  w ith  a p a rtn e r?
Q73. Did yoj taka  <xit an injurmno* p o licy  to  covmr y o u rse lf  f o r  repaying th is  loan In 
sic*r*as3 c r  vnoxployowtt?
case of
C
7 . . . 7
074. Old ycu provide any s o r t  o f s e c u r i ty  f o r  th i s  loan , such as  your tons?
a __a
to  — -----------------------------------— ---------- --------------------------------------------------- - o --------------o --------------
( 63)  
— 1 
— 2 
3
073. Do yen pay in t e r e s t  on th i s  loan  o r  i s  I t  in t e r e s t - f r e e ?
Pay In te rn e t - 
I n te r e s t  Free
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1ST XXL '< »  '»< JT C V Z S 1
578- **» you Suyinq any srocery cr loan?
flM M  roc L-rlirw m uifinq j a m ,  Sure do m n r  
Jointly hold ajre w  cr k«ra.
(J78a) -Sow aany 1X^ 71 )■< ax* you rapayinq at preeartc?
Sen't know/Ttaduaad 
On* ----------------------
Q77. r* your ra m la your only cr jointly h»ld?
078. did you amnp* your aaaa mrtpap*? «u It
ROO CLT
CTB*. la whim aorta did you Oka out fi» aortrjapa?
gfgjr/ iivota : WRITE DR .“CKIH D» BOOS 
(a.9. .Oraicar • 111
C7S6 . la CMa a tlxad tncaraat cr wartaOLa Infant  rcrapal
079c. ..M you plaaaa tall na f»  atproruaca valua o f  to*
rcrtqaq*, =5 fja naaxaat fouaand pourxla?
079. 3 0 * C1R0 9 (carryI Wiat Typa ed icxt a^ya La It?
11mm raad fa  caraqmaa araluiiy.
Sana only
wxtnin Luc 6 im tfa
7 - 1 2  aontftj apo ----
1 - 2 yaari *90 -------
1 - S yaaxa apo -------
6 - 1 0  yaara apo -----
Cvar 10 yaara apo — 
Son't iQXM/Rafuaad —_124]_1121
Vartaol* 
Ccn't Ire
(T< 1
1 1 SJC
2 Q7«a)2
4 03
5 1136 on
kaoayaanc. vltA protaction 
Raoayoanc. no pi of art an
Owar £100,000— coda CO 
Om't taxx — coda 99 
Rafuaad — coda IXinr
ASK 0801 ca r
R^ aynant, mam amut procaction - 3 IQ!
D rk v e a n t a x tp a p a -----------------------------  *
Ranucn icrti^pa ■■—-■■■ 5 ASX 090
Out t iraarl mrtpapa ----------------------- 0_________
O t f a r  l u n c a  i n  t  n n g j
Oan' t knca>/Radua*d
WO gSXTCOT rPARI SKX O X 3 9 '14171
080. S3CV PRO « IggTNl Wum Lida uaunnca aapany do you pay your 
aroartc or procaction praauuaa to?
ydxvmn  : writs cues in sots *9 . ' 8 ' La «nttai ;
fl.. 1211.
Array Motional 
AUianca 1 Laioaatar
Sraddord t BLnqlay - 
Snatol 4 van 
Bniamla —
Caltam a 6 Cloucaatar 
Caraway
H al l i a r  -------------------------------
COMER
CZINN
SixBurpnoe .'tdaruxaa -
Saticnal 1 Provincial
ru u a n w a d *  AnqLia ------
Jtrsan Hoot ------------
Haalvicn --------------------
Ycrxmur* —. — . -
Ctnar Buildirq Sociacy 
Con • t know ------------------
Bank cf Scotland 
Canadian '-•paru l 
C a m l  
Citibank -----
dydaadala — 
Co-Oparaeiva
CLrooana -----
Lloyda --------
fl HI .—I ■ —.
Aa Kxtpapa Corporation 
Any Irmirtnrm Ctaoarry
ctnar (vnci in 1 nnql
National Waaoainatar
Any Ctnar 0 ar aai Sana 
Ofwar Bank ——— —  
Cm't -row--------------------
183. Rrw yoi Cwroad fa  ’.andLpq fatifjtlcn ycur aaln 
x r .y y  u vxcn. vicmut ao/xr*? nouM, in Ijltc.
T2 TtXXCalS?
Clal. *ava yoi L-Xfaaaaj y* nr* cf cxir -am N-rtraqw 
f. fa  laat 12 acntr.1? TTiac is. wicnouc aovmq
C84. 1* fxa your Cixrt avar aortqap* ’ Yaa, firm 
No. aaaord 
No. fird - 
faurta cr *
3CK‘T 7 2 0* 
Coda n
(13) 
— 1 
— 2
ASX ca ia
C84al..Ho* Lcnq did you l\a>M your prawloua nortpaqa?
184b. Haa tma m your naav only or Jointly hold? 
084C. ‘^vat typa o t aorcpapa « i lt7
laal fan 6 ncnfia 
7 - 1 2  soncna —
I -  2 yoara -------------
3 - 5 yaan ----------
4 - 1 0  yaara ■—— 
Cfar 10 yaars ——
Joint
only
Ctnar I writ* in t nop)
084d. Wu.cn barm, tulldinq aociacy cr ocnar LnatiCutim -u  your prawncua «octoaqa -id)
cmxvnvrR: wtm at cw sxr tssc ttz list ar Btnuec ajcur^is/baajcs;cwh ctrrrr.TTONS rs obi .
StrtL3I3C 
I3 rr 
11L L
TCP C3UJM4 a- 081 ?70
BAT*
io n  axirw cr 08i
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J 1
ASK ALL 18+ (PRIVATE MEDICAL AND PENSION) 
Q85. Have you e v e r  had c o n tr ib u tio n s  paid in t o  any o f  th e se  p e n s io n  
arrangem ents? READ OUT. CAN BE MORE THAN ONE ANSWER. RECORD BELOW
Q8 6 . Are c o n tr ib u t io n s  p r e se n tly  b e in g  made to  any o f  th ese?  
RECORD BELOW
Q85
Ever
C on tribu ted
(20)
P er so n a l P en sion  P lan (PPP) ------------------------------------1.
SERPS (S ta te  Earnings R elated  Pension
Scheme) -------------------------------------    2
N on -C ontribu tory Company Pension Scheme ---------- 3
C o n tr ib u to ry  Company Pension Scheme  --------------  4
Company P en sio n  and A d dition al V oluntary
C o n tr ib u tio n s  (AVC's) --------------------------------------------5.
N o n e -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------6
D on 't know/Re f u s e d ---------------------------------------  ]_
Q86
P r e s e n t ly
C o n tr ib u tin g
(21)
-----------  1 ASK Q8 6 a
GO TO 
Q89
GO
TO
Q89
20
/21
ASK Q8 6 a . OF PERSONAL PENSION PLAN HOLDERS ONLY. 
OTHERS GO TO Q89
Q8 6 a . Did you p e r so n a lly  con tract
o u t  o f  SERPS (S ta te  Earnings Yes  --------
R e la ted  P en sion  Scheme)? No — - — —
HAND RESPONDENT SPARE SHOW CARD 9 
(WHITE)
Q8 7 . SHOW CARD 9 (GREEN) With which 
company do you have your 
P er so n a l P en sion  Plan?
Q87a. SHOW CARD 10 (YELLOW) With whom 
d id  you i n i t i a l l y  arrange th is  
P en sio n  P lan?
OTHER: code and g iv e  d e ta i ls
IF BUILDING SOCIETY (CODE 0 1 ). BANK (0 2 ) .  OR 
ESTATE AGENT (07) ASK :
Which B u ild in g  S o c ie ty /B a n k /E sta te  Agent 
was t h is ?  WRITE IN.
Q8 8 . How lo n g  have you had th is  plan?
Q8 8 a . Did you o p t  o u t o f  a company 
p e n s io n  scheme to  s t a r t  th is  
p lan ?
Q89 . Are you covered  by any type o f
P r iv a te  M edical o r  H ealth Scheme, 
n o t in c lu d in g  h o lid a y  insurance?
'm . I22i
D o n 't know 
Code 99
22
/
23
(2*0 (25)
24 
/
25
(26)
6 months o r  l e s s ---------------1
7 - 1 2  m o n th s   -------------2
Longer ----------------------------------- 3
D on't know /R efused -------- 4
Y e s --------------------------------------------5
N o  ------  — ------------------6
Y e s  ------   7No 8
Don' t  k n o w ----------------------------9
R efused — —   — 0
26
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ASK ATX Ig »  2 S U W C S I
0 9 0 . Which c f  th e  fo l lo w in g  ty p es  o f  in su ran c e  p o l ic y  a r e  you co v e re d  by? READ COT H O  RECORD EIXCW 
ANSWER YES CR M3 iCR EACJ J2
a )  Hone C o n te n ts  in s u r e s  p o s se ss ic n s , a re  y o u rs  co v e re d ?
b) House S t r u c t u r e  in s u re s  th e  b u ild in g  s t r u c t u r e  I t s e l f , i s  y a i r s  co v e re d ?
e j  Mi ■>■■■ i- in s u r a n c e  a p p l ie s  to  p r iv a te  c a r s » .nocortaikes# v a n s  e t c .  A re y o j  c o v e re d ?  Ex c lu d e  cancany  c a r s .
R esponden t C ov ered :
Yes ---------------------------
No
(a )
roc cyg?rrs 
(27)
  1 ----------
  2 ---------
C c n 't  know /R efused
(b)
HDUSE STRUCTURE 
(34)-------- t ------
  2 ----------------- 3 ------
?CW ASK 091 -  <;$ rOR EACT PCIICY CDVS3SP. IT 1CNE k i 'U Z .  03  TO rilT E K  u ti lR ! ' 097 
KAJO RES7CNCE1T SPARE SHDW C?RS 9 (WHITT)
0 9 1 . SOW CARD ? (O^TEN) Which conpany Is  
tn e  P o lic y  w i th  ( D c n 't  tacw  cede 99)
-(29) (29) (35) (36)
(c )
M3TCR INSURANCE 
E x c lu d in g  G arcanv C ars 
(41)  1
  2
-------------------  3
(42) (43)
0 9 2 . SHEW CARD 10 (YTTrfW) How was th i s  
in s u ra n c e  i n i t i a l l y  o b ta in ed ?  _
(30) (31) (37) (38) (44) (45)
CTKER : Cede and  gave  d e t a i l s
r r  s c u d e c  sxzsm ( c t e  on sank (02 i ,
CR ESTATE AGE/T (07) ASX :
Which B u ild in g  S o c ie cy /3 a rX /E s ta te  Agent 
was t h i s ?  V*U— IX
C 92a. What p r o r a t e d  you t o  f i r s t  rak e  c o n ta c t w ith  
them? READ CCT
A l e a f l e t  o r  o f f e r  th rough  th e  s a i l  
An a d v e r t is e m e n t
They w ere  p e r s o n a l ly  rectmoended to  you 
A v i s i t i n g  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e
(32) 
— 1 - 
-  2 •
— 3 ■
— 4 •
— S ■You a c te d  on  y o u r  own i n i t i a t i v e  ----------------------
Sanacrte e l s e  i n  y o u r househo ld  made th e  c o n ta c t  —  6 
O th e r  : ( w r i t e  in  A r in g )
D c n 't  know
C 93. How f r e q u e n t ly  a r e  th e  p re n u s n  p a id  on t h i s  p o l ic y ?  
I s  i t   READ OUT
Weekly ------------------
M onthly -------------------
Y early  ---------------------
O th e r  tim e  p e r io d  - 
D o n 't know /R efused
(39) 
— 1 - 
-  2 -
-  3 ■
— 4 ■
-  S ■
—  6 ■
(46) 
— 1 
-  2
— 3
— 4
— 5
—  6
27
/
47
0 9 4 . Are t h e s e  paym ents p a id  to  an ag en t who c a l l s  
r e g u l a r ly  a t  y o u r  home and e n te rs  th e  paym ents 
i n to  a  prem ium r e c e ip t  bock?
Yes
(33) (40) 
— 1 .
N o -------------------------------------------------------------—------
C94a. Co you y o u r s e l f  pay th e se  prem iuas?
------------  2 ------------------------------  2 -------------------------------------
"Cl
: : o ----------------------------------------------- ---------- .-------------------  j  -------- ---------4 -----------------------
(47) 
-  1 
2
C 95. Hew lo n g  h av e  you had t h i s  type c f  insu rance?
l e s s  th a n  a  y e a r
1 -  5 y e a r s  --------
6 - 1 0  y e a r s  —  
lo n g e r
D o n 't  icnow/Refused
C96. The l a s t  tim e  t h i s  in su ran c e  was renewed Hid you 
change company o r  s ta y  -with the  same one?
Same
.’le v e r renew ed/D on ' t  know
X --------
Y --------
C96a. ■t-i'-f'. ESERAfCE CtZ.7 « h ic .  v e rn c ie s  a re  you in s u re d  f o r  : READ CUT
C ar/V an  — -----—
Moped
—  0 —
— X —
— Y —
M otorb ike--------------------------------------
O th e r ---------------------------------------------
(48) 
—  1 
2
3
4
SKIP TO 
50
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ASK ALL 18 ♦ (PROTECTI ON INSURANCE 1 |
SHOW CARD 11 (YELLOW) This card e x p la in s  two typ es o f  p rotection  p o lic y .  
Premiums are paid  reg u la r ly  in to  e i t h e r ,  but money i s  on ly  paid out in  the  
event o f  death . They are a means o f  insurance ra th er  than a means o f  sa v in g s . 
Mortgage P ro tec tio n  p o l ic ie s  are exclud ed .
Q97- Which o f  th ese  are you covered by, e i t h e r  p erso n a lly  or J o in t ly  w ith  a
spouse o r  partn er?  ___
READ OUT EACH POLICY SAME, WHOLE LIFE TERM
ANSWER YES/NO FOR EACH. POLICY POLICY
(50) (57)
Respondent covered? Yes —— — — — — — — —— —  1 — — —  l
N o  2  2
Don't know/Refused — — —— —  3 —  —  3
ASK 098 -  102 FOR EACH POLICY HELD. IF NONE GO TO FILTER BEFORE Q103
098. How many p o lic ie s  are you covered by?
(51) (58)
One — — — — — — — -----  1 — ——  1
Two —— — — — — --------------------------2 ——-------2
Three or  more — — — — ——-----   3 — —  3
Don't know/Refused —— —- —- — 4 ——----------4
098a. Kow many p o l ic ie s  have you taken out in  the l a s t  year?
None — — — ----------—   — 5 ---------------------5
One — — —— — ----------------------------------6 — ——  6
Two — — — —  ------------  7 -----------------7
Three o r  more — — — — —  8 ----  3
50
/
63
C98b. How long have you had your (main) p o licy?
6 months o r  le s s   -------  —--9 —— ----------------9
7 -  12 months — ------     0 —— ------ 0
Longer — — — — — ——  X —  — — X
Don’ t  know/Refused —— — — —  Y — —  Y
HAND RESPONDENT SPARE SHOW CARD 9 (WHITE)
G99- SHOW CARD 9 (GREEN) With which company i s  your . . . .  p o lic y  held?
Q100. SHOW CARD 10 (YELLOW) How was th is  p o lic y  
i n i t i a l l y  obtained?
OTHER: Code and g iv e  d e t a i l s
(54)(55) (61)(62)
IF BUILDING SOCIETY COl) BANK (02)
ESTATE AGENT (07) ASK :
Which b u ild in g  s o c ie t y ,  bank, or  e s t a t e  
agent was th is?  WRITE IN
QI01. How freq u en tly  are the premiums paid on the 
p o licy ?  READ OUT
Weekly —— — — — —
Monthly --------------------------
Yearly -----------------------
Other -------------------------
Den' t  know/Refused —
Q102. Are the premiums paid to  an insu ran ce agent who 
c a l l s  r eg u la r ly  a t your house and e n te r s  the 
payments in to  a premium r e c e ip t  book?
WHOLE LIFE TERM
POLICY POLICY
(5^ 1 (63)
 1  1
 2  2 3 -----------3
 H-----------q
 5 -----------5
Yes ---------------------------------------------------------- 6 ---------------------6
N o ------------------------------------------------------------------------7 -------------------------7
Ql02a. Do you y o u r se lf  pay *2713se premiums?
Yes
No
8
9
8o
CARD
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ASX ALL AGED 18* (SAVINGS 9 AS ZD POLICIES) ^  2
SHOW CARD 12 (BLUE) This card ex p la in s two types o f  p o licy  for regu lar
savings and two types fo r  lump-sum in vestm en ts.
Q103- Which o f  th e se  do you hold; e ith e r  p e r so n a lly  or jo in t ly  with a
spouse or  partner? READ OUT EACH POLICY NAME. ANSWER YES.NO FOR cACH.
UNIT WITH
LINKED PROFITS INVESTMENT
ENDOWMENT ENDOWMENT ANNUITY TYPE BONDS 
(17) (23) (29)( 11 )
Respondent Covered?
Y e s ---------------------------------1
D on't know/Refused. 3
2  2  2
3 -------------3 ---------------- 3
ASK Q1Q4 -106 FOR EACH POLICY HELD. 
IF NONE AT ALL. GO TO Q109
C1G4. How many p o l i c i e s  do you hold?
One —  ----- --—— —
(12) (IS) (24) (30) 11
-  2
--------- 1
-----------2 : : : : : : :  \ ---------2 /
-  3
l. 4 --------- 1 I /f 34
Cl04a. How many p o l ic ie s  have you taken 
out in  the l a s t  year?
N o n e---------------------5 ------------- 5 ------------5 -------------5
O n e  —- — ------6 ------------ 6 --------------6     6
T w o-----------------------------7 -----------------7 ---------------7 ----------------7
Three o r  m o re ------ 8 ------------- 8 ------------- 8 — ------ 8
QlOUb. How long have you had your 
(main) po licy?
6 months o r le s s  — 9 — 9 —------ 9 -------------9
L o n g e r----------------- X ------------- X ------------X -------------X
Don’ t  know/Refused. Y —  Y ———  Y   — Y
HAND RESPONDENT SPARE SHOW CARD 9 
(WHITE)
G105. SHOW CARD 9 (GREEN)
With which company i s  
th is  p o lic y  held?
Q106. SHOW CARD 10 (YELLOW)
(13) (I*1) (19 )(20) (25) (26) (31H 72)
(15) ( 16 ) (21) (22) (27) (23) (~3)
How was th is  p o l i c y  
o r ig in a l ly  obtained?
IF BUILDING SOCIETY (01) BANK 
(02) ESTATE AGENT (07' ASX : 
Which b u ild in g  s o c ie t y ,  bank, or 
e s ta te  agent was th is?  WRITE IN
ASX Q107 -  108 OF ENDOWMENT 
POLICIES ONLY
G107. How freq u e n tly  are the
premiums paid  on the p o licy?  UNIT WITH-
LINKED PROFIT
ENDOWMENT ENDOWMENT
(35)
Weekly         1 ■
Monthly — —  ----------—    2 •
Yearly —------------------— —    3 .
Don't k n o w /R efu sed   -------5 ■
Ql07a. Do you y o u r s e lf  pay *-hese 
premiums? s274-
(36) 
-  1 
-  2
-  3-  4
~ 5
Y e s .......................... - .............................................6 ....................
1C
35
/
36
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LQlOfl. A re th e s e  p re e iu a s  p a id  to  an in su ran c e  a s e n t 
who c a l l s  r e g u la r ly  ac your house and e n te r s  
th e  paym ents in to  a p re a iu a  re c e ip t  book?
ASX ALL
Q109- A re you p e r s o n a l ly  a  p r iv a te  aeeb er o f  any o f  
th e  fo l lo w in g  ao c o rin g  o rg a n isa tio n ?
READ OUT
Q 1 0 9 a .SH0W CARDS 13 (BLUE) Which one o f  th e se  b e s t  a p p l ie s  to  you? 
RE RECORD ONTO PERSONAL DETAILS
Yes
No -
UNIT LINKED 
ENDOWMENT 
(37) 1----
WITH PROFITS 
ENDOWMENT
(351
 1
 2
A A ----------------------------
RAC--------------------------
N a tio n a l Breakdown
O t h e r ----------------------
None — — — — — —
D o n 't know
(39)
 1
 2 3 n
 5
 6
(**0) — I
2 ASX
3 0110
E ap lo y ee  w orking  f u l l  tim e (over 30 hours p e r  week) *
E ap lo y ee  w orking  p a r t  t i a e  (8*29 hours p e r  week) - - - - -  ^
S e lf -E a p lo y e d  -   4 GO TO NOTE ABOVE 0115
S t i l l  a t  S c h o o l_______       =------------------------------------- *
In  f u l l - t i a e  e d u c a tio n  (eg . U n iv e rs ity . T e a c h e r-T ra in in g  o r  P o ly te c h n ic )  6 ASX
U neap loyed /N o t W orking/Not in  f u l l  t i a e  e d u c a t io n ------------------------------------------------- g
O t h e r --------------- ------------------------------------- — ———  — -  ■ ■
QUO. Would you d e s c r ib e  y o u rs e lf  as w orking in  a  c o n e e rc ia l  o rg a n is a t io n  o r  n o t .  
By t h i s  I  would in c lu d e  a o s t types o f  b u s in ess  b u t would ex c lu d e  a l l  
g o v e m a e n t b o d ie s  -  f o r  exaap le te a c h in g , c i v i l  s e r v ic e ,  a rn ed  fo r c e s ,  
p u b l i c  s e r v ic e s  e t c .
Y e s -----------
N o -------------
D o n 't know
QllOa.How o f t e n  a r e  you p a id  your 
w ages o r  s a la ry ?
Q l l l .  How i s  th e  aoney p a id  to  you?
D a ily  ----------
Weekly --------
F o r tn ig h t ly
Four-W eekly
M onthly ------
O th er
1*1) I
 2
 3 (I
 5
 6
S e lf -E a p lo y e d  -----   7
C a s h --------
Cheque —
(42) 
— 1 
 2
Q112. Which o f  th e se  b e s t  a p p lie s  to 
you? READ OUT: Are you?
D ire c t t r a n s f e r  to  bank acco u n t/b an k  G iro  c u r r e n t  ac co u n t — - — 3 
D ire c t t r a n s f e r  to  bank acco u n t/b an k  G iro  s a v in g s  a c co u n t —  4 
D ire c t t r a n s f e r  to  b u i ld in g  s o c i e t y  — ----------------  —  5
Refused — — ------    — ----------- — . . . --------------  — ---------7
(43)
M a r r i e d -------------------------1 ASX Q113
S in g le  -------------------------  2
D iv o rc e d /S e p a ra te d  — 3 ASX Q114 
W idow ed---------- — ---------- 4
Q113. Which one o f  th e s e  b e s t a p p lie s  to  you and you r husband /w ife?  
READ OUT AND RECORD BELOW. 00 TO NEXT SECTION.
Q 114. Which one o f  th e s e  b e s t a p p lie s  to  you p e rs o n a l ly ?
READ OUT AND RECORD BELOW. GO TO NEXT SECTION.
Pay incoae  ta x  ac b a s ic  r a t e  —  
Pay ln co ee  ta x  ac a h ig h e r  r a t e
Do n o t pay in co ee  ta x  — -------------
Re fused /D on ' t  k n o w ---------------------
(44) 
— 1 
—  2
-  3
— 4
39
ASX ALL WITHOUT A 'PHONE IN HOUSEHOLD -  OTHERS 00 TO NEXT SECTION
Q115. I n  th e  n e a r  f u tu r e ,  we w i l l  be conduc ting  a  su rv ey  abou t sp en d in g , s a v in g  and p a y a e n ts  
c a r e f u l l y  chosen  sa a p le  o f  a d u lts  th ro u g h o u t B r i t a in .
P e o p le  w i l l  be asked to  keep a d ia ry  fo r  one eo n th  to  re c o rd  any p a y e e n ts  th e y  sa k e  o f  £5 o r  s o r e .  
A l l  th o s e  who r e tu r n  a coapleced  d ia ry  w i l l  be e n te re d  in  a  draw, w ith  a f i r s t  p r iz e  o f  £1000, 
a  seco n d  p r iz e  o f  £500 and f i f t y  th i r d  p r iz e s  o f  £10
IF  NECESSARY. EXPLAIN: A ll the in fo rn a t lo n  g iv en  w i l l  be t r e a te d  in  s t r i c t  c o n f id e n c e  and y o u r
answ ers  w i l l  be p u t to g e th e r  w ith  th o se  f ro e  a l l  th e  o th e r  peop le  who r e p l y ,  to  g iv e  an o v e r a l l  
P i c t u r e .  Would you be prepared  to  keep a re c o rd  fo r  us o f  your s p en d in g  o v e r  a  one ao n th  p e r io d ?
(45 )
--------------------------------------------------------  I READ OUT STATEMENT BELOWYes
No - 2 GO TO NEXT SECTION
*You w i l l  p ro b a b ly  r e c e iv e  your d ia ry  by p o s t w ith in  th e  n e x t few w eeks. We w i l l  in c lu d e  d e t a i l e d  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  on how to  f i l l  in  and re tu rn  th e  d ia ry " .
\
4(
/
41
42
43
ASK ALL (W ill in g  to  be re  in te rv ie w ed ) .
C a r r i e d  cwfc w u /  C . i f c c /  N C ?
Q l. Would you be w i l l in g  to  tak e  p a r t  in  f u tu re  s u rv e y s /c o n c e rn in g  th e  to p i c s  and answ ers i n  t h i s  
q u e s t i o n n a i r e  o r  on ocher n a t te r s  e i t h e r  by phone o r  i n  person?
(4 6 )
_ _ _  Yes -  b o t h / e i t h e r -------------------------------------------------------------  1
Z / J  Yes - p h o n e  ----   ___------------- 2 46
Yes - p e r s o n a l -------------- — — -----------------------------------------3
N o/D on't know u
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APPENDIX G
The Mortgage Prepayment Model Variables
Postal Codes By Region Length of Tenure Age of head of Household
Greater London 0-1 18-20
NW 2-4 21-25
NE 5-8 26-30
SE 9-13 31-37
SW 14-20 38-45
South West > 20 46-55
South East > 55
Midlands 
North East 
North West 
Wales 
Scotland
No. of children Education Marital Status
<2
3-4
> 4
O levels 
A levels 
1st degree 
Graduate School
Married
Single
Divorced/Separated
Widowed
Household income
< 8,000
8.000-9,999
10.000-14,999
15.000-19,999
20.000-29,999
30.000-39,999
40.000-49,999
50.000-59,999
60.000-69,999
70.000-79,999
80.000-89,999 
>90,000
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APPENDIX H
Simulation started on 11/14/92 at 16:33:29 
Simulation stopped on 11/14/92 at 17:20:47
Forecast: Avg. Life of Mortgage Pool Cell: H24
Summary:
Display Range is from 0.00 to 25.00 Years
Entire Range is from 0.16 to 23.43 Years
After 10,000 Trials, the Std. Error of the Mean is 0.03
sties: Disolav Ranae Entire Range
Trials 10000 10000
Mean 9.58 9.58
Median 9.35 9.35
Mode 7.96 7.96
Standard Deviation 3.17 3.17
Variance 10.04 10.04
Skewness 0.48 0.48
Kurtosis 3.42 3.42
Coeff. of Variability 0.33 0.33
Range Minimum 0.00 0.16
Range Maximum 25.00 23.43
Range Width 25.00 23.27
Mean Std. Error 0.03 0.03
Cell H24
Forecast: Avg. Life of Mortgage Pool 
Frequency Chart 10,000 Trials Shown
.04 i I- 360
.03 - 270
- 180.O  .02-- a
XIo
.01 - -L.0. - 90
.00
0.00 6.25 12.50 18.75 25.00
-n
CD.aCns
3
Years
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Forecast: Avg. Life of Mortgage Pool (cont'd)
Percentiles for Entire Range (Years):
Percentile
0%
5%
25%
50%
75%
95%
100%
Frequency Counts for Entire Range (Years): 
Frequency:
Cell: H24
Avg. Life of Mortgage Pool
0.16 
4.84
7.35
9.35 
11.49 
15.21 
23.43
Grouo Startyoiue End Value Prot>, Freg.
-Infinity 0.00 0.000000 0
1 0.00 0.25 0.000100 1
2 0.25 0.50 0.000100 1
3 0.50 0.75 0.000200 2
4 0.75 1.00 0.000100 1
5 1.00 1.25 0.000300 3
6 1.25 1.50 0.000100 1
7 1.50 1.75 0.000900 9
8 1.75 2.00 0.000800 8
9 2.00 2.25 0.000700 7
10 2.25 2.50 0.001100 11
11 2.50 2.75 0.001300 13
12 2.75 3.00 0.001300 13
13 3.00 3.25 0.002600 26
14 3.25 3.50 0.004000 40
15 3.50 3.75 0.004500 45
16 3.75 4.00 0.004300 43
17 4.00 4.25 0.007200 72
18 4.25 4.50 0.008300 83
19 4.50 4.75 0.007900 79
20 4.75 5.00 0.010600 106
21 5.00 5.25 0.011300 113
22 5.25 5.50 0.014400 144
23 5.50 5.75 0.017200 172
24 5.75 6.00 0.018800 188
25 6.00 6.25 0.021200 212
26 6.25 6.50 0.024600 246
27 6.50 6.75 0.023300 233
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Forecast: Avg. Life of Mortgage Pool (confd) Cell: H24
Grouo Start Value End Value Prot>, Freq.
28 6.75 7.00 0.025900 259
29 7.00 7.25 0.027400 274
30 7.25 7.50 0.025400 254
31 7.50 7.75 0.027900 279
32 7.75 8.00 0.036000 360
33 8.00 8.25 0.029300 293
34 8.25 8.50 0.033400 334
35 8.50 8.75 0.030800 308
36 8.75 9.00 0.035200 352
37 9.00 9.25 0.028700 287
38 9.25 9.50 0.033300 333
39 9.50 9.75 0.030800 308
40 9.75 10.00 0.033500 335
41 10.00 10.25 0.030800 308
42 10.25 10.50 0.031300 313
43 10.50 10.75 0.027800 278
44 10.75 11.00 0.026700 267
45 11.00 11.25 0.026700 267
46 11.25 11.50 0.022400 224
47 11.50 11.75 0.021500 215
48 11.75 12.00 0.017900 179
49 12.00 12.25 0.021300 213
50 12.25 12.50 0.018900 189
51 12.50 12.75 0.015900 159
52 12.75 13.00 0.013700 137
53 13.00 13.25 0.015100 151
54 13.25 13.50 0.012800 128
55 13.50 13.75 0.013800 138
56 13.75 14.00 0.010400 104
57 14.00 14.25 0.009400 94
58 14.25 14.50 0.008200 82
59 14.50 14.75 0.008300 83
60 14.75 15.00 0.007100 71
61 15.00 15.25 0.006600 66
62 15.25 15.50 0.006200 62
63 15.50 15.75 0.006000 60
64 15.75 16.00 0.003700 37
65 16.00 16.25 0.003300 33
66 16.25 16.50 0.004000 40
67 16.50 16.75 0.003600 36
68 16.75 17.00 0.002600 26
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Forecast: Avg. Life of Mortgage Pool (cont'd) Cell: H24
Group Start Value End Value Prob. Freq,
69 17.00 17.25 0.002300 23
70 17.25 17.50 0.002000 20
71 17.50 17.75 0.001100 11
72 17.75 18.00 0.002600 26
73 18.00 18.25 0.000800 8
74 18.25 18.50 0.001700 17
75 18.50 18.75 0.001000 10
76 18.75 19.00 0.001200 12
77 19.00 19.25 0.001200 12
78 19.25 19.50 0.000400 4
79 19.50 19.75 0.000400 4
80 19.75 20.00 0.000900 9
81 20.00 20.25 0.000800 8
82 20.25 20.50 0.000300 3
83 20.50 20.75 0.000500 5
84 20.75 21.00 0.000600 6
85 21.00 21.25 0.000100 1
86 21.25 21.50 0.000400 4
87 21.50 21.75 0.000200 2
88 21.75 22.00 0.000100 1
89 22.00 22.25 0.000100 1
90 22.25 22.50 0.000200 2
91 22.50 22.75 0.000000 0
92 22.75 23.00 0.000100 1
93 23.00 23.25 0.000000 0
94 23.25 23.50 0.000200 2
95 23.50 23.75 0.000000 0
96 23.75 24.00 0.000000 0
97 24.00 24.25 0.000000 0
98 24.25 24.50 0.000000 0
99 24.50 24.75 0.000000 0
100 24.75 25.00 0.000000 0
25.00 +lnfinity 0.000000
1.000000
0
10000
Cumulative:
Grouo Start Value End Value Prob, Freq.
-Infinity 0.00 0.000000 0
1 0.00 0.25 0.000100 l
2 0.25 0.50 0.000200 2
3 0.50 0.75 0.000400 4
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Forecast: Avg. Life of Mortgage Pool (cont'd) Cell: H24
GrouD Start Value End vgiye Prot>, Freq,
4 0.75 1.00 0.000500 5
5 1.00 1.25 0.000800 8
6 1.25 1.50 0.000900 9
7 1.50 1.75 0.001800 18
8 1.75 2.00 0.002600 26
9 2.00 2.25 0.003300 33
10 2.25 2.50 0.004400 44
11 2.50 2.75 0.005700 57
12 2.75 3.00 0.007000 70
13 3.00 3.25 0.009600 96
14 3.25 3.50 0.013600 136
15 3.50 3.75 0.018100 181
16 3.75 4.00 0.022400 224
17 4.00 4.25 0.029600 296
18 4.25 4.50 0.037900 379
19 4.50 4.75 0.045800 458
20 4.75 5.00 0.056400 564
21 5.00 5.25 0.067700 677
22 5.25 5.50 0.082100 821
23 5.50 5.75 0.099300 993
24 5.75 6.00 0.118100 1181
25 6.00 6.25 0.139300 1393
26 6.25 6.50 0.163900 1639
27 6.50 6.75 0.187200 1872
28 6.75 7.00 0.213100 2131
29 7.00 7.25 0.240500 2405
30 7.25 7.50 0.265900 2659
31 7.50 7.75 0.293800 2938
32 7.75 - 8.00 0.329800 3298
33 8.00 8.25 0.359100 3591
34 8.25 8.50 0.392500 3925
35 8.50 8.75 0.423300 4233
36 8.75 9.00 0.458500 4585
37 9.00 9.25 0.487200 4872
38 9.25 9.50 0.520500 5205
39 9.50 9.75 0.551300 5513
40 9.75 10.00 0.584800 5848
41 10.00 10.25 0.615600 6156
42 10.25 10.50 0.646900 6469
43 10.50 10.75 0.674700 6747
44 10.75 11.00 0.701400 7014
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Forecast: Avg. Life of Mortgage Pool (cont'd)
Grouo Start Value End Value
45 11.00 11.25
46 11.25 11.50
47 11.50 11.75
48 11.75 12.00
49 12.00 12.25
50 12.25 12.50
51 12.50 12.75
52 12.75 13.00
53 13.00 13.25
54 13.25 13.50
55 13.50 13.75
56 13.75 14.00
57 14.00 14.25
58 14.25 14.50
59 14.50 14.75
60 14.75 15.00
61 15.00 15.25
62 15.25 15.50
63 15.50 15.75
64 15.75 16.00
65 16.00 16.25
66 16.25 16.50
67 16.50 16.75
68 16.75 17.00
69 17.00 17.25
70 17.25 17.50
71 17.50 17.75
72 17.75 18.00
73 18.00 18.25
74 18.25 18.50
75 18.50 18.75
76 18.75 19.00
77 19.00 19.25
78 19.25 19.50
79 19.50 19.75
80 19.75 20.00
81 20.00 20.25
82 20.25 20.50
83 20.50 20.75
84 20.75 21.00
85 21.00 21.25
Cell:: H24
Prob. Freq,
0.728100 7281
0.750500 7505
0.772000 7720
0.789900 7899
0.811200 8112
0.830100 8301
0.846000 8460
0.859700 8597
0.874800 8748
0.887600 8876
0.901400 9014
0.911800 9118
0.921200 9212
0.929400 9294
0.937700 9377
0.944800 9448
0.951400 9514
0.957600 9576
0.963600 9636
0.967300 9673
0.970600 9706
0.974600 9746
0.978200 9782
0.980800 9808
0.983100 9831
0.985100 9851
0.986200 9862
0.988800 9888
0.989600 9896
0.991300 9913
0.992300 9923
0.993500 9935
0.994700 9947
0.995100 9951
0.995500 9955
0.996400 9964
0.997200 9972
0.997500 9975
0.998000 9980
0.998600 9986
0.998700 9987
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Forecast: Avg. Life of Mortgage Pool (cont'd) Cell: H24
Grouo Start Value End Value Prot>, Freq,
86 21.25 21.50 0.999100 9991
87 21.50 21.75 0.999300 9993
88 21.75 22.00 0.999400 9994
89 22.00 22.25 0.999500 9995
90 22.25 22.50 0.999700 9997
91 22.50 22.75 0.999700 9997
92 22.75 23.00 0.999800 9998
93 23.00 23.25 0.999800 9998
94 23.25 23.50 1.000000 10000
95 23.50 23.75 1.000000 10000
96 23.75 24.00 1.000000 10000
97 24.00 24.25 1.000000 10000
98 24.25 24.50 1.000000 10000
99 24.50 24.75 1.000000 10000
100 24.75 25.00 1.000000 10000
25.00 +lnfinity 1.000000 10000
End of Forecast
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Assumptions
Assumption: Estimate Cell: C5
Lognormal distribution with parameters: 
Mean 12.99
Standard Dev. 2.94
Selected range is from 0.00 to 25.00 
Mean value in simulation was 0.00
6.48 11.05 15.63 20.20 24.77
Assumption: Greater London Cell: C7
Normal distribution with parameters: 
Mean -3.06
Standard Dev. 1.10
Selected range is from -Infinity to +lnfinity 
Mean value in simulation was -0.00
G—a tar London
4.36 -4.71 -3.06 1.41 0.24
Assumption: Southwest
Normal distribution with parameters: 
Mean -2.65
Standard Dev. 0.95
Selected range is from -Infinity to ^Infinity 
Mean value in simulation was -0.00
Cell: C8
South We*
-550 -4.07 2.65 122  020
Assumption: South East
Normal distribution with parameters: 
Mean -2.96
Standard Dev. 1.03
Selected range is from -Infinity to +lnfinity 
Mean value in simulation was -0.00
Cell: C9
South Earf
6.05 -451 2.96 -1.41 0.13
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Assumption: Midlands
Normal distribution with parameters:
Mean -2.04
Standard Dev. 1.00
Selected range is from -Infinity to +lnfinity 
Mean value in simulation was -0.00
Cell: CIO
Mkflands
-5.04 -3S4 -2.04 -0-54 036
Assumption: North East Cell: Cl I
Normal distribution with parameters:
Mean -1.86
Standard Dev. 1.50
Selected range is from -Infinity to +lnfinity 
Mean value in simulation was -0.00
Assumption: Northwest Cell: C l2
Normal distribution with parameters: 
Mean -1.17
Standard Dev. 1.20
Selected range is from -Infinity to +lnfinity 
Mean value in simulation was -0.00
Assumption: Wales Cell: C l3
Normal distribution with parameters:
Mean -1.04
Standard Dev. 1.48
Selected range is from -Infinity to +lnfinity 
Mean value in simulation was -0.00
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Assumption: Scotland
Normal distribution with parameters:
Mean -2.48
Standard Dev. 0.98
Selected range is from -Infinity to +lnfinity 
Mean value in simulation was -0.00
Cell: C14
Scotland
-S.42 - 3 *  -2-4* -1.01 0.46
Assumption: Age 30-30
Normal distribution with parameters: 
Mean -2.13
Standard Dev. 0.21
Selected range is from -Infinity to +lnfinity 
Mean value in simulation was -0.00
Assumption: Age 40-49
Normal distribution with parameters: 
Mean -2.11
Standard Dev. 0.21
Selected range is from -Infinity to +lnfinity 
Mean value in simulation was -0.00
Cell: C l7
Ag« 30-30
-2.77 -2.45 -2.13 -121 1.49
Cell: C l8
A©«4<M9
Assumption: Age 50-59
Normal distribution with parameters: 
Mean 0.23
Standard Dev. 0.02
Selected range is from -Infinity to +lnfinity 
Mean value in simulation was -0.00
Cell: C l9
Ag# 60-59
0.16 0.20 023 026 030
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Assumption: Age >59
Normal distribution with parameters: 
Mean 2.37
Standard Dev. 0.24
Selected range is from -Infinity to +lnfinity 
Mean value in simulation was -0.00
Cell: C20
Age >59
1.66 2.02 237  2.72 3.06
Assumption: C Married
Normal distribution with parameters:
Mean -0.68
Standard Dev. 2.17
Selected range is from -Infinity to +lnfinity 
Mean value in simulation was -0.00
Cell: C22
C22
End of Assumptions
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